A comparative study of Jewish and Christian responses to the Holocaust. by Wollaston, Isabel Louise
Durham E-Theses
A comparative study of Jewish and Christian
responses to the Holocaust.
Wollaston, Isabel Louise
How to cite:
Wollaston, Isabel Louise (1989) A comparative study of Jewish and Christian responses to the Holocaust.
Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1015/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO
THE HOLOCAUST. 
ISABEL LOUISE WOLLASTON.
FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD.
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM.
DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY.
1989.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.
I 2 AUG 19B0
Isabel Louise Wollaston, A Comparative Study of Jewish and
Christian Responses to the Holocaust, PhD., 1989. 
As religions of redemption, Judaism and Christianity are
predicated upon the belief that God acts in history, and
that humanity is created in the divine image. These two
beliefs combine in the concept of a covenant between God
and humanity. The covenant can be understood as a
dialectic of promise and counter-testimony: the promised
redemption is rooted in a historical event and will be
realised in history. Thus, history can either bear witness
to the covenant, or serve as counter-testimony. As the
"paradigm evil event", the Holocaust (the murder of six
million Jews by the Nazis) stands as radical counter-
testimony to the redemptive claims of both Judaism and
Christianity.
In Judaism, there are three broad responses to the
counter-testimony of the Holocaust. First: the rejection
of the covenantal framework (Richard Rubenstein). Second:
the denial of the theological uniqueness of the Holocaust
(Eliezer Berkovits). Third: the reformulation of the
covenant (Emil Fackenheim). In each case, the dialectic
between promise and counter-testimony is resolved: the
former is preserved at the expense of the latter, or vice
versa. The tension between the two is maintained, not in a
formal theology, but in the novels and essays of the
Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel.
Christian responses to the Holocaust are judged both
by the extent to which they maintain the dialectic of
promise and counter-testimony, and by their appreciation
of the Church's history of anti-Judaism It is ironic that
the Christian response most analogous to that of Wiesel
does not directly address the Holocaust. It is argued that
the work of Stewart Sutherland is more analogous to that
of Wiesel, than that of theologians engaged directly in
formulating a Christian response to the Holocaust
is
(Rosemary Radford Ruether, Jurgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist
Metz).
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PART I. THE COVENANT AND THE COUNTER-TESTIMONY OF HISTORY: 
JEWISH THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST. 
INTRODUCTION: 
Theological responses to the Holocaust emerge as part of a
dialectic between covenantal affirmation (symbolised by
the Exodus) and the counter-testimony of history. However
radical the conclusions, the reformulation of covenantal
thinking in the light of the Holocaust constitutes a
deeply traditional response. Thus, Jewish religious
responses to the Holocaust are rooted within an awareness
of the dialectical relationship between promise and
counter-testimony.
Covenantal faith centres upon the Exodus, an event
that incorporates three essential truth-claims: God is,
by definition, a God who cares; human life is of infinite
value; and the conviction that both of these claims will
be vindicated in the messianic future. The Exodus serves
as both norm and model. It is normative because these
three truth-claims form the core of all subsequent
reinterpretations of the covenant. The Exodus serves as a
model: there is a clear recognition of the gulf between
the covenantal promise of Sinai and reality. The Exodus
provides a blueprint for the future: the Messianic Age
will be the Exodus "writ large".1
By viewing the Exodus as both norm and model, Judaism
comes to define itself in terms of testimony. The Jews, as
the Chosen People, bear witness to the promise of the
future on the basis of the Exodus as an historical
reality. As a consequence of this self-definition,
historical events are seen as testifying for or against
the covenantal promise: history is the sphere in which
redemption will occur. Historical events are, in effect,
the "barometers of God's disposition toward His people".2
The credibility of the Jews' testimony fluctuates in the
light of their historical circumstances: prosperity
appears to confirm their claim to be the Chosen People,
whereas disaster undermines the credibility of this claim.
Disaster also serves to undermine the Jews' willingness to
give such testimony.
-
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Thus, Judaism constitutes a "wager of faith" 3 : the
Jews continue to testify to the covenantal promise
(symbolised by the Exodus) in spite of the inherent risk
that the cumulative counter-testimony of history will
finally prove too great. Thus, each successive historical
disaster poses a critical challenge to the credibility of
the Jewish faith. Major events, such as the destruction of
the Second Temple (70 C.E.), and the Expulsion from Spain
(1492), resulted in reformulations of the covenant:
religious thought adapted in order to maintain its
credibility in the face of historical disaster. The
Orthodox rabbi, Irving Greenberg suggests that there are
three recurrent responses to catastrophe. 4 The first is to
deny the theological significance of post-Exodus history:
the covenant is held to be immune from the counter-
testimony of history ( a response that is current in most
Orthodox circles). A variant of this response is to
acknowledge the significance of disaster, but to assert
that it is only transitory: a corresponding redemptive act
is imminent. 5
 The second response is to reinterpret the
covenant in the light of historical counter-testimony. The
third and final response is to concede that belief is no
longer credible in the face of the counter-testimony of
history. Each of these responses can be illustrated by
reference to Jewish history.
Greenberg suggests that Jewish history forms three
"great cycles": the Biblical, the Rabbinic, and the post-
Holocaust. The Biblical 'cycle' provides the 'raw
material' for the reinterpretation of the covenant in the
light of historical counter-testimony. Alan Berger
suggests that this structure be developed to incorporate
Lurianic Kabbalah and Hasidism: both movements gave rise
to significant developments in covenantal thinking.6
Although Rabbinic theology undoubtedly constitutes the
major stage in the reinterpretation of the covenant,
Berger is correct in noting the significance of Lurianic
Kabbalah and Hasidism. It is therefore suggested that that
there are five key stages in the development of covenantal
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thinking: the Biblical; the Rabbinic; Lurianic Kabbalah;
Hasidism, and post-Holocaust religious thought.
In adopting this schema, it is necessary to register
two caveats. First, the effect of historical counter-
testimony upon covenantal thinking only becomes evident
with the benefit of hindsight. It has yet to become
apparent which, if any, of the responses to be considered
will become normative for Jewish faith after the
Holocaust. Second, the reinterpretation of covenantal
thinking is only one of Greenberg's three suggested
responses to disaster. The dominant response has always
been to deny the theological significance of post-Exodus
history. Movements that have since become normative (such
as Rabbinic theology or Lurianic Kabbalah) began as
minority groups in the face of conservative opposition.
The emphasis on post-Holocaust reinterpretations of the
covenant cannot be said to reflect the concerns of
mainstream Orthodox Judaism.
The first part of this thesis seeks to contextualise
religious responses to the Holocaust within the dialectic
of covenantal promise and historical counter-testimony.
The first chapter offers a brief review of the
developments in covenantal thinking in biblical and
rabbinic theology, Lurianic Kabbalah, and Hasidism; and
concludes by considering a number of the more conservative
responses to the Holocaust. The remaining three chapters
analyse the responses of Richard Rubenstein, Eliezer
Berkovits, and Emil Fackenheim. These three thinkers
loosely represent Greenberg's spectrum of responses to
disaster: Rubenstein argues that the covenant is no longer
credible in the face of the overwhelming counter-testimony
of the Holocaust; Berkovits asserts that the event offers
no new theological challenge; and Fackenheim strives to
reinterpret covenantal thinking in the light of the
Holocaust.
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1. THE "WAGER OF FAITH": COVENANT AND CRISIS. 
1. 1. INTRODUCTION.
1. 2. BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.
1. 3. RABBINIC THEOLOGY.
1. 4. LURIANIC KABBALAH.
1. 5. HASIDISM,
1. 6. ORTHODOX RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST.
1.1. INTRODUCTION. 
The Exodus is both the normative event and model for the
Jewish faith; the memory of which has enabled Judaism to
survive in spite of the counter-testimony of history.
Recognition of the gulf between promise and reality is an
integral part of the Jewish faith and has its roots in the
Exodus: the gift of the Law is juxtaposed with the account
of the creation of the Golden Calf. The biblical narrative
is notable for its critical portrayal of those involved:
the Exodus is not an idealised memory. The tension between
promise and reality, integral to the Exodus itself,
increases with every subsequent historical disaster. The
cumulative weight of history's counter-testimony threatens
to overwhelm covenantal affirmation. The trauma of
historical disaster generates fundamental revisions of
covenantal faith. Thus, the four major reinterpretations
of the covenant arise under the pressure of historical
counter-testimony. Rabbinic theology emerged in the
aftermath of the destruction of the Second Temple (70
C.E.) and the failure of the Bar Kochba revolt (135 C.E.).
Lurianic Kabbalah reflects the trauma generated by the
Expulsion from Spain (1492). Hasidism emerges out of the
disillusionment generated by the conversion to Islam of
the supposed Messiah, Shabbetai Zvi (1666); and the
succession of pogroms in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries in Eastern Europe. Last, there is the counter-
testimony of the Holocaust. Each catastrophe challenges
the credibility of covenantal faith. The 'wager of faith'
concludes that belief in the covenant remains credible,
despite such overwhelming counter-testimony.
The biblical accounts constitute the 'raw material'
for later theological interpretation of the covenant.
Rabbinic theology marked the key stage in development and
modification of the covenant. Subsequent interpretations
built upon this Rabbinic foundation. The key concepts in
the elaboration of covenantal thinking concern divine
power, divine immanence, the level of divine-human
responsibility, and the understanding of evil.
1. 2. BIBLICAL THEOLOGY. 
The message of redemption that is central to the
Jewish tradition grew out of and is validated by an
event in Jewish history: the Exodus, thq freeing of
the Hebrew slaves from bondage in Egypt.'
Despite the existence of two earlier covenants--with Noah
and Abraham--the Exodus marks the most developed stage in
the understanding of the relationship between God and
humanity. The covenant governs the biblical understanding
of divine power and immanence, and inspires the
traditional Jewish theodicy--suffering is interpreted as
punishment for sin.
The biblical account is built around three successive
covenants, with Noah, Abraham, and Moses. Each marks a
growth of maturity in the divine-human relationship. In
the earliest of the three covenants, God is totally
dominant: He addresses His subjects as the transcendent
Creator. Noah obeys, but never speaks. The covenant is
established in the aftermath of the Flood, as a symbol of
God's promise:
never again shall all flesh be cut off by the waters
of a flood, and never again shall there be a flood
to destroy the earth. (Gen.9:11 1
 RSV).
The second covenant marks a development: Abraham both
speaks to God and disputes some of His decisions; an
obvious case in point being the destruction of Sodom and
Gomorrah (Gen. 18:20-33). The transformation of the
biblical divine-human relationship is completed on Mount
Sinai, with the establishment of the Mosaic covenant.
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The Sinai covenant reveals both that God cares for
His people, and that He considers them to be of infinite
value. The very notion of covenant is an evaluation of
worth: one only enters into a covenant with a partner
capable of responding to this initiative; the concept
necessarily entails a degree of equality:
One does not enter into a partnership with someone
whose moral discourse is incomprehensible. The
notion of partnership entpils dialogue, mutual
respect, and shared purpose.'
God is not totally transcendent: He is accessible to His
people. Indeed, this accessibility is an integral part of
the covenant. Torah provides the moral basis that enables
the Jews qua Chosen People to contend with God: the
covenant is binding upon both partners. God is obliged to
protect His people; whereas the Jews are to keep the Law
and bear witness to the divine presence in history (Ex.
19:3-6; 32:11-4). In the biblical account, God is clearly
the dominant partner, initiating the covenant and
punishing the Israelites for failing to fulfil their
responsibilities (Ezek. 20:33-8). However, there are also
occasions when individuals dispute with God--the obvious
illustration being the book of Job.
God's dominant role in the covenant informs the
biblical conception of divine power and immanence. God is
both Creator and Lord of History. He calls the Jews out of
Egypt and leads them into the land of Canaan. God leads
the Jews in the Wilderness quite literally, as a pillar of
smoke by day and a pillar of fire by night (Ex. 13:21-2).
Israel's history reflects both divine power and divine
immanence. God's power is employed, either ensuring
Israel's success, if she is faithful, or bringing about
her defeat, if she strays from the covenant (Deut. 27-8).
This direct intervention in human affairs is paralleled by
direct communication of the divine will via the prophet.
The presence of God was also immediate; first, in the
tabernacle; then, in the Ark of the Covenant; and finally,
in the Holy of Holies in the Jerusalem Temple. The cultic
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system and the prophet are the logical counter-parts to a
God who intervenes in history on behalf of His people.
It is, however, significant that even in the biblical
accounts, there is an awareness of divine dependency upon
humanity: God is known only insofar as He has revealed
Himself in His dealings with the Jews. He is "the God of
Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob" (Ex. 3:16), who is
primarily known through His covenant with Israel. It is of
primary significance that God introduces Himself by
reference to the covenantal relationship:
I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the
land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. (Ex.
20:2)
Without the Jews' testimony to God's actions on their
behalf, He would remain unknown or inaccessible. Thus, the
Jewish historian, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi emphasises the
central role of memory in the covenantal relationship:
"memory has become crucial to ... faith, and ultimate to
its very existence.". 3 The centrality of memory to the
covenant is illustrated by the numerous injunctions to
remember, and parallel warnings against forgetfulness
(Deut. 32:7; Isa. 44:21; Micah 6 5; Deut. 6:10-2, 8:11-8).
The cult centred on re-enacting past history; rehearsing
God's acts on behalf of His Chosen People. The biblical
text incorporates a number of poetic fragments which would
have originated in this cultic act of remembrance; the
connection between memory and the cult is made explicit in
the ceremony of First Fruits:
A wandering Aramean was my father; and he went down
into Egypt and sojourned there, few in number; and
there he became a nation, great, mighty and
populous. And the Egyptians treated us harshly, and
afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. Then we
cried to the LORD the God of our fathers, and the
LORD heard our voice, and saw our affliction, our
toil, and our oppression; and the LORD brought us
out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched
arm, with great terror, with signs and wonders; and
he brought us into this place and gave us this land,
a land flowing with milk and honey. (Deut. 26:5-9)
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The rehearsal of past events enables the individual to
recognise his heritage: the Exodus becomes a common
history.
The importance of memory and testimony lies in the
fact that it is a function that can only be executed by
humanity. Therefore, although the biblical accounts bear
witness to an embryonic stage of the covenant, God is
still dependent on His human partner:
Despite the glorification of God and His power in
the Biblical accounts, God is, as it were, dependent
on human testimony for awareness of His Presence.
The locus of redemption,is in a human setting and in
the sight of humankind.'
The Exodus owes its redemptive significance to the Jews'
acceptance of the covenant at Sinai. The importance of the
human response to divine initiatives is reflected in the
biblical accounts, in the narratives detailing the actions
of individuals on behalf of their community. Having said
this, the overall emphasis is still upon God, as the
'senior partner' in the covenant.
The Problem Of Evil: 
The biblical response to the problem of evil primarily
follows the schema outlined above: suffering is a
punishment for human disobedience. However, there are the
rudimentary outlines of two complementary, alternative
strategies: evil arises whenever God "hides" His face, and
that contention is a valid response to this state of
affairs.
The basic theodicy asserts that evil is the direct
consequence of sin:
When Israel obeyed the Lord, it was victorious. When
it strayed, it was defeated. Defeat, itself, was the
best proof that disobedience had taken place.J
Thus, every historical defeat, including the twin
catastrophes of the loss of the Northern Kingdom and the
destruction of the First Temple, could be interpreted in
terms of divine retribution for sin. Indeed, this basic•
schema constitutes the editorial standpoint 	 of the
Deuteronomic History (Deut. 27-8, 32-3; 1 Kings 13:33-4,
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14:7-16, 16:12-3, 21:20-4). The conquerors of Israel,
whether the men of Ai (Josh. 7:2-26) or Nebuchadrezzar (2
Chron. 36:17-21), are the agents of divine retribution.
Israel is punished precisely because of her election:
special status brings additional responsibility:
You only have I known / of all the families of the
earth; therefore I will punish you / for all your
iniquities. (Amos 3:2)
Israel's history can be interpreted by reference to a
straightforward schema of rewards and punishments:
prosperity is a sign of covenantal faithfulness; defeat is
a consequence of sin. This theodicy has remained central
to Orthodox Judaism.
Yet, the biblical account also acknowledges the
limitations of this position: the schema of rewards and
punishment does not necessarily equate with that of
faithfulness and sin. Hence, the reiterated plea:
Why does the way of the wicked / prosper?
Why do all who are treacherous / thrive? (Jer. 12:1)
Two hypotheses are suggested. The first posits that "the
imagination of man is evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21).
Humanity possesses an evil inclination (Gen. 6:5-6; Jer.
, 3:17). However, such a suggestion runs contrary to the
assessment of creation as "very good" (Gen. 1:31). The
alternative hypothesis suggests that evil is an integral
part of God's creation:
I form light and create darkness / I make weal and
create woe, / I am the LORD, who do all these /
things. (Isa. 45:7)
Hence, the prologue to the book of Job, where the Satan
receives God's permission to inflict suffering (Job 1:6-
12; 2:1-8).
The biblical accounts suggest two complementary
response to this dilemma. In the first, evil occurs as a
consequence of God "hiding" His face (Hester panim).
Originally, the Hiding of God's face was interpreted as a
punishment for sin:
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I will surely hide my face in that day on account of
all the evil which they have done, because they have
turned to other gods. (Deut. 31:18)
However, the Hiding of God's face is held to be
increasingly arbitrary and unjustified. Hence, the second
response: the believer contends with God, asserting his
innocence:
Why dost thou hide thy face? / Why does thou forget
our affliction and oppression? / For our soul is
bowed down to the dust; / Our body cleaves to the
ground. Rise up, come to our help! (Ps. 44:25-6)
Contention is as much a demand for evidence of God's
presence with His people, as it is a demand for an
"answer" to an individual's suffering.
The twin notions of divine hiddenness and contention
form the basis of subsequent developments in the treatment
of the problem of evil. Rabbinic theology emphasised
divine hiddenness through the concept of the Shekhinah--
the presence of God. Isaac Luria developed a cosmology in
which divine hiddenness is an a priori assumption.
Hasidism combined both developments with an emphasis upon
the need for contention with God. The biblical accounts
therefore bear witness to the seeds of subsequent
interpretations.
1. 3. RABBINIC THEOLOGY: 
To go on with the same religious way of life would
be a contradiction of the historical model of
revelation, which demands that catastrophe be taken
seriously in order that Judaism make credible--not
merely pious--statements.0
The reinterpretation of covenantal thinking, instigated by
Yohanan ben Zakkai in the aftermath of the destruction of
the Second Temple (70) and the suppression of the Bar
Kochba revolt (135), has proved the most fundamental to
date. The rabbinic concept of the Shekhinah going into
exile with Israel laid the foundations for the cosmology
of Isaac Luria, and the developments of Hasidism and post-
Holocaust religious thought. The rabbinic response to
disaster was to assert that God was more hidden and
elusive: direct access to the divine was no longer
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available. Hence the emphasis on seeking the divine
through Torah study and covenantal obedience. This
development in the interpretation of divine immanence is
reflected in an alternative authoritative teacher: the
rabbi; there is no role for a prophet in a world where the
divine presence is hidden. Divine hiddenness also demands
an increased level of human responsibility for the
covenant.
Rather than interpreting the twin catastrophes of 70
and 135 as punishment for sin, or a sign of divine
absence, the rabbis argued that God was present with his
people in their suffering: the Shekhinah- -the divine
presence--once present in the tabernacle, now accompanies
Israel into exile. God qua Lord of History has withdrawn,
but He is present with His people in the form of the
Shekhinah. The concept derives from the root, shakan--to
dwell. The biblical basis for the rabbinic interpretation
is found in the Psalms:
When he calls me, I will answer / him;
I will be with him in trouble. (Ps. 91:15)
Thus, the Shekhinah is held to accompany - Israel into
exile:
Come and see how beloved Israel is before God; for
whenever they went into exile the Shekhinah went
with them. When they were exiled to Egypt, the
Shekhinah went with them; in Babylon the Shekhinah
was with them; and in the future, when Israel will
be redeemed, the Shekhinah will be with them.
(Talmud, Meg. 29a)1
Rabbi Akiba (50-135) argued that the Shekhinah was the
indwelling presence of God in the world, which yearns for
and is dependent upon humanity: wherever Israel goes, the
Shekhinah necessarily follows. The Shekhinah's presence
with Israel illustrates God's continuing love for His
People.
Increased divine hiddenness demands a change in
religious practice. Jewish religious life no longer
centres around the Prophet and the cult: the prophet is
replaced by the rabbi, and the cult by the synagogue and
the home. The end of prophecy was taken as normative :
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there could be no direct communication or intervention by
God in an era of divine hiddenness. Thus, the prophet is
replaced by the rabbi. Divine guidance is attained through
study of Torah. Hence, the significance of the rabbinic
insistence on the divine origin of both the Oral and
written Torah. Rabbinic rulings are binding because they
are an indirect reflection of the divine will. However,
because they are only an indirect reflection of the divine
will, it is possible to have conflicting rulings: the
rulings of both Hillel and Shammai (respectively president
and vice-president of the Sanhedrin in the first century
B.C.E.) are correct; a fact that is symptomatic of
increased divine hiddenness:
The truth is that, in a world in which God is
hidden, both can be right. The redemption is not
manifest nor is the way to it single and
illuminated. The rabbis are searchers, guided by
past models. They seek ways of living the
redemption, walking toward it, and telling the story
in a form believable after a catastrophe.°
The rabbis reaffirm the continuity between their position
and that of biblical theology, while acknowledging the
discontinuity. 9 They are attempting to present a theology
that is consistent with both the covenantal promise and
life in the aftermath of catastrophe.
The transition from prophet to rabbi is paralleled by
one from temple cult to synagogue and home. One of
rabbinic theology's greatest successes was the domestic
reinterpretation of the cult. Every home becomes a "hidden
temple"; hence the application of strict purity
regulations to the home. The theological justification for
this lies in the fact that the divine presence is no
longer identified primarily with Jerusalem: the Shekhinah
is found wherever there are Jews.
Increased emphasis upon divine hiddenness demanded a
greater degree of human responsibility for the covenant:
God no longer intervened directly in history on behalf of
His people. The burden of covenantal responsibility passes
to the Jews. This responsibility is discharged through
Torah study, covenantal obedience, and prayer. Whereas, in
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the biblical era, God communicated His commands via the
prophet; in the rabbinic era, the people address God, via
synagogue and domestic worship, or Torah study. Divine
intervention becomes a ritualised memory, rather than an
expectation. History is less obviously Heilsgeschichte:
meaning only becomes apparent through continuous study.
Yohanan ben Zakkai and rabbinic theology was not the
only response to the disasters of 70 and 135. The period
bears witness to all three of Greenberg's possible
responses. The rabbinic reinterpretation was opposed by
the Wnei B'tera; an Orthodox group who opposed Yohanan
ben Zakkai, arguing that the tradition as it stood was
sufficient: there was no need for a further
reinterpretation of the covenant. The Wnei B'tera focused
its opposition on the transfer of the rabbinic centre from
Jerusalem to Yavneh, arguing that certain practices, such
as the blowing of the Shofar, could only take place in the
Jerusalem Temple. The B'nei Wtera discounted the
significance of the destruction of the Second Temple as
counter-testimony. An alternative strategy was to look to
an imminent redemptive act, which would cancel out the
negative significance of the Destruction. The Talmud
refers to one group, Avlei Zion—the Mourners of Zion, who
refused to eat meat or drink wine (symbols of joy and
celebration) until the Temple was rebuilt. This vow
obviously reflects a short-term strategy: such asceticism
is not a realistic long-term policy. Many religious groups
thus put all their energies into working for the
restoration of the Jerusalem Temple and Jewish
sovereignty. Rabbi Akiba was one of many put to death for
his support of the, possibly messianic, Bar Kochba revolt
of 135. The suppression of the Bar Kochba revolt was of
crucial importance to the success of rabbinic Judaism, and
the ultimate survival of Judaism as a living faith:
Had the temple-centred view triumphed, the Jews
would have had to put all their effort into
regaining Jerusalem, a policy that would have spelt
frustration,, A spiritual exhaustion and, finally,
devastation."
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The years after 70 C.E. also bear witness to
Greenberg's third response: the loss of belief in the face
of the overwhelming counter-testimony of catastrophe. The
most famous illustration being the Talmudic heretic,
Elisha ben Abuya, who concluded that "there is neither
judgement nor judge". 11 Greenberg suggests that widespread
Jewish assimilation in the prevailing Hellenistic culture
can , be interpreted as a negative response to the
counter-testimony of history. 12 .
The Problem Of Evil: 
The development in the rabbinic response to the problem of
evil was not as dramatic as the reinterpretation of
divine immanence and covenantal responsibility. The
conservative theodicy that suffering was a punishment for
sin continued to dominate. This theodicy received its
classical expression in the formula Mi-p'nai-hata'einu--
for our sins we are punished. An alternative theodicy also
developed, reflecting the increased emphasis upon human
covenantal responsibility. The concept Yissurim shel
ahavah--suffering in love--acknowledged the fact that the
punishment' often outweighed the 'sin'. Suffering was
interpreted as either chastisement (God punished Israel
more than other nations because of her special status), or
as a mystery--to be embraced in faith. This response to
the problem of evil drew upon the concept of Kiddush
haShem--Sanctification of the Divine Name. The Jew
sanctified God's Name through Torah study and covenantal
faithfulness. Acceptance of suffering, or death, in faith
represented an extension of this principle: the sufferer
bore witness to God through faith. The death of Rabbi
Akiba, in the aftermath of the Bar Kochba revolt, became
the archetype fa accepting death as Kiddush haShem.
Indeed, this archetype governed the response of subsequent
generations to centuries of persecution in the Diaspora.
1. 4. LURIANIC KABBALAH: 
Lurianic Kabbalah was a messianic / redemptive
system which emphasized both the special role of the
Jewish people and the idea of the individual
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responsibility of each and every, ,Jew for helping to
perform Israel's God-given task."
Isaac Luria developed his cosmology in the aftermath of
the expulsion of the Sephardic community from Spain in
1492. The Expulsion was traumatic, in that the Sephardic
community was long-established and flourishing. It was a
literary and philosophical centre, being home to Judah
Halevi (1075-1141), Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), Abraham
ben David Halevi ibn Daud (1110-80) and Hasdai Crescas
(1340-1412). Kabbalah flourished prior to the Expulsion,
primarily in Provence in the thirteenth century. It
received its classic formulation in the Zohar, the Book of
Splendour. These developments culminated in the system of
Isaac Luria (1534-72). Luria (or An--the Lion) studied
Talmud in Cairo, before retiring for seven years to an
island in the Nile to meditate on the Zohar. In 1569, he
travelled to the centre of Kabbalah at Safed, and spent
the rest of his life communicating his ideas to a small
group of disciples. Luria's ideas were disseminated after
his death by one of these disciples, Hayim Vital. Lurianic
Kabbalah posits a three stage cosmology: Tzimtzum
(contraction or withdrawal); Shevirat Ha-kelim (the
Breaking of the Vessels); and Tikkun (repair or
restoration).
Kabbalah is a mystical system, based on the notion of
the Divine as Becoming, and thus in a constant state of
flux, rather than Being. In Luria's system, the Divine is
simultaneously the En sof: the Infinite, transcendent,
perfect, and beyond thought; and the Hidden God, dependent
upon humanity for redemption. Luria is not positing a
kenotic self-emptying of the Divine, but a simultaneous
existence in two contradictory modes:
The infinite God can exist simultaneously with the
finite God; the omnipotent God of spiritual activity
can exist simultaneously with the impotent God
dependent on human action; the God who brings
redemption „can also be the God who awaits
redemption."
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Luria responds to catastrophe by asserting both divine
power and divine powerlessness; divine transcendence and
divine immanence.
Luria articulates a three-stage cosmology. The first
stage, Tzimtzum, is a response to Luria's own question:
How can there be a world if God is everywhere? If
God is "all in all" how can there be things which
are not God? How caliGod create out of nothing if
there is no nothing?"
He answers his own question by suggesting that exile is a
metaphysical attribute of God, even prior to Creation.
Indeed, it is necessary for God to go into 'exile'. The En
sof contracts into Himself, creating an empty space
(tehiru) in which Creation can take place. The first act
of Creation is therefore negative rather than positive:
divine contraction or absence is an essential
prerequisite.
The second stage in Lurianic cosmology is Shevirat
ha-kelim--the Breaking of the Vessels. After Tzimtzum,
primal light floods into the tehiru. This light creates
the vessels, the external shape of the sefirot, the ten
heavenly spheres linking the En sof to creation. However,
the vessels prove incapable of retaining the divine light
and shatter, allowing the nizonot- -the divine sparks--to
escape. The primal light escapes into the upper half of
the tehiru, while the broken vessels, with the nizonot
still attached, fall into the lower part. The cosmos thus
splits into two: the Realm of Divine Light and the Kingdom
of Evil. Evil gains its power from feeding off the trapped
divine sparks.
The final stage in this cosmology concerns the
attempt to repair Shevirat ha-kelim. Subsequent history
can be understood as a series of attempts at Tikkun--
repair or restoration. Humanity was created in order to
accomplish this task: as a divine soul within a body
controlled by evil powers, Adam would overcome his own
weakness and restore creation. However, in failing in this
task, Adam initiated a catastrophe comparable to Shevirat
ha-kelim, with the subsequent loss of yet more divine
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sparks. Israel's election marked a further attempt at
Tikkun: the covenant both marked Israel's acceptance of
this task and provided the means by which it would be
accomplished. However, the creation of the Golden Calf
proved yet another catastrophe. Israel's subsequent
history is interpreted in terms of advances and setbacks
in the attainment of Tikkun. The concept of Tikkun is of
crucial importance in the development of covenantal
thinking: every individual Jew is personally responsible
for the attainment of Tikkun. A divine spark is attached
to every act showing correct kavannah--intention; whereas
every time a Jew sins, a further spark is lost. Humanity
has total responsibility for the covenant:
Lurianic kabbalah significantly elevates man's
status in the covenantal relationship. Luria's
cosmogenic myth of exile and redemption viffs God as
a savior desperately in need of salvation."
God is totally dependent on human willingness to bring
about Tikkun; a notion which finds expression in the image
of the Messiah 'in chains' awaiting redemption. Lurianic
Kabbalah therefore offers a total inversion of the
biblical interpretation of the respective covenantal roles
of God and humanity.
The Problem Of Evil: 
Isaac Luria follows earlier Kabbalah in questioning the
three basic premises of theodicy: God is all-powerful; God
is good, and evil exists. The divine is all-powerful prior
to Tzimtzum. After this, God is dependent upon humanity.
Neither is God unequivocally good: evil is a direct result
of the creative process; and, as God is "all in all",
cannot be attributed to an outside agency. Evil must
necessarily be part of the divine. Luria also challenges
the notion that evil exists: it 'feeds' off the nizonot;
it has no independent existence. In Lurianic Kabbalah,
suffering is an inevitable result of Shevirat ha-kelim.
The appropriate response is Tikkun: the repair or
restoration of a creation in which suffering takes place.
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1. 5. HASIDISM: 
Hasidism differs from earlier reinterpretations of the
covenant, in that it is not a reaction to a specific
historical catastrophe (as in the case of Rabbinic
theology and the destruction of the Second Temple, or
Lurianic Kabbalah and the Expulsion from Spain). It arises
in response to a number of factors; the main three being :
the disillusionment generated by the false messiah,
Shabbetai Zvi (1626-76). 17 ; the succession of pogroms
against Eastern European Jewry, including the notorious
Chmielnicki massacres (1648 following); and severe
economic depression. Hasidism developed as a revivalist
movement, offering the majority of Jews a clear sense of
identity and purpose.
The movement was founded by Israel Baal Shem Toy , the
Master of the Good Name (1700-60) 18 ; originating in
Podolia and Volhynia, before extending throughout Eastern
Europe. However, the nature of the movement is such that
it defies easy interpretation. Hasidism incorporates a
number of schools or dynasties, each with a different
authoritative Zaddik--righteous or holy man. The schools
derive their name from the town where the original Zaddik
- held his court; thus, there are various schools,
including the Bratslav, Lubavitch, Satmar, and Wizsnitz
Hasidim. Each school reflects the views of its original
Master; views which often conflict. It is therefore
impossible to present a single interpretation of Hasidism;
although all the schools reflect a shared emphasis upon
joy, ahavat Israel--love of the whole people Israel; and
Devekut- -cleaving to God. In many respects, Hasidism can
be viewed as a reinterpretation and popular dissemination
of the ideas of Lurianic Kabbalah. Hasidism humanises
Luria's system by supplanting Tikkun with Devekut;
offering an individual, rather than a cosmic perspective
on redemption.
Hasidism adopts the Lurianic paradox of divine power
and divine powerlessness, and pushes it to extremes. It
has been suggested that Hasidism be interpreted as
- 25 -
panentheism: all things are in God. 19
 This suggestion
reflects the centrality attached to divine omnipresence.
Hasidism differs from Lurianic Kabbalah in arguing that
Tzimtzum is only an apparent divine withdrawal: God is
present throughout creation. Tzimtzum is a positive,
rather than negative, creative act. Existence derives from
emanations of divine light. However, this light is too
bright, so it has to be 'filtered'; in order to be
effective, the divine light is necessarily limited.
According to Hasidism, God is present throughout creation
in the form of divine sparks. The dispersal of divine
sparks thus becomes a positive, rather than a negative,
act: it is a sign of divine omnipresence, rather than
divine self-limitation or absence:
There is nothing in the world, large or small, which
is isolated from God, for 4, is present in all
things. (The Rabbi of Polnoye)"
Hasidism follows Rabbinic theology in arguing that the
divine presence is found wherever there are Jews. Indeed,
this principle is extended to the assertion that the
divine presence is diffused throughout creation.
The Hasidic emphasis upon divine omnipresence is
paralleled by the assertion of divine omnipotence: God is
Ribbono Shel Olam--Master of the Universe. Following on
from their reinterpretation of Tzimtzum as only an
apparent withdrawal, the Hasidic Masters emphasise God's
role as Creator, Lord of History, and initiator of the
Covenant. They also follow Luria in asserting divine
powerlessness. The fact that the divine presence is
dispersed throughout creation means that God is
necessarily hidden. The divine presence is not immediate:
it is necessary for the individual to search for God.
Hasidism links this understanding of the hidden divine
presence with the rabbinic notion of the Shekhinah, and
the Lurianic concept of the dependent God: the Shekhinah
is dependent on humanity searching and finding it. If
humanity elects not to seek for the Shekhinah, then the
divine presence necessarily remains hidden:
Imagine two children playing hide-and-seek; one
hides but the other does not look for him. God is
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hiding and man is not,qeeking. Imagine his distress.
(Barukh of Medzebozh)"
In Hasidism, it is the knowledge that God is hidden which
is important: "when man knows that God is hidden God is
hidden no longer", 22
In many respects, Hasidism synthesises elements of
Rabbinic theology and Lurianic Kabbalah. Its unique
contribution lies in its emphasis upon Devekut at the
expense of Tikkun, and in the importance attached to the
Zaddik. Devekut originally meant attachment or devoutness.
However, from the thirteenth century, the term was applied
to a state of intimate communion with God. Hasidism's
innovation lay in making Devekut the focal point of the
religious life. The founder of the movement, the Baal Shem
Toy , equated emunah (faith) with Devekut: "faith ... is
the intimate communion of the soul with God". 23 Devekut is
equated with awareness of the omnipresence and immanence
of God; thus, falling away from a state of Devekut is
tantamount to estrangement from God. Devekut differs from
Tikkun in that it is attainable by the individual; whereas
the tikkunim (restorative acts) of an individual are only
a minor part of a cosmic whole. Tikkun was a fundamental
concept in the development of covenantal thought: it
marked the transition to total human responsibility.
However, it was also a concept which gave little immediate
consolation: there was no tangible, immediate result. The
attainment of Devekut offered an individual, and
realizable goal.
It is necessary to note that there were two
interpretations of Devekut, one more elitist than the
other.
	
In many cases, Devekut was interpreted in a
mystical sense:	 it was a state realised through
contemplation, preferably in retreat. Interpreting
Devekut in this way limited its appeal. However, the
mystical interpretation of Devekut was combined with a
less esoteric reading: Devekut could be attained through
all activities; all that is required being the appropriate
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frame of mind--Kavannah. Thus, secular activities can
become an act of worship, if they embody Devekut.
The link between the mystical and the pragmatic
interpretation of Devekut is found in the figure of the
Zaddik, the central authoritative figure in Hasidism. The
Zaddik, or he "who lives by his faith", was held to be
endowed with spiritual powers. Hasidic faith is defined as
adherence to a specific Zaddik. The Hasidic Master, Nahman
of Bratslav argued that there were four unique Zaddikim:
Moses, Simon bar Yohai (a second century rabbi,
traditionally accredited as author of the Zohar), Isaac
Luria, and the Baal Shem To y . He himself was the Zaddik
hador--the Zaddik of his generation. The majority of
Hasidim disputed this claim, arguing that there were a
group of Zaddikim in every generation, forming a crucial
link in the chain between the individual Jew and the
Messiah. The Zaddik was a person who performed Tikkunim
every day, and who had the ability to ascend to the upper
worlds through Devekut. He gains spiritual strength from
his followers faith in him; who, in return, receive
spiritual sustenance and protection from evil. Thus, the
Zaddik attains the highest level of Devekut on behalf of
his followers. Such a high level of mystical communion
cannot be maintained without interruption. Therefore, the
Zaddik has to break off from Devekut, in order to attain
higher spiritual heights after a respite. The Zaddik's
career is thus marked by alternate spiritual ascent and
descent; the latter is often marked by extreme
depression. 24
 Some Zaddikim were convinced that attainment
of the highest state of Devekut would enable them to force
the Messiah to come. The Zaddik's followers provided for
his material support; in return, they received blessings.
The Problem Of Evil: 
Hasidism's response to the problem of evil is informed by
its concepts of divine omnipresence, Devekut, and the
centrality granted to the Zaddik. There are two primary
strands to the problem of evil. The first emphasises the
Zaddik's ability to redeem evil. The second acknowledges
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the continued existence of suffering despite the Zaddik's
efforts, and responds by emphasising the need for joy and/
or contention with God.
The call to redeem evil is the logical response to
the Hasidic insistence that God is in everything. In
effect, Hasidism is building on the Lurianic idea of the
nizonot. Evil gains its spiritual power by feeding off the
divine sparks. Thus, evil and good are integrally linked;
by redeeming the former, the Zaddik releases the latter.
The need to open oneself to temptation, in order that evil
may be redeemed, forms a recurrent theme in Hasidism.
However, the dangers of this policy are also acknowledged;
hence the importance of the Zaddik. The sins of the
followers are transferred as sinful thoughts to the
Zaddik, who, because of his superior spiritual powers, is
able to redeem them by transforming them into the original
good--thus releasing the trapped divine spark. As a result
of the Zaddik's labours, a hasid's repentance is accepted
by God.
The Baal Shem Toy
 suggests an alternative explanation
of evil; one that combines a hasidic emphasis upon divine
omnipresence with the rabbinic concept of suffering in
love. He suggests that suffering is the inevitable
consequence of finite existence:
Evil and suffering are the price we have to pay for
our very existence since without a finite, imperfect
world there could be no creatures to benefit from
God's goodness. Consequently, God's judgement and
sternness are themselves the products of God's love.
When man acknowledges his suffering in love he
makes, it were, Elohim "the Lord", the God of
mercy.
The Baal Shem Toy
 is employing the notion that Tzimtzum is
a positive creative act: it enables human existence to
come into being. However, such self-limitation
nevertheless has negative repercussions: the existence of
evil and suffering. Yet, creation remains a positive,
rather than negative, act because God provides redress to
the situation: by accepting suffering in love, humanity
causes divine grace to flow; without this human response,
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God's majesty would remain incomplete because He would be
unable to be All-Merciful.
In spite of these arguments, Hasidism was acutely
aware of the depth of Jewish suffering in Eastern Europe,
both from pogroms and from economic deprivation. As a
result, the Hasidic Masters were exercised by the
challenge to continue affirming the covenantal promise in
the face of seemingly overwhelming historical counter-
testimony. There were two, not necessarily exclusive,
strategies for coping with this problem. The first
response helps to explain the hasidic emphasis upon the
need for joy and fervour, particularly in worship. Under
the influence of Lurianic Kabbalah, life was interpreted
as a battle between good and evil; with the former
striving to redeem the latter. Joy or fervour formed a
crucial weapon in this battle:
Sadness and sorrow help the evil powers, while
happiness and joy drive them away. The essential
idea is the ongoing battle to redeem and uplift the
trapped sparks--to transform evil into good and to
help the Zaddik in his struggle against the satanic
forces.26
Hasidic expressions of joy or fervour do not arise at the
expense of memories of suffering, but are rather part of a
concerted effort to oppose the balance of power in the
world: suffering is a sign of the dominance of the powers
of evil in the world; whereas joy and fervour are the
Hasid's means of defeating these powers.
An alternative, and indeed complementary strategy is
to emphasise the need to contend with God. This emphasis
on contention is one of the major reasons for Elie
Wiesel's interest in Hasidism. In Wiesel's reading, there
are two approaches to contention; the second being the
more aggressive. The Zaddik, as both a holy man and the
representative of his community, is entitled to contend
tc"
with God, remindingkof His covenantal responsibilities.
Hasidic contention differs from the biblical or rabbinic
model: • the Zaddik addresses God as an equal. The first
approach is conciliatory; the tone being respectful,
almost apologetic:
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Don't think of man's sins, I beg of You. Think
rather of his good deeds. They are fewer, I agree.
But you must admit, they are more precious .... I ask
of You: don't be harsh with Your children; rare as
it may be, it is their kindness that shouldgqrprise
You. (Rebbe Leib, The Grandfather of Shpole)''
The strategy is to acknowledge Israel's sins, but to
suggest that God should overlook them out of love for His
people. The second approach is much more aggressive, and
is typified by the Hasidic Master, Levi-Yitzhak of
Berditchev; to such an extent that Barukh of Medzebozh was
led to remark:
If we were to accept the Rebbe of Berditchev's
reasoning ... there would no„to
 be a single Jew
towards whom God is not guilty."
The suggestion is that, as God is omniscient, He
presumably knew how the covenant would develop, and is
therefore being unjust in punishing Israel. Levi-Yitzhak
of Berditchev develops this argument by appealing to the
legend that God offered the covenant to other nations, who
refused the offer; only Israel was prepared to accept the
covenant:
From the moment You concluded a covenant with Your
people, You have consistently tried to break it by
testing it; why? Remember at Sinai You walked back
and forth with Your Torah like a peddler unable to
dispose of his rotten apples. Your law, You offered
it to every nation and each turned away
contemptuously. Israel alone declared itself reggy
to accept it, to accept You. Where is its reward?"'
Hasidism develops Luria's understanding of the covenantal
partnership. It is a symbiotic relationship: the partners
are mutually dependent; consequently, the Zaddik, as the
spokesman of his community, is entitled both to reproach
God, and to criticise His management of the universe in
allowing suffering to exist. Thus, the relationship
between God and humanity exists on two levels. On one
level, the Zaddik stands totally in awe of God, qua Master
of the Universe. 30
 On another level, the relationship is
deeply personal: God and humanity are partners, each able
to criticise the other: both are accountable to each other
for the state of the covenantal relationship.
- 31 -
Hasidism therefore personalises the ideas of Lurianic
Kabbalah, emphasising both human responsibility and human
potential. Through Devekut and the mediation of the
Zaddik, humanity can attain its redemptive goal. However,
these positive reinterpretations of Lurianic Kabbalah are
paralleled by an acute awareness of the problem of
continued suffering. The emphasis upon personal redemption
is therefore contextualised within a cosmic battle between
good and evil. Hasidism thus combines the cosmic
perspective of Kabbalah with an emphasis on the
individual. The figure of the Zaddik acts as a shield
between the individual and the wider cosmic drama. The
tenets of Hasidism enabled many to retain their faith
despite the events of the Holocaust. However, for many
this later event demanded a further reinterpretation of
the covenantal tradition.
1. 6. ORTHODOX RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST: 
Responses to the Holocaust cover the spectrum suggested by
Greenberg. At one extreme, there is Richard Rubenstein's
suggestion that the covenant is at an end as a result of
the unanswerable counter-testimony of the Holocaust.
Alternatively, many thinkers acknowledge the Holocaust's
status as counter-testimony, but insist on the retention
of covenantal faith, albeit in modified or reinterpreted
form. The following chapters on Rubenstein, Eliezer
Berkovits, Emil Fackenheim, and Elie Wiesel consider these
options at greater length. However, the third of
Greenberg's options remains. The final section of this
chapter considers some of the Orthodox responses to the
Holocaust: those responses which either regard the event
as punishment for sin, or as a mystery beyond explanation.
Divine providence provides the context for Orthodox
consideration of the Holocaust. A distinction is drawn
between general and individual providence. In the context
of the former, the Holocaust is a part of the redemptive
process leading to the restoration of Israel (understood
either politically with reference to the establishment of
the State of Israel in 1948, or spiritually in terms of an
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as yet unrealized messianic future). Such debate as there
is in Orthodox circles surrounds the relationship between
the Holocaust and individual providence. There are a
series of possible answers to this question.
The most straightforward response is to interpret the
Holocaust as a punishment for sin, understood as either
assimilation, Communism, or nationalism. Jewish
assimilation signified an abandonment of the Jews'
election as the Chosen People: God had called them to be a
people apart. Second, there was held to be a
disproportionately high level of Jewish involvement in
Socialism and Communism. Third, the growth of secular
Zionism was a sin, because Jewish attempts to establish
the land of Israel impinged upon a divine prerogative:
only God could decide when the Return to the land would be
accomplished. The Orthodox rabbi, Elchonon Wassermann
(1875-1941) suggests that the nature of the Jews'
punishment serves to identify their sins. The Jews were
punished for nationalism and assimilation. As a
consequence, their suffering was at the hands of a
nationalist movement, the Nazis, who legally expelled the
Jews from the society they were struggling to enter.
Wassermann argued that it was useless for the Jews to
resist because the Nazis were the instruments of divine
punishment. 31 The innocent necessarily suffer along with
the guilty: the Jews are punished as a people.
An alternative response views the Holocaust in terms
of Kiddush haShem. The faithful suffer either because of
the sins of others, or for the sake of others. Death is
embraced as the will of God, even if its purpose remains
unfathomable:
It is clear beyond all doubt that the blessed Holy
One is the ruler of the universe, and we must accept
the DAdgement with love. (Rabbi Shmuel David
Unger)
Suffering tests the victim's faith. Berkovits' collection,
With God in Hell illustrates this response. He cites
numerous examples of Jews embracing their fate with
emunah--steadfast faith.33
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A third strategy combines the two outlined above: the
Holocaust marks the "birth-pangs" of the Messiah, and can
be interpreted as the historical unfolding of the
"rabbinic apocalypse":
In the footsteps of the Messiah insolence will
increase, respect will diminish the wisdom of
the sages will decay, sin fearers will be despised,
truth concealed, the young will shame the old, the
old will stand in the presence of children To
whom can we turn for support? [pply] to our father
in Heaven. (Mishnah Sotah 9: 15)''
The most developed formulation of this response is found
in Elchonon Wassermann's, Ikvossoh Demeshicho--In the
Footsteps of the Messiah. His title refers to the period
between exile and redemption; a period when evil is purged
in order to pave the way for the coming of the Messiah.
Torah and good deeds offer the only means of surviving the
"birth-pangs". However, even these are not necessarily
sufficient: the innocent suffer because of the evil
unleashed to punish Jewish sinners. Wassermann admits that
it is impossible to predict how long the "birth-pangs"
will last, but he retains the conviction that continued
Torah study and good deeds can hasten the end. He also
predicts that God's intervention will come at the moment
of greatest suffering:
The stronger the persecution of the Jews, the more
grounds for their salvation. Now the persecution is
of a terrible degree, unlike anything before.
Accordingly, God must take up the [plight] of the
victims It is when Jews are in their greatest
crisis, that the birth takes place. It is clear that
the contemporary moment is the crisis. This means
that the birth is coming closer.
Wassermann therefore attaches great importance to the
Yeshivas(Talmudic schools), because it is Torah learning
which will bring an end to the period of punishment and
thus hasten the "birth". The deaths of the innocent serve
to hasten the coming of the Messiah:
It would seem that in Heaven we are considered
Tzaddikim(righteous) The time is short. The
ninth fort [where we will be executed] is near. We
must keep in mind truly to sanctify God's name
God forbid, that any thought should enter anybody's
mind which makes the sacrifice (Korban) unfit. We
now carry out the greatest Mitzvah, Kiddush Hashem
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(sanctification of God's name). The fire which will
burn our bodies, the fire which will resurrect
the Jewish people."
Thus, Wassermann interpreted his own death as a means of
hastening the "birth" of the Messiah.
Of these Orthodox viewpoints, the first two are still
prevalent today: the Holocaust is seen as either
punishment for sin, or as the death of six million
Kedoshim--holy ones. Some Jews see the return to the land
of Israel in 1948 as a messianic event, thus undermining
the negative impact of the counter-testimony of the
Holocaust. However, the non-messianic responses are more
prevalent.
CONCLUSION: 
Although the majority of Orthodox Jews find one of these
three interpretations acceptable, non-Orthodox Jews do
not. Their response is to adopt one of Greenberg's other
two responses to disaster: either to reject belief or to
reinterpret the covenant. The former could be said to be
the strategy adopted by the majority of secular Jews.
Richard Rubenstein comes closest to articulating a
theology rooted in this response. Others elect to
reinterpret the covenant in order to respond to the
Holocaust. In doing so, thinkers such as Emil Fackenheim
and Elie Wiesel, are standing in a long tradition of
covenantal reinterpretation; a tradition they utilise in
formulating a response to the most recent catastrophe in
Jewish history: the Holocaust.
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2. RICHARD RUBENSTEIN: "THERE IS NEITHER JUDGEMENT NOR 
JUDGE". 
2. 1. INTRODUCTION.
2. 2. THE TRIUMPH OF COUNTER-TESTIMONY OVER COVENANT.
2. 3. "COVENANTLESS JUDAISM".
2. 4. REFLECTIONS ON MASS DEATH.
2. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
A generation ago this writer sadly concluded that
the Jewish community's traditional mode of
constructing a meaningful cosmos could only retain
its credibility if the Holocaust were interpreted as
God's chastisement of a sinful Israel. Since such a
view entails seeing Hitler as a latter-day
Nebuchadnezzar and the death camps as God's method
of punishment, ideas this writer regarded as beyond
obscenity, he had no choice but to conclude that the
Jewish community was faced with a theological crisis
of unparalleled dimensions.'
The importance of Richard Rubenstein's After Auschwitz
(1966) cannot be underestimated. It was the first major
treatment of the theological implications of the
Holocaust, and thus can be said to have initiated the
subsequent debate. After Auschwitz is not only the
earliest treatment of this subject, it is arguably the
most radical. Other writers, such as Eliezer Berkovits and
Emil Fackenheim, attempt to articulate a traditional
alternative to Rubenstein's radical conclusions. Thus,
their work can be seen as a direct response to After
Auschwitz, albeit a negative one. Furthermore, the book is
important because of the starkness with which the
theological challenge of the Holocaust is posed.
Rubenstein argues that there is a clear choice: between
affirmation of the covenant (which demands that the
Holocaust be interpreted as a punishment for sin), and
rejection of belief in Israel's election and in God as
Lord of History; there are no other alternatives. His own
conclusion is that the Holocaust provides such
overwhelming counter-testimony that belief in the covenant
is no longer possible.
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After Auschwitz constitutes the foundations of
Rubenstein's subsequent work: his concern is to analyse
"the character of religious existence after Auschwitz".2
Thus, his analysis of the Holocaust forms the basis of his
subsequent interest in mysticism and the problems
generated by over-population or surplus populations. The
Holocaust is foundational to his thinking, but does not
provide the subject matter for the bulk of his work.
Rubenstein's only other extensive treatment of the
Holocaust is The Cunning of History: Mass Death and the
American Future (1975). 4
 This second treatment of the
Holocaust differs from the first: it is not concerned with
the theological implications of the Holocaust. The Cunning
of History is a socio-political study of the Holocaust;
the dominant theme being the use of technological mass
death as a means of eradicating surplus populations. There
are therefore two, complementary stages of development in
Rubenstein's response to the Holocaust: one theological,
and one socio-political.
Before considering the two main components of
Rubenstein's response to the Holocaust, it is important to
note the hostility generated by his work. The response to
Rubenstein's work bears comparison with the hostility
which greeted Hannah Arendt's reports on the Eichmann
tria1. 5
 Both are seen as assimilated "outsiders",
trespassing on forbidden territory. In Arendt's case, the
issue was the question of Jewish collaboration with the
Nazis. Rubenstein's rejection of the covenant generated
comparable hysteria. He has been likened to a "second
Hitler"; while his work has been called a "tragic
disaster". 6
 Yet Rubenstein's rejection of the covenant
parallels the response of millions of secular Jews, in
Israel, the United States, and Europe. He is far from
alone in finding traditional Judaism untenable after the
Holocaust. One of Rubenstein's most vehement critics is
Emil Fackenheim; yet Fackenheim echoes Rubenstein's
rejection of the traditional theodicy--"for our sins we
are punished"--in refusing to interpret the Holocaust as a
punishment for sin. Therefore, why the criticism? There
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appear to be three answers to this question. First,
Rubenstein elaborates his reasons for rejecting
traditional Judaism in print. The majority of secular Jews
do not do so; they merely allow religious practice to
lapse. Second, Rubenstein is a rabbi and refuses to
relinquish this office, although many feel that such a
move should be the logical consequence of his views.7
Third, despite his office, Rubenstein is regarded as an
1/ outsider" and a maverick by the wider Jewish community,
particularly in America. This fact is partly explained by
his background. He is from a fully assimilated, American-
Jewish background, with interests in secular philosophy
(particularly in Existentialism) and psychology. He brings
these interests to bear on his treatment of the Holocaust.
Rubenstein is thus held to interpret an quintessentially
Jewish experience--the Holocaust--by reference to alien
categories. In many ways, the hostility directed against
Rubenstein is similar to that directed against insensitive
responses to the Holocaust on the part of Christians. 8 The
hostility is all the greater because Rubenstein is not
literally an outsider, however much he may be perceived as
one. Yet despite such criticism, his response cannot be
described as insensitive: it stems out of great compassion
for his people--Rubenstein constantly repeats that he is
compelled to reject the covenant because he refuses to
assert that the Holocaust was a divine punishment. If
there is any insensitivity, it lies in Rubenstein's posing
of a challenge which many would prefer left unsaid.
2. 2. THE TRIUMPH OF COUNTER-TESTIMONY OVER COVENANT: 
With respect to the doctrine of election within
Judaism, (a) if God chose the Jewish people and (b)
the major events in the history of that people are
ultimately expressions of God's will, we must (c)
conclude that God is the ultimate author of
Auschwitz. Furthermore, we must conclude that a just
and omnipotent God sent Hitler to exterminate Ahis
people either to punish them or to correct them.'
The seeds of Rubenstein's theological response to the
Holocaust were sown in 1961, at a meeting with Heinrich
Griiber, a protestant pastor who spent three years in
Sachsenhausen as a result of his opposition to Hitler.
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Gruber startled Rubenstein by arguing that belief in God
as Lord of History, and in Israel's election, could only
mean that Hitler was the agent of divine punishment.1°
This encounter led Rubenstein to believe that there was a
clear choice: either God is Lord of History and the Jews
are His Chosen People (in which case the Holocaust was a
punishment for sin),	 or	 belief	 in	 the covenant	 is
impossible (as it entails	 acceptance	 of the	 above
definition of the Holocaust).	 Therefore, although	 he
cannot accept the views of Elchonon Wassermann, Rubenstein
argues that they constitute an authentic, biblical
response to the Holocaust.11
The meeting with Griiber convinced Rubenstein that the
Jewish concept of covenant lay at the root of the problem.
It is because the Jews persist in interpreting history in
terms of Heilsgeschichte that historical counter-testimony
carries such weight. He argues that covenant theology
necessarily sees historical counter-testimony as
expressions of the will of God:
Either such a God is a sadist who inflicts pain
because he enjoys it or he has a reason for the pain
he inflicts. The only morally defensible motive for
a superior to inflict pain on an inferior would be
punitive chastisement which has as .Ats purpose
altering the victims' mode of behavior."
For Rubenstein, the Holocaust can be interpreted only as a
punishment for sin within the framework of covenant. Any
other alternative is dismissed as "gloss". 13 He rejects
the strategies of Wiesel and Fackenheim, on the grounds
that they depict God as a "cosmic sadist" who toys with
His creation. 14 Viewed in terms of Greenberg's three
possible responses to disaster, Rubenstein offers a choice
between the first and the third. Either historical
disaster does not have the power to effect faith: it can
be interpreted by reference to the traditional theodicy of
"for our sins are we punished"; or historical counter-
testimony is deemed sufficient to end faith in the
covenant. Reinterpretation of the covenant is no longer
considered a viable option. In effect, Rubenstein
transforms Greenberg's second response into a subsidiary
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of the third. Reinterpretation becomes necessary only
after belief in the covenant has been rejected: it is
necessary to deconstruct covenantal language in a way that
is meaningful to covenantless Judaism.
Rubenstein's response to the Holocaust is to reject
belief in God as Lord of History and in the Jews'
election. He does so because he refuses to accept that the
Holocaust was a punishment for sin. Whereas many thinkers
see the establishment of the State of Israel as proof of
the continuing validity of the covenant, Rubenstein argues
the exact opposite. 14 The establishment of the State of
Israel only proved possible because the Jews relied on
their own efforts, rather than on divine intervention.
Rubenstein cites the increasingly secular character of
Jewish life in Israel to support his argument. Again
Rubenstein appeals to logic: interpreting Eretz Israel as
proof of divine agency demands that the same be said of
the Holocaust. God is either the author of both events, or
of neither. The rejection of belief in divine election is
foundational to Jewish existence in Israel:
What is happening in Israel has nothing to do with
the cosmic drama of God's involvement with the
Jewish people. The „Iraeli fights his own battle,
not somebody else's.'
To interpret events in Israel as part of divine providence
is doubly false. First, because it implies that the
covenant between God and the Jews is still a valid
formula. Second, because it misrepresents the attitudes of
modern Israelis. Rubenstein's response to the Holocaust is
thus to argue that there is no difference between Jews and
other religious or ethnic groups: they are no longer a
people set apart by God.
Rubenstein's rejection of covenantal faith partly
explains the controversy generated by his work. The
starkness with which he poses the dilemma facing the
religious Jew after the Holocaust is certainly welcome.
However, there is a suspicion that this starkness is
attained at the expense of caricaturing covenantal faith.
Rubenstein acknowledges that Jewish faith centres on the
- 43 -
dialectic of promise and counter-testimony, but he fails
to treat this fact seriously. He caricatures the dialectic
in terms of an alternative between suffering as a
punishment for sin and the rejection of the covenant, as a
protest against the imputation of sin to the Six Million.
However, numerous thinkers have succeeded in retaining the
covenant while rejecting the traditional theodicy.
Rubenstein follows the rabbis in scanning history for its
theological significance, but differs in his willingness
to sacrifice covenantal faith. He ignores the long
tradition within Judaism of covenantal reinterpretation in
the face of historical counter-testimony. Would he dismiss
Rabbinic, Lurianic and Hasidic thinking as a "gloss"? The
answer is presumably affirmative. Wiesel and Fackenheim
are following the traditional course in attempting to
reinterpret the covenant in a way that incorporates the
radical counter-testimony of the Holocaust.
A corollary of this criticism involves Rubenstein's
use of evidence. He rejects the covenant purely on the
basis of the Holocaust, only invoking the tradition to
point to precedents for this, as in the case of the
Talmudic heretic, Elisha ben Abuya. The continued
existence and development of Judaism despite historical
counter-testimony is not admitted as evidence in support
of the validity of the covenantal promise:
Rubenstein errs in viewing the entirety of Jewish
existence through a Holocaust prism.... For
Rubenstein, post-Holocaust Jewish existence is
radically discontippous with all preceding forms of
Jewish expression."
There is a vast difference between Rubenstein's approach
and that of the Rabbis in the aftermath of the twin
disasters of 70 and 135. The Rabbis emphasised both the
radically new character of their situation and their
theology, but still continued to insist on the continuity
between their ideas and the Mosaic covenant. Rubenstein
not only emphasises the discontinuity of ideas, he also
reads this discontinuity back into the tradition. Thus,
his own rejection of the covenant finds its precedent in
Elisha ben Abuya's declaration that "there is neither
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judgement nor judge". He also argues that this recognition
was present, but suppressed, in biblical theology:
Since there is nothing to indicate that biblical man
was less intelligent or insightful than men in our
generation, we have no reason to believe that
biblical man was incapable of drawing conclusions
similar to those which Elisha ben Abuya drew. It is
my opinion that the author(s) repressed their
insights because they were fearful of the price to
be paid for, living in a spiritual and metaphysical
wasteland.'
Thus, Rubenstein's acceptance, albeit in reinterpreted
form, of the dialectic of promise and counter-testimony
proves misleading. His theology does not arise out of the
tension between the covenant and the Holocaust. Rather, he
interprets Jewish theology under the existential impact of
the Holocaust. Thus, the tradition only plays a passive
role in Rubenstein's approach, as opposed to the active
role played by covenantal theology in the dialectic of
promise and counter-testimony. Rubenstein's work is not in
dialogue with the tradition, as is the case with Wiese1.18
Instead, the tradition is mined to provide support for an
already established position.19
The argument outlined above can be illustrated by
reference to Rubenstein's treatment of Eretz Israel. As
the dialectic is traditionally understood, historical
disaster stands as counter-testimony, whereas success or
prosperity is equated with covenant promise. Rubenstein is
prepared to accept the Holocaust as counter-testimony, but
he refuses to allow the establishment of Eretz Israel to
count as promise. Is such a strategy logically
permissible? Rubenstein argues that it is, claiming that
the State of Israel reflects the fact that Jews no longer
expect divine intervention on their behalf. However, this
expectation had no place in Rabbinic or Lurianic thinking.
The primary hope of divine intervention lay in messianic
expectation. Other than this, the major emphasis was upon
human responsibility for Tikkun; an emphasis which, by
definition, presumes the impossibility of divine
intervention. Rubenstein's failure to engage with the
tradition thus leads him to distort the covenantal
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understanding of divine power. The drive to establish the
State of Israel does not necessarily include belief in the
covenant. It points to an awareness of the Jews'
responsibility for their own fate. However, such an
awareness was already theologically present within the
Jewish tradition. The novelty lies in the widespread
belief that Diaspora existence was no longer tenable after
the Holocaust, with a consequent increase in support--both
Jewish and non-Jewish--for Zionism.
To conclude, if the dialectic between promise and
counter-testimony is to be taken seriously, then it is
essential that positive, as well as negative evidence be
admissible. The Holocaust is undeniably negative. However,
there were numerous expressions of faith by the victims.
Such faith cannot be ignored. Hence the insistence of the
majority of Jewish thinkers that a response to the
Holocaust must incorporate both the faith and loss of
belief generated by the Event. 20 Nor can the positive
content of Jewish history be ignored. Rubenstein errs in
concentrating solely on the negative side of the equation.
2. 3. "COVENANTLESS JUDAISM":21
Though I believe that a void stands where once we
experienced God's presence, I do not think Judaism
has lost its meaning or its power .... Judaism is the
way in which we share the decisive times and crises
of life tough the traditions of our inherited
community.
There are two dimensions to Rubenstein's analysis of
Judaism. The first concerns his understanding of God; the
second the way that understanding informs Jewish religious
life. However, this analysis of Judaism is in a state of
flux: Rubenstein has substantially modified the views
outlined in After Auschwitz.
In After Auschwitz, Rubenstein argues that "God-is-
dead"--that is belief in God as Lord of History is no
longer tenable. In place of the covenant, he offers a
picture of an essentially meaningless universe. He follows
Camus in arguing that the only meaning is that created and
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imposed on the universe by humanity. Rubenstein's
theological vision is bleak:
We stand in a cold, silent, unfeeling cosmos,
unaided by any power beyond our own resources,After
Auschwitz, what else can a Jew say about God?"
In this reading, God is defined as "Holy Nothingness". 24
It is this definition that provides the basis for an
increasingly positive understanding of God. Whereas, in
After Auschwitz, God is viewed in primarily negative terms
(either as dead or absent), there is an increasingly
positive, mystical understanding of God in Rubenstein's
later work. God is dead, in the sense that He is not an
active power intervening in history on behalf of a
particular people. Instead, God as Holy Nothingness is the
mystical source of existence:
God is spoken of as the Holy Nothingness. When God
is thus designated, he is conceived of as the ground
and source of all existence. To speak of God as Holy
Nothingness is not to suggest that he is a void. On
the contrary, he is an indivisible plenum so rich
that all existence derives from his very essence.
God as the Nothing is not absence of being but
superfluity of being."
The obvious criticism of Rubenstein's position is that
there is no longer anything distinctively Jewish about it.
If this is the case, why does he persist in emphasising
the importance of Jewish religious practice?
There are two aspects to Rubenstein's understanding
of the religious life: a call for a return to Paganism,
and for a deconstruction of Jewish practice. In After
Auschwitz, Rubenstein interprets the return to Eretz
Israel as a return to Paganism. The return to the land not
only symbolises Jewish rejection of the covenant, it also
illustrates a return to a form of fertility worship. The
Jews, particularly in the Kibbutzim, return to an
existence dominated by the fertility cycle. The
establishment of Eretz Israel will lead to an embracing of
nature:
I am a pagan. To be a pagan means to find again
one's roots as a child of Earth and to see one's own
existence as wholly and totally an earthly
existence. It means once again to understand that
for mankind the true divinities are the gods of
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earth, not the high gods of the sky; the gods of
space and place, not the gods of time; theAods of
home and hearth, not the gods of wandering. "
However, the establishment of Eretz Israel has not led to
a growth in Paganism: the rejection of covenant faith has
resulted in a widespread secularism. The Kibbutzim, rather
than being the fount of a new Paganism, are in economic
crisis. The majority of Jews, rather than returning to the
land, have chosen to remain in the Diaspora. As a result,
although Rubenstein has not abandoned his appeal to
Paganism, he has placed increasing emphasis on mysticism,
while acknowledging that the majority of religious Jews
will never accept his views, preferring instead to accept
the traditional theodicy of suffering as punishment for
sin.
The second, and more consistent, element in
Rubenstein's analysis of religious life is his attempt to
deconstruct Jewish practice. He argues that rejection of
the covenant need not entail the rejection of Judaism.
Indeed, rejection of the covenant renders Jewish practice
all the more important:
I believe that in a world devoid of God we need
Torah, tradition, and the r eligious community far
more than in a world there God's presence was
meaningfully experienced,
Religious community is all that remains of the Jewish
religious framework. In 'Covenant and Holocaust',
Rubenstein appeals to biblical scholarship to argue that
the covenant was primarily a social, rather than a
religious, institution. Its purpose was to bind together a
disparate group of tribes by appealing to a common
historical experience, thus creating a code of moral
obligation. 28 He argues that it is legitimate to
deconstruct Jewish practice in the light of this fact.
Festivals such as the Passover can be deconstructed and
understood as re-enactments of this communal binding
together. The Bar-Mitzvah can be understood as a rite of
passage, initiating a child into full group-membership.
The logical conclusion of this process lies in
Rubenstein's assertion that the individual Jew is free to
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accept or reject any, or all, of Torah's 613 mitzvot
(commandments). The individual Jew accepts those
commandments which he finds meaningful for his existence.
Thus, in line with his rejection of the covenant, the
sacred origin of Torah is denied. The Torah derives its
authoritative status from the fact that Jews choose to
make it the basis of their religious life.
However, does a deconstructed Judaism provide a
meaningful basis for religious life. Those forms of
Judaism which emphasise Torah observance, i.e. Orthodox
Judaism, insist upon both belief in the covenant and the
divine origin of Torah. Can Jewish practice maintain a
vital existence without acceptance of these two root
claims? The current crisis within Reform Judaism,
particularly in the United States, suggests that it
cannot:
The serious crisis in contemporary Reform Judaism is
witness to the limitations of this view while the
return to more traditional forms and the reinclusion
of more mitzvot into Reform Judaism is evidence of
the at least tacit admission that the "translation"
technique by which Judaism is translated into non-
Jewish criteria, has many negative consequences both
for the quality of one's Jewish life as well as for
Jewish survival. Judaism as a community of shared
values dies, as , nrecent history indicates, under
these procedures.'
This criticism by Steven Katz is borne out by the fact
that the vital area of contemporary Judaism is undoubtedly
the Orthodox. By contrast, Reform Judaism, both in Israel
and the United States is going through a period of crisis
as a consequence of decreasing numbers.
The inevitable conclusion is that Rubenstein's
definition of religious life is insufficiently Jewish to
be attractive. Despite his emphasis on the social function
of religion, he fails to acknowledge the fact that an
important part of this function is the provision of a
clear sense of identity. Ironically, the success of
covenantal Judaism lies precisely in its provision of
such an identity; the very area where Rubenstein's
proposals are weakest. Second, Rubenstein again offers a
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caricature of contemporary Judaism: those who reject his
proposals do not necessarily embrace the traditional
theodicy of suffering as a punishment for sin. This
definition can neither be applied to secular Jews, nor to
those whose religious ideas parallel the responses of
Berkovits, Fackenheim, or Wiesel.
2. 4. REFLECTIONS ON MASS DEATH: 
With the publication of The Cunning of History (1975),
Rubenstein turned his attention to a socio-political
analysis of the Holocaust. The reason for this transition
is twofold. First, he argues that the uniqueness of the
Holocaust lies in the fact that the Jews' traditional
responses to persecution: martyrdom and conversion were no
longer viable options. Second, the theological
significance of the Holocaust cannot be confined to
reconciling the covenant with radical evil. The Holocaust
profoundly challenges Jewish ethics, specifically the
claim that humanity is created in the image of God and
that there is a consensus concerning human rights.
The most controversial section in The Cunning of
History concentrates on the role of the Judenrate—the
Jewish Councils--in the Holocaust. Rubenstein's argument
builds upon his understanding of the uniqueness of the
Holocaust. The event was unique because it denied the Jews
the possibility of martyrdom or conversion. The Jews
traditionally responded to persecution by attempting to
buy off their persecutors, or by petitioning local
authorities (either secular or clerical) for mercy. If
these strategies failed, the Jews could either convert (as
in Medieval Spain, in the case of the Marranos), or they
could embrace death in faith (following the example of
early martyrs, such as Rabbi Akiba or Rabbi Ishmael). The
Holocaust was unique among Jewish historical catastrophe
because these options were no longer available:
Auschwitz was qualitatively different from other
Jewish catastrophes. In all other misfortunes it was
usually possible for Jews to remain alive either
through surrender or apostasy	 The Germans
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deprived ,t,.,he Jews of the final dignity of
martyrdom.Ju
Martyrdom can only be applied to the Holocaust if it is
reinterpreted to refer to those who died because they were
Jewish, as in the description of the Six Million as
Kedoshim.
In defining the Holocaust as unique in this way,
Rubenstein does not deny the role played by Christian
theological anti-Judaism. Christian anti-Jewish
teaching contributed to the "acceptability" of the Nazi
choice of the Jew as scape-goat. 31 . However, Rubenstein
points to the need to recognise both the continuity and
the discontinuity between Christian anti-Judaism and Nazi
racial anti-Semitism. To recognise the latter is not to
excuse the former. The discontinuity lay in the racial
definition of Judaism: once Jewishness was defined
racially, rather than religiously, conversion no longer
constituted an alternative. Nazi persecution differed from
religious persecution--it was inexorable:
Where Christianity usually rested content in seeking
to convince the Jews of the error of their ways and
to seek error's remedy in conversion, Nazism had no
interest in regarding the Jews as anything but
objects to be exterminated. Nothing the Jews could
do by way of confession, submission, surrender,
betrayal or apostasy could havA altered their
destined roles in the Nazi system.'
The lack of an adequate response to the Holocaust by both
Jews and Christians can be explained in part by the
failure to recognise the discontinuity between Nazi anti-
Semitism and previous anti-Jewish policies.
This failure was particularly catastrophic for the
Jewish community in that it hampered attempts at organised
resistance. The Judenrite, in mediating between the Jews'
and their aggressors, were reacting in time-honoured
fashion, and in a way that had been successful in averting
or minimising such threats in the past. Initially, the
Holocaust was perceived in terms of the recent past; an
illusion actively encouraged by the Nazis: the Jews were
to be exploited as a labour force. Rubenstein suggests
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that the Nazis exploited the fact that Jewish Diaspora
existence was a "culture of submission and surrender".33
Jewish history could point to few examples of armed
resistance; the majority of which were unsuccessful, as
in the case of the revolts against Rome in 65 and 135.
Emphasis was placed on those who accepted death in faith,
rather than those who resisted. The Jewish communities
therefore had little precedent for active opposition to
oppression:
At no time in the two-thousand year history of
diaspora Judaism before the Holocaust were Jews
prepared to resist unto death, although tEw often
chose death rather than betray their faith."
Rubenstein is careful to point out that this is not a
criticism of the JudenrAte. He is attempting to identify
the factors which informed the Jewish response to Nazism,
one of which was a widespread failure to recognise the
unique character of Nazi anti-Semitism; a failure which
was understandable in view of the parallel continuity with
Christian anti-Judaism.
A clear understanding of the uniqueness of the
Holocaust is a pre-requisite for any theological response.
If it is claimed that the Holocaust is a radically new
event in Jewish history demanding a new, or reinterpreted,
theology, it is essential to be clear precisely why this
is the case. As we shall see, the confusion in Eliezer
Berkovits' response largely stems from a lack of clarity
concerning the uniqueness, or otherwise, of the Holocaust.
In Rubenstein's analysis, the uniqueness of the Holocaust
is twofold. First, it excluded the possibility of
conversion or martyrdom. Second, its essential modernity
undermines the fundamental claims of Jewish ethics
concerning the value of humanity as created in the image
of God.
The Cunning of History is dominated by Rubenstein's
claim that:
the Holocaust bears witness to the advance of
civilization to the point at which large scale
massacre is no longer a crime and the state's
sovereign powers are such that millions can be
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stripped of their rUhts and condemned to the world
of the living dead.'
Such a claim poses a twofold challenge to both Jewish and
Christian ethics. First, technically speaking, the Nazis
committed no crime in the Holocaust, hence the creation of
the charge "crimes against humanity" at the Nuremberg
Trials. The Holocaust therefore illustrates that "human
rights" have no legal status; the belief in the innate
dignity of humanity is a ethical / theological category.
Second, the Holocaust makes a mockery of the assertion
that humanity is created in the image of God: human
dignity only exists in as far as it is allowed to exist.
Rubenstein pays greater attention to the first of
these two points. He emphasises the fact that the Nazis
formed a constitutionally elected Government. The
Holocaust must be seen as:
the first attempt by a modern, legally constituted
state to pursue a policy of bureaucratically
organized ,g,nocide both within and beyond its own
frontiers.-3°
In carrying out their anti-Jewish policies, the Nazis
employed a highly developed state bureaucracy, and relied
upon the co-operation of the army, the police force,
industry, the medical professions, and the transport
networks. The Holocaust is therefore a product of modern
technology and bureaucracy. The death-camps themselves
were geared to the industrialised production of mass
death. As far as criminal law is concerned, the whole
process was entirely legal: the Nazis stripped the Jews of
citizenship, and then changed the Nationality Law in order
to strip them of Reich nationality; the Jews lost their
rights of nationality automatically upon deportation. On
arrival in the death-camps the Jews were stateless, and
therefore without legal rights. The problems raised by the
creation of a new criminal category--"crimes against
humanity"--to cover the Holocaust are acute. 37 Rubenstein
suggests that human rights are thus shown to be dependent
on the individual being a recognised member of a group--
the Nuremberg Laws removed this recognition from the Jews:
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they became a racial group with no legal rights. The loss
of legal rights rendered the Jews a "surplus population",
and as such they were expendable: either as a slave-labour
force, or as a target for extermination:
The history of the twentieth century has taught us
that people who are rendered permanently superfluous
are eventually condemned to segregated preciAts of
the living dead or are exterminated outright."
The Stalinist purges and the Soviet system of labour-camps
provide further illustrations of this principle.
The corollary of the above is that human dignity is
not viewed as an innate characteristic. As far as
Rubenstein is concerned it is irrelevant whether humanity
is created in the image of God: this fact had no bearing
on events in the Holocaust:
Theologians or moralists may argue that all men
possess some God-given irreducible measure of
dignity, but such talk will neither deter future
emulators of gle Nazis nor comfort realistically
their victims.'
Rubenstein suggests that the breakthrough came with the
mechanised slaughter of the First World War. Once the
enemy or victim becomes faceless, there is less need for a
moral code: engagement with the enemy / victim becomes
defined in abstract terms. He argues that modernity is
marked by an absence of limits. When everything is
possible, human rights become a luxury. The Holocaust was
a bureaucratic problem that was solved when "gas chambers
with a capacity for killing two thousand people at a time
were installed at Auschwitz". 40 Rubenstein ties this
argument in with his interpretation of the Judenrgte. The
Nazis' bureaucratic success lay in organizing "an entire
people for its own extermination". 41
Rubenstein therefore argues that the Holocaust should
be seen as the "shadowside" of modernity. The positive
achievements of modernity are obvious; the Holocaust
suggests that these successes are only attained at a
price: the Holocaust was only possible because of the
advance in civilization, in terms of technology and
bureaucracy. As a consequence, he suggests that the
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Holocaust should undermine optimism concerning the
beneficial effects of civilization and human nature.42
CONCLUSION: 
Rubenstein's work is notable both for its clarity and its
intellectual honesty. He poses the theological problem of
the Holocaust with considerable force. In one sense, the
hostility that his work has aroused can be seen as a
compliment: it has touched a nerve within the American
Jewish community.
Rubenstein's distance from the Jewish tradition, both
in terms of background and education, has both positive
and negative repercussions. Positive, because such
distancing enables him to be more open to the work of
those such as Arendt, who are viewed with suspicion by the
Jewish community. In The Cunning of History, Rubenstein
strives to present a detached portrayal of the mechanisms
governing the actions of both victims and perpetrators. He
asserts that such detachment is an essential pre-requisite
for writing on this subject: all feelings of sympathy for
the victim or hostility towards the perpetrators must be
excluded. 42 Although it is arguable whether such extreme
detachment is either possible or desirable, a certain
degree of detachment from the Jewish community's concerns
is essential for a treatment of the subject of the
Judenrate and Jewish co-operation with the Nazis. Writers,
such as Berkovits or Fackenheim, who are more in tune with
the wider Jewish community are noticeably more reluctant
to interpret Nazism within the wider framework of
totalitarianism. Fackenheim in particular is critical of
Rubenstein's analysis of the Holocaust in terms of the
twentieth century phenomenon of mass death. 43 Rubenstein's
awareness of non-Jewish, or purely secular treatments of
the Holocaust allows him to place the Event in an inter-
disciplinary context. He is also acutely aware of the need
for such a context: a religious response to the Holocaust
demands a clear answer to the question of the Event's
uniqueness. If the Holocaust is deemed unique, such a
definition requires an interpretation of Nazism, which in
- 55 -
turn requires an awareness of the political and historical
debate over the nature of Nazism; the role played by anti-
Semitism in the Nazi programme; and the nature of the
Holocaust itself. 44 The clarity of Rubenstein's argument
stems, in part, from the separation of his theological
response to the Holocaust and his definition of
uniqueness. This progression stands in contrast to
Berkovits (who only offers a theological definition of
Nazism) and Fackenheim (who offers a theological
interpretation of the Holocaust, and only gradually
develops a historical reading of Nazism).
The negative effect of Rubenstein's distance from
traditional Judaism is evident in his treatment of the
dialectic of covenantal promise and counter-testimony. He
never acknowledges the significance of theological
reinterpretation under the impact of historical disaster.
Rubenstein regards the alternative as a clear-cut choice
between the theodicy of suffering as a punishment for sin
and the rejection of the covenant. However, this was never
the only alternative: Jewish theology has never been
unequivocally centred around this theodicy; there are
alternatives even in the Bible. If Rubenstein's analysis
is accepted, then the developments of Rabbinic theology,
Lurianic Kabbalah, and Hasidism would have to be dismissed
as "gloss". The major developments in Jewish theology stem
from the belief that reinterpretation of the covenant is a
valid response to historical counter-testimony: belief has
to remain credible by continually adapting itself to new
situations. Those who attempt to reinterpret the covenant
in the aftermath of the Holocaust are thus following a
deeply Jewish impulse. To reject belief as no longer
feasible after the Holocaust is an option to be considered
after attempting to reinterpret the covenant, not before.
In Rubenstein's interpretation, the dialectic of promise
and counter-testimony has not broken down, it has never
been deemed to exist, except in the stereotyped form of
counter-testimony as punishment for sin. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that Rubenstein reads a rejection of the
covenant back into Jewish history: if the theodicy of "for
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our sins we are punished" was the only alternative,
rejection of the covenant would have been more widespread
in the past. The fact that such rejection was not
widespread was due to the existence of an alternative, in
the form of reinterpretation of the covenant.
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3. ELIEZER BERKOVITS: FAITH AFTER THE HOLOCAUST. 
3. 1. INTRODUCTION.
3. 2. FAITH HISTORY AND POWER HISTORY.
3. 3. GALUT: ISRAEL IN EXILE.
3. 4. HESTER PANIM: THE HIDING OF GOD'S FACE.
3. 5. WITH GOD IN HELL.
3. 6. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE HOLOCAUST.
3. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
Eliezer Berkovits' response to the Holocaust marks the
opposite extreme to Richard Rubenstein. The latter argues
that the Holocaust bears witness to the end of covenantal
faith; the former asserts that it poses no radical
challenge to religious faith: the Holocaust poses, albeit
on a drastically larger scale, the same challenge as the
death of a single innocent child. Whereas, Rubenstein
represents the third of Greenberg's responses to
historical counter-testimony, Berkovits represents the
first. As such, Berkovits' work provides an illustration
of the inherent limitations of any Orthodox response to
the Holocaust. He initially asserts that the Holocaust is
historically, but not theologically unique. However, there
is increasing ambivalence over the latter half of this
assertion. In effect, Berkovits is torn between the claim
that the Holocaust is not theologically unique, and his
recognition that the event has had a profound existential
impact on Jewish religious consciousness. He responds by
attempting to construct a theodicy that is capable of
meeting the challenge of the Holocaust, yet relies solely
on the existing resources of the tradition.
Berkovits' strategy reflects his position as an
"insider", as opposed to Rubenstein's status as
"outsider". He responds to the Holocaust by turning to
resources within the Jewish tradition, rather than calling
upon the external resources of Freudian psychology and
Existentialist philosophy. This strict reliance on the
existing tradition is both a strength and a weakness. A
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strength, because unlike Rubenstein, Berkovits is acutely
aware of the spectrum of traditional response to
historical disaster; a weakness, because his reliance on
the tradition tends to blind him to the validity of the
concerns of the non-Orthodox. Thus, he dismisses the
response of Rubenstein as "shadowy and unreal", failing to
acknowledge the significance of the questions he raises
concerning the morality of the traditional theodicy "for
our sins we are punished" as a response to the Holocaust.1
Berkovits rejects this theodicy, but fails to recognise
that in doing so he is inadvertently agreeing with
Rubenstein, at least in part. 2 The major weakness of
Berkovits' approach is that, in his concern to defend
the tradition against the radical challenge of Rubenstein,
he refuses to listen to the questions being raised. Thus,
his response, although doubtless convincing to those who
hold similar beliefs, fails to address the concerns of the
non-Orthodox: Berkovits' response is for the benefit of
"insiders", rather than an attempt to make such a response
convincing to a non-Orthodox audience.
Berkovits' response to the Holocaust takes a deeply
traditional form: he offers an interpretation of the
covenant in terms of Israel's function in history as the
witness to God's presence. The Holocaust is interpreted
within the context of this covenantal reading of history,
and particularly in terms of Berkovits' understanding of
Galut--exile. Israel's history reflects the divine exile:
God has to withdraw from creation in order to provide
humanity with the freedom necessary to existence.
Similarly, the Jews live in exile "among the nations". The
Holocaust is interpreted as the confrontation of "power
history" (the nations) and "faith history" (the Jews as
the witnesses to God's presence in creation). Berkovits'
response to the Holocaust is therefore to construct a
theodicy on the basis of a form of the free-will defence
and the biblical concept of Hester Panim--the hiding of
God's face. God has to withdraw from history in order to
allow humanity to exercise free-will. Freedom is
necessarily open to abuse; abuse that culminates in the
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Holocaust. Berkovits' theodicy combines with his reading
of covenantal theodicy in his distinction between
"authentic" and "inauthentic" Jews. The former are the
pious Jews of Eastern Europe who embraced death as
providing an opportunity for Kiddush haShem; the latter
are the assimilated Jews of Western Europe. In effect,
Berkovits interprets the Holocaust as a demonic attack on
the spiritual values of "faith history" as typified by
"authentic" Jews in the ghettos and deathcamps of Eastern
Europe. Throughout, there is a constant ambivalence over
the status of the Holocaust. Berkovits is reluctant to
grant the theological uniqueness of the Holocaust, but is
drawn towards this position almost in spite of himself.
3. 2. FAITH HISTORY AND POWER HISTORY:
The very existence of the Jewish people is
suggestive of another dimension of reality and
meaning in which the main preoccupations of the man
of power history are adjudged futile and futureless
in the long run.'
Berkovits agrees with Elchonon Wassermann in interpreting
the covenant as a call for the Jews to exist as a people
living apart. The Jews are elected and set apart, to act
as witnesses to the divine presence in history. He argues
that history is only possible because God withdraws His
manifest presence, thus allowing human freedom. The
presence of God is indirect: the Jews as Chosen People
symbolise the hidden divine presence. If the Jews are
faithful to the covenant, they bear witness to this hidden
presence. If they are faithless, knowledge of the divine
presence is lost. Berkovits thus interprets history as a
confrontation between two forces. The dominant force is
"power history", typified by Christianity and Western
culture. Berkovits regards "power history" as essentially
aggressive and imperialistic. By contrast, "faith
history", as typified by the Jews, relies upon faith in
God to ensure survival. Jewish survival, despite centuries
of persecution, is the best proof that the Jews represent
"faith history":
The survival of the Jew, his capacity for revival
after catastrophe such as had eliminated mighty
nations and empires, indicate the mysterious
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intrusi9n of a spiritual dimension into the history
of man.'
Anti-Semitism marks the recurrent attempt of Christianity
qua "power history" to destroy this "spiritual dimension".
The Jews, by their very existence, pass judgement on the
values of Christianity.
Berkovits stands out among Jewish thinkers because of
the depth of his hostility to Christianity. He argues that
the Jews provided the means by which God tested Christian
culture. The existence of Christian anti-Judaism marked
Christianity's rejection of the "spiritual dimension" in
history. Hostility to the Jews thus becomes hostility to
God's purposes. The Holocaust, as the culmination of
Christian anti-Jewish teaching, illustrates the moral
bankruptcy of both Christianity and Western culture.
Berkovits thus lays the entire responsibility for the
Holocaust at Christianity's door. The lack of widespread
opposition to the Holocaust undermines any Christian claim
to "moral and spiritual leadership in the world". 5 Thus,
the Holocaust is a tragedy for both Judaism and
Christianity. It is a tragedy for Jews because of their
status as victims. It is a tragedy for Christians because
it marks the end of any claim to "dignity and respect".6
Berkovits rejects any Jewish-Christian dialogue on the
subject of the Holocaust: there is nothing that Christians
can say to Jews. Dialogue may be possible a long time in
the future, but only if Christianity illustrates its
repentance in deeds toward the Jewish people:
For Jewry as a whole, an honest fraternal dialogue
with Christianity is at this stage emotionally
impossible. The majority of Jews still mourn in a
very personal sense. In a hundred years, perhaps,
depending on Christian deeds towar4 Jews we may be
emotionally ready for the dialogue.'
The apparent increase in Christian tolerance towards other
religions is merely a reflection of the Church's concern
at its own minority status. Tolerance is a reaction to a
changed balance of power: Christianity only offers
tolerance to others because it depends upon it itself in
countries that are either communist or increasingly
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secular. As an Orthodox thinker, Berkovits dismisses the
need for any contact with Christianity:
As far as Jews are concerned, Judaism is fully
sufficient. There is nothing in Christianity for
them. Whatever in Christianity is acceptable to them
is borrowed from Judaism.... And whatever is not
Jewi§h in Christianity is not acceptable to the
Jew.°
In his view, there are emotionally powerful reasons
against dialogue: Christianity bears the guilt for
engendering sufficient hatred of the Jews to enable the
Holocaust to take place and then continue unimpeded.
Equally, there is no corresponding positive theological
motive for dialogue: Christianity is of no interest to
Jews.
Berkovits' interpretation of Nazism is contextualised
within his understanding of the confrontation between
power history and faith history. Nazism, as the
culmination of Western culture, builds upon the legacy of
Christian anti-Jewish teaching. The Holocaust itself
represented power history's attempt to destroy faith
history once and for all. In exterminating the Jews,
Nazism was hoping to eradicate the "spiritual dimension"
of history:
there was a direct confrontation between Hitler's
Germany and the people of Judaism because the Nazi
ideology was essentially not a political one, but a
nihilistic rebellion against all human values and a
satanic defacing of he divine image of which man is
the bearer on earth.'
Consistent with this interpretation, Berkovits places
great emphasis on the persecution of devout Jews, and the
desecration of Torah scrolls, synagogues, and Jewish
cemeteries. He argues that in effectively wiping out
Eastern European Jewry, the Nazis destroyed Judaism's
"most important spiritual reservoir". The Holocaust was
not so much a war against the Jews, but rather an attempt
to destroy the "creative vitality of the Jewish people".10
Armed resistance was thus less important than spiritual
resistance. In continuing to pray and follow Jewish law,
the "authentic" Jews of Eastern Europe were waging their
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own war against the Nazi attempt to eradicate the
"spiritual dimension" of history. The problems inherent in
Berkovits' definition of Nazism will be discussed in
sections 3. 5 and 3. 6.
Berkovits' interpretation of the covenant in terms of
power history and faith history provides the framework for
his theological response to the Holocaust. He differs from
Rubenstein in emphasising the centrality of Israel's
election. Rather than rejecting the concept of election as
a consequence of the Holocaust, he argues that it was a
primary cause. It was because the Nazis recognised the
true nature of the Jews' election that they initiated the
Holocaust. Whereas Rubenstein considers Israel's election
and the Holocaust to be morally incompatible, Berkovits
employs the same concept as the Holocaust's raison d'atre
The parallel with Elchonon Wassermann is again striking.
Both thinkers view assimilation as an doomed attempt to
escape the responsibility of election; both because
Western culture is unworthy of membership, and it is
essentially hostile to Jews. Berkovits would doubtless
agree with Wassermann that the Holocaust proves the
futility of Jewish assimilation.
3. 3. GALUT: ISRAEL IN EXILE: 
mankind has its own goals such as passion for power,
desire for domination, for possessions and
pleasures, such egoistic human drives deny the
divine purpose in the creation of man. As a result
God's own purpose finds itself in Exile in the
history of mankind....It is this exile that is prior
to, and at the root of the national exile. It is on
account of this that tiln history of the Jewish
people begins with exile."
Galut or exile is central to Berkovits' understanding of
the covenant, and is the means by which he anchors his
interpretation of faith history and power history in the
Jewish tradition. There are two dimensions to Galut: the
cosmic exile of the divine presence in history and the
historical exile of the Jews in the Diaspora; the latter
is a reflection of the former. The establishment of the
State of Israel is central to Berkovits' analysis: it ends
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the historical exile of the Jewish people, and as such
constitutes a significant stage in the messianic process.
In arguing that exile is a metaphysical
characteristic of God, Berkovits is building upon the
rabbinic concept of the Shekhinah and Luria's concept of
Tzimtzum. In allowing human freedom, God creates the
possibility for power history. In doing so, He ensures
that His purposes remain unrealised: the Jews are a
minority witnessing to the divine presence in the hostile
environment of power history. Thus, the historical
suffering and isolation of the Jews is a reflection of
Galut haShekhinah, the exile of the divine presence. The
historical exile of the Jews and the cosmic exile of the
divine presence will only end with the coming of the
Messiah.
Exile is therefore an integral characteristic of
Jewish history. Indeed, Berkovits argues that Jewish
history begins with a command to go into exile:
Go from your country and your kindred and your
father's house to the land that I will show you. And
I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless
you, and make your name great, so that you will be a
blessing.(Gen. 12: 1-2)
Exile is thus a prerequisite of Jewish history in the same
way that divine self-limitation was a necessary precursor
of creation. It is this sharing in the cosmic Galut that
renders the Jews a Chosen People. In the command to
Abraham, future promise is conditional on him accepting
the burden of exile. It is the promise of Gelulah--
redemption—that enables the Jews to endure exile. Thus,
messianic hope centres on the expectation of an end to
Galut, in the form of a return to the land of Israel.
In Berkovits' analysis, the Jews' historical exile
begins with the call to Abraham; national exile begins
with the Hurban, the end of sovereignty and the dispersion
of the Jews. However, national exile should not be
interpreted purely in negative terms: it called the Jews
to a new level of covenantal responsibility, challenging
them to typify faith history while living among "other
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nations". Thus, he argues that the suffering of national
exile has also been the source of Jewish survival. 12 . The
Holocaust, as the determined attempt of power history to
eradicate faith history, threatened to overwhelm the
spiritual resources of the latter. In Berkovits' analysis,
the establishment of Eretz Israel was the only possible
response to the Holocaust; it alone enabled the Jews to
continue witnessing to the "spiritual dimension" of
history. The Holocaust threatened to destroy Galut through
extermination. The Return to Eretz Israel was an essential
counter-testimony to annihilation:
The rise of the State of Israel, after two millennia
of ... Exile and at the moment when it occurred, has
become the reviving force, calling back to life the
"dry bones" of the shattered Galut. Divine
Providence had no choice but to grant us a measure
of natipnal redemption to meet the national
Hurban.li
Whereas Rubenstein interprets the establishment of the
State of Israel as a consequence of the Jews' rejection of
providence, Berkovits views it as proof of the continuing
validity of both divine providence and Israel's election.
In one sense, Berkovits' approach is the more consistent:
he allows both the Holocaust and the State of Israel to be
read as "barometers" of God's disposition towards His
people. If the Holocaust is to be interpreted as counter-
testimony, it is only logical to argue that a positive
event such as the State of Israel be accredited with the
positive status of promise. Rubenstein is logically at
fault in accepting the former, but refusing to countenance
the possibility of the latter. The insistence on viewing
the Holocaust within the continuum of Jewish history is
one of the strengths of Berkovits' position.
However, surely the establishment of the State of
Israel marks the end of the Jews' exile from power
history: in establishing a nation state, defending it by
military force, and attaining a nuclear capacity, the
Israelis are relying upon the means of power history
rather than faith? Berkovits disputes such a claim by
arguing that Israel's continuing existence is only
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explicable in terms of divine involvement in history. He
interprets Israel's political isolation as a continuation
of the state of Galut, despite the end of national exile:
As a state, Israel is in exile in power history just
as Jews as a scattered people were in exile in the
"wilderness of the nations". Israel's strength must
come from the same resources from which the survival
power of the Jew came in the past--from within the
Jewish pepple, from within the Jew, from his heart
and mind."
Israel continues in exile, in that she can never become
like other nations. In attempting to become a state like
any other, Israel fails in her vocation. Berkovits
suggests that the Yom Kippur war (1973) provided a
salutary reminder of this fact: Israel can never be other
than an exile among the nations. 15 He grudgingly
acknowledges that Israel avails herself of the trappings
of power history in order to ensure her survival, but
argues that this is done in "the spirit and the methods of
faith history".16
There are obvious difficulties with Berkovits'
interpretation of the State of Israel. He freely admits
that his analysis offers a "metaphysical interpretation of
Jewish existence". 17 . For substantiating evidence, he
appeals to continued Jewish survival: survival after the
Holocaust, followed by the establishment of the State of
Israel, and victories in the Six Day War (1967) and the
Yom Kippur War, provide illustrations of both God's
providential care and Israel's status as witness to the
divine presence in history. However, such claims belong to
the realm of faith, being neither provable or falsifiable.
Military setbacks, such as initial Egyptian successes in
the Yom Kippur War are regarded as divine reminders,
rather than counter-testimony. Despite his claims to the
contrary, Berkovits is as reluctant as Rubenstein to admit
evidence to stand counter to his thesis. Whereas
Rubenstein reinterprets the establishment of Israel as
proof of Israeli rejection of the covenant, rather than
allowing it to stand as promise; Berkovits reinterprets
all negative counter-testimony in terms of power history
of hisnature
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and faith history: disaster is either equated with power
history's attempt to destroy faith history, or is
interpreted as a divine reprimand--reminding Israel of the
futility of striving to assimilate and become like other
nations.
Even if Berkovits' analysis of power history and
faith history is deemed convincing, a question mark hangs
over the credibility of his treatment of the State of
Israel. Can Israeli policy be described in terms of faith
history rather than power history? It is possible to
present a cogent case for this argument with reference to
the events of 1948, 1963, and 1973, but what of the
invasion of Lebanon (1982) and the Intifada? The latter
events are qualitatively different from previous
campaigns: in 1948, 1967, and 1973, Israel was on the
defensive, rather than being the aggressor. Michael
Berenbaum suggests that Berkovits' analysis is "naive,
distorted, and dangerous", in that it ignores the
realities of Israel's political situation. Israel may be
geographically isolated, in being surrounded by hostile
Arab countries. However, it is ridiculous to talk of
Israel being politically isolated in view of the
substantial financial and military aid provided by the
United States. As a nuclear force, Israel has undeniably
entered the domain of power history, and it has done so as
such a move "provides the only possible assurance for
survival". 18 To view Israel solely in terms of faith
history is
unreasonable
ironic that
politics is
despite the questionable
establishment
and imposes an
the State. It is
current Israeli
than Berkovits',
analysis of the
of the State.19rationale behind the
both politically naive,
burden of expectation upon
Rubenstein's analysis of
ultimately more realistic
3. 4. HESTER PANIM: THE HIDING OF GOD'S FACE: 
While God tolerates the sinner, he must abandon the
victim; while he shows forbearance with the wicked,
he must turn a deaf ear to the anguished cries of
the violated. This is the ultimate tragedy of
existence: God's very mercy and forbearance, his
very love for man, necessitates the abandonment of
some men to a fate they may well experience as
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divine
suffering. ifference	 to	 justice	 and	 human
Berkovits echoes other Orthodox responses to the Holocaust
in refusing to see the event as theologically unique. He
challenges the validity of Rubenstein's claim that the
Holocaust constitutes sufficient counter-testimony to end
faith in the covenant. Whereas Rubenstein sees the
challenge as a choice between belief in God as Lord of
History (with the corollary that Hitler be viewed as the
agent of divine punishment), and rejection of the
covenant; Berkovits views the Holocaust as one
illustration of the challenge posed to belief by innocent
suffering. He therefore argues that quantity makes no
difference:
the suffering of a single innocent child poses no
less a problem to faith than the undeserved
suffering of millions. As far as one's faith in a
personal God is concerned, there is no difference
between Aix, five, four million victims or one
million."
For Berkovits, there is no need to respond to the
Holocaust as such: the question at issue is the broader
one of theodicy, the justification of God's ways to
humanity. In Faith after the Holocaust, he sets out to
defend a conception of God that permits such suffering as
the Holocaust, rather than responding to the event per se.
The conception of God articulated by Berkovits synthesises
a form of the free-will defence and the rabbinic image of
Hester Panim, the Hiding of God's Face.
Berkovits' reliance on a form of the free-will
defence is consistent with his reading of Jewish history
as faith history, and his understanding of Galut. The idea
of Galut haShekhinah, the Exile of the Divine Presence, is
intrinsically linked with an emphasis upon free will. God
withdraws in order to allow creation to occur. In
Berkovits' reading, this withdrawal is not only necessary
to provide space for creation to take place. In
withdrawing the divine presence, or going into cosmic
exile, God allows humanity the exercise of free will.
Thus, he argues that free will is essential to creation:
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freedom and responsibility are of the very essence
of man. Without them man is not human. If there is
to be man, he must be allowed to make his choices in
freedom. If he has such freedom, he 3411 use it.
Using it, he will often use it wrongly."
The confrontation between power history and faith history
reflects, broadly speaking, the respective abuse and
correct use of free will. In the Holocaust, Nazism qua
power history abused free will in an attempt to
exterminate the Jews qua faith history.
Berkovits acknowledges that the fate of the innocent
in this scenario is unjustified suffering, but he argues
that the existence of free will is necessary. He suggests
that there is ultimately a choice between justice and
human freedom:
he who demands justice of God must give up on man;
he who asks for God's,Xpve and mercy beyond justice
must accept suffering.4J
Berkovits denies that, in adopting this position, he is
justifying suffering. Within history, innocent suffering
remains "unforgiveable".24 However, although
unforgiveable, suffering is to be accepted in faith.
Ultimately, humanity cannot seek to comprehend the ways of
providence, but can only respond in faith. He denies that
this strategy illustrates "a willingness to forgive the
unheard cries of millions". 25 The injustice is only
temporary, in that there is "a dimension beyond history in
which all suffering finds its redemption through God.".26
He also counters the charge that the God of the covenant
is a God who constantly intervenes in history. The
covenant necessitates divine withdrawal from history: the
partnership between God and the Jews qua Chosen People
relies upon the exercise of free will. Interventions in
history, such as the Exodus, are miracles, rather than the
norm. By this definition, a miracle is an event outside
history; thus the Exodus does not set a precedent for
future expectation that God will intervene in history. The
Exodus cannot therefore be cited to support the contention
that God should have intervened to stop the Holocaust.
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Berkovits further develops his response to the
Holocaust by appealing to the rabbinic concept of Hester
Panim. In doing so, he further develops his reliance on
the free will defence. The concept of Hester Panim
combines with that of Galut haShekhinah to express the
nature of the self-limitation of divine power. Berkovits
interprets the biblical accounts as reflecting two
understandings of God's presence in history. In the first
reading, God intervenes in history to ensure that the
righteous prosper and the wicked suffer. The second
reading, recognises that this is too simplistic. Instead
of history being interpreted in terms of rewards and
punishments, the emphasis is either upon the unjust
suffering of the innocent, or on the ultimate triumph of
the weak over the strong (1 Sam. 2: 1-10). The problem
facing the believer is the apparent divine lack of concern
at the fate of the innocent; a problem considered at
length in Job and Ecclesiastes. The concept of Hester
Panim represents one attempt to respond to this problem.
Initially, the Hiding of God's Face was held to be a
punishment for sin:
Then they will cry to the LORD, but he will not
answer them; / he will hide his face from them at
that time, / because they have made their deeds
evil. (Micah 3: 4)
However, the Hiding of God's Face is also seen as
inexplicable in the face of the suffering of the faithful:
How long, 0 LORD? Wilt thou / forget me for ever?
How long wilt thou hide thy face / from me? How long
must I bear pain in my / soul, / and have sorrow in
my heart all the / day? / How long shall my enemy be
exalted / over me? (Ps. 13:1-2)
Berkovits develops the latter response to argue that God
is essentially a God who hides: divine hiddenness is the
necessary consequence of Galut haShekhinah. The cosmic
exile is necessary if humanity is to have free will. If
human freedom is to be meaningful, then God must
necessarily hide Himself. He finds traditional support for
this argument in the rabbinic concept of the Shekhinah,
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and in biblical references to hiddenness as a divine
characteristic:
Truly, thou art a God who hidest / thyself, / 0 God
of Israel, the Saviour. (Isa. 45: 15).
Thus, divine hiddenness is not a reaction to human action,
but an essential attribute. Hiddenness is essential to
God's role as Saviour. Berkovits argues that goodness is
an essential quality of God, as is perfection. In being
perfect and incapable of the unethical, God lacks the
ability to strive after perfection. This value belongs
solely to mankind. Divine hiddenness is essential to allow
humanity the perfection that is necessary if the striving
after perfection is to be meaningful. In hiding Himself,
God thus enables humanity to seek salvation through
striving after perfection in the form of covenantal
obedience.
In the context of the Holocaust, the Hiding of God's
Face both enables the Nazis to abuse free will in
attempting to exterminate the Jews, and allows the
"authentic" Jew the opportunity for Kiddush haShem in the
most extreme circumstances. However, Berkovits
acknowledges that the suffering in the Holocaust was so
extreme that it cast doubt on the morality of God's
continued hiddenness. The Holocaust differs from the story
of Job, the biblical paradigm of faith in the face of
divine hiddenness in one profound respect: there was no
voice from the whirlwind:
unlike the case of Job, God remained silent to the
very end of the tragedy and the millions in the
concentration camps were left alone to shift for
themselves in the midst of infinite despair....To
the very end God remained silent an in hiding.
Millions were looking for him--in vain."
Berkovits suggests that if it had not been for the
restatement of promise inherent in the establishment of
Eretz Israel, then the counter-testimony of the Holocaust
would have been sufficient to end faith in the covenant:
The state of Israel came at a moment in history when
nothing else could haxg saved Israel from extinction
through hopelessness."
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Berkovits dismisses the suggestion that the Holocaust
was a punishment for sin, arguing that such suffering was
"injustice absolute". He also acknowledges that it was
"injustice countenanced by God ” . 29 However, does
Berkovits' reliance upon a form of the free-will defence,
in conjunction with his concept of Hester Panim,
constitute an acceptable response to the Holocaust? There
are a number of levels that a critique of this theodicy
can take. The first concerns the adequacy of an appeal to
free will as a response to innocent suffering in general,
and to the Holocaust in particular. The main question
concerns the morality of such an appeal. Does the
assertion of divine hiddenness resolve the problem of
innocent suffering, or create additional difficulties:
Given the moral attributes, the qualities of love
and concern, that are integral to God's nature, how
can we rest in the assertion of his self-willed
absence, that is, in passivity,„in the face of the
murder of one million children?"
Berkovits asserts that the existence of free will
necessarily entails the risk of abuse, but that the
benefits are such as to merit such a risk. He acknowledges
that such a strategy sacrifices the victim in the interest
of preserving the free will of the aggressor. The
resulting suffering is inevitable, even though it can
never be justified except in "a dimension beyond history".
Are such claims justified? Steven Katz suggests not.
First, can such extensive suffering as that inherent in
the Holocaust be justified as the necessary price of free
will? Could not God have created a world in which there
was free will, but less evil? Furthermore, even if
Berkovits' argument is logically coherent, even
convincing, is it morally acceptable? In Berkovits'
analysis, there is a tendency to forget the individual
victims. He offers a logical explanation for the existence
of innocent suffering, rather than an emotionally or
morally satisfying response to the Holocaust.
The general nature of Berkovits' theodicy is
reflected in his attitude to numerical scale. He argues
that numbers make no difference: the challenge to faith in
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a personal God is the same whether the sufferer is one
innocent child or the six million Jews who died in the
Holocaust. However, is this the case? The problem is
doubtless the same as far as the philosophical
justification of God is concerned. Within the context of
covenantal faith, it is not. Berkovits freely admits that
in exterminating Eastern European Jewry, the Nazis wiped
out the spiritual centre of World Jewry. This
extermination occurred against the background of God's
covenantal promise to protect His Chosen People. The
challenge to covenant faith comes precisely from the
number of victims and the manner in which they died:
From the perspective of covenant theology, quantity
is decisive....If God is specially involved in the
destiny of the Jews, there is no escape from the
fact that the annihilation of almost half the world
Jewish population represents a gxeater problem than
the suffering of a small number.'
Berkovits himself admits that numbers are decisive when he
argues that only the establishment of the State of Israel
could counterbalance the hopelessness engendered by the
Holocaust.
The major difficulty with Berkovits' theodicy is its
"cost-effectiveness": the numerical price is too high.
Such a theodicy may be convincing to those who share
Berkovits' orthodoxy. To the non-Orthodox, such a theodicy
mocks the victims far more than it honours them". 32 There
is also the crucial issue of whether it is legitimate to
offer an interpretation of a victim's suffering that it is
incompatible with that individual's own beliefs.
Berkovits' theodicy is possibly legitimate if applied
solely to those among the Orthodox he deems to be
"authentic" Jews, but what of those with different, or no
beliefs? The question arises as to whether it is
legitimate to distinguish between "authentic" and
"inauthentic" Jews when all the victims died because they
were deemed racially Jewish by the Nazis.
3. 5. WITH GOD IN HELL: 
I who was not there, cannot reject, because to
reject would be a desecration of the myriads who
accepted their lot in faith. How dare I reject, if
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they accepted! Neither can I accept. I who was not
there, because I was not there, dare not accept,
dare not submit, because my brothers in their tens
of thousands, who did go through that hell, did
rebel, and did reject. How dare I, who was not
there, accept that superhuman suffering and submit
to it in faith!
The irony is that Berkovits' reliance on the free-will
defence and the concept of Hester Panim calls for
precisely this kind of acceptance and submission. In With
God in Hell Berkovits offers an "electrifying and soul-
stirring collection of tales of faith in extremis"34;
tales which serve to illustrate his definition of
"authentic" Jewishness. It is this demarcation between
"authentic" and "inauthentic" faith that undermines his
claim to suspend judgement.
Berkovits is adamant that the Holocaust marked the
confrontation of power history (in the form of a morally
corrupt Western European culture) and faith history. The
Jews' ability to meet this challenge was undermined by the
degree of "inauthentic" Jewishness, in the form of
assimilation. He regards Western European Jewry as
particularly corrupt because of the high level of
assimilation. The "authentic" Jew was thus isolated in his
attempt to combat the "religious befouling of purity and
innocence" that was the primary aim of Nazism. 35 In
persisting in bearing witness to their faith, the
"authentic" Jews engaged in battle with Nazism:
it was in the ghettos and concentration camps that
the dignity of man reached its highest
manifestation, commensurate in its greatness to the
abysmal depthis, of the moral bankruptcy of Western
civilization.'
Berkovits thus argues that the most effective resistance
to Nazism was that of the Hasidim and pious Jews of
Eastern Europe. In persisting in observing Torah even in
the ghettos and deathcamps, they bore witness to values
that were the very antithesis of Nazism. He argues that
the high fatalities among the Hasidim and the Orthodox
reflect their conviction that survival was not the main
priority.
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The central point at issue in Berkovits' analysis of
"authentic" Jewishness is a halachic one. The primary
commandment concerns the sanctification and preservation
of life. A recurrent question in the rabbinic Responsa of
the Nazi period is whether it is legitimate to break the
commandments of Torah in order to preserve life. Rulings
differed as to whether the circumstances called for
Kiddush haShem or Kiddush ha-hayyim, the Sanctification of
life. Rabbi Isaac Nissenbaum, one of the leaders of Warsaw
Jewry, argued that the situation called for the latter:
This is a time for Kiddush ha-hayyim, the
sanctification of life, and not for Kiddush ha-Shem,
the holiness of martyrdom. Previously the Jew's
enemy sought his soul and the Jew sanctified his
body in martyrdom (i.e., he made a point of
preserving what the enemy wished to take from him);
now the oppressor demands the Jew's body and the Jew
is ob,l4ged therefore to defend it, to preserve his
life.Ji
In recognising the discontinuity between past Christian
anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, Nissenbaum calls for a
discontinuity in response, hence his support for armed
resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto. Berkovits disagrees and
asserts that Kiddush haShem remained the most appropriate
response. However, he acknowledges the element of
discontinuity in the situation by redefining the concept:
sanctification of life means living in the presence
of God, striving for the integrated harmonization of
the spirit and flesh as the wholeness of human life
and giving this striving potent expression,oin
responsible human behavior towards all creation.'
In effect, Kiddush haShem becomes identical with
covenantal faithfulness. Berkovits identifies such
faithfulness with Jewish practice, thus enabling him to
rule:
Judaism is the life of the Jew and its
sanctification. Not to surwder it is the highest
affirmation of life itself.'7
Therefore, contra Nissenbaum, Berkovits rules that in
maintaining high visibility through continued Jewish
religious practice, the "authentic" Jew was sanctifying
life, even though such visibility increased the likelihood
of his death. In sanctifying life in this way, the
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"authentic" Jew attained the highest form of Kiddush
haShem: the Holocaust was marked by God's apparent
abandonment of His people, in that He remained hidden; in
sanctifying life, the "authentic" Jew accepted this
radical abandonment" as a "gift from God".40
Berkovits assessment of "authentic" Jewishness has
provoked considerable uneasiness among Jewish critics.
Steven Katz suggests there is an inherent danger in
interpreting the Holocaust as a confrontation between good
and evil, qua faith history and power history:
The greater the malevolence the greater the heroism.
The significance of Berkovits' constant invocation
of instance of truly extraordinary moral heroism in
the face of Nazi brutality turns on this
contention....Thus if killing six million Jews
caused a corresponding amount and kind of virtue,
killing twelve million will produce, say, twice the
amount of,yirtue and a still higher quality of moral
Katz is not seriously suggesting that Berkovits would
legitimate a hypothetically greater Holocaust on the
grounds that it would generate more "authentic"
Jewishness. He is highlighting the fallacy in Berkovits'
selective use of evidence. First, all of the Six Million
do not fall within his definition of "authentic"
Jewishness. Is Berkovits suggesting that there is a
qualitative distinction between the death of an
"authentic" Jew, and that of a convert (such as Edith
Stein) or a non-believing Jew? Second, what is the basis
for his analysis of the motivation of the "authentic" Jew?
Alan Berger questions the conclusions that Berkovits draws
from the tales in With God in Hell. Do such tales explain
why the pious Jew who prayed in a corner of an
enormous killing pit, surrounded by corpses, was
performing a holy act. Was this faith? Was it mocql
indifference? Or was the man in a state of shock?"
The whole question of the faith or otherwise of the
victims is one that needs to be approached with great
humility and caution. Regarding such faith as data is an
inherently dangerous and questionable exercise.43
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There is also the crucial question of selectivity.
Berkovits concentrates solely on the piety of the Hasidim
and the Orthodox Jews of Eastern Europe. Both Langer and
Berenbaum suggest that such a strategy deflects attention
from the barbarity of the Holocaust:
Berkovits seems determined to document only the
moments of glory when individuals achieved the
highest in ethical and compassionate behavior. He
therefore runs the risk of transforming the
concentration camp experience into a her4c one
rather than one of deeply tragic proportions."
In defining such behaviour as "authentic" Jewishness,
Berkovits implicitly passes judgement on those who either
rejected belief or failed to act in this way. Ultimately,
his description of faith in the ghettos and deathcamps
fails to meet his own criteria: he accepts the "superhuman
suffering" of others and submits to it in faith.
3.6. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE HOLOCAUST: 
Throughout Berkovits' work, there is ambivalence over the
precise status of the Holocaust. On the one hand, he
denies that the Holocaust is theologically or historically
unique; on the other, he asserts that the event would have
marked the end of covenantal faith had it not been for the
establishment of the State of Israel. This ambivalence is
a major flaw in Berkovits' approach.
Theologically, Berkovits argues that the Holocaust
poses no radically new problem: it restates the
traditional question of theodicy. He is less consistent in
denying that the Holocaust was historically unique.
Berkovits points out that the Jews have always been beset
by Amalek throughout their history:
Within the comprehensive context of the Jewish
experience, the concentration camps and gas chambers
were one Epiong a long series of Holocaust
experiences.'
The Holocaust thus poses the same theological problem as
previous disasters. It is no different in this respect
from the destruction of the First and Second Temples, and
previous instances of the expulsion and destruction of
Jewish communities. The only difference lies in the scale
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of the disaster, and numerical scale is irrelevant to a
theological response to the problem of innocent suffering.
Yet, elsewhere in his work, Berkovits offers a
conflicting analysis of the Holocaust, suggesting that the
event was indeed historically unique, being qualitatively
different from previous disasters. He offers a number of
reasons as to why this is the case. First, the Nazis
conceived the idea of the total destruction of World
Jewry:
With the Hitler era, something entirely new entered
Jewish and world history. Whereas during the
specifically Christian era of Jewish persecution the
genocidal criminality was normally limited to
localized communities, from the beginning of Western
civilization's Nazi plipgse the threat to Jewish
survival becomes total."
The difference is a conceptual one, rather than one of
numerical scale. In conceiving the Holocaust, the Nazis
added a new dimension to Jewish history: the threat of
total extinction. The establishment of the State of Israel
was a response to this threat. After the Holocaust, Jews
could no longer delude themselves that Western culture
would act to prevent total annihilation. The Nazi threat
to Jewish survival marked the end of Galut, and thus marks
the beginning of a new era in Jewish history. However, if
the Holocaust was a "radically new event--the total
threat" 47 , then surely it is also theologically unique.
Berkovits describes the return to Eretz Israel as a
messianic event. If this is so, then it would be more
consistent to grant the event that made this return
necessary unique theological status. The Holocaust is on a
different theological plane to previous disasters: it
engendered a hopelessness that necessitated the longed for
return to Eretz Israel.
Second, the Holocaust was of a different nature to
previous anti-Jewish persecution. The difference was not
confined to the local nature, or numerical scale of the
disaster. Berkovits acknowledges that the dehumanization
of the Holocaust was also unique:
The cruelty of the Germans was different not only in
degree from the other forms of cruelty practised by
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man against his fellows. Unique was their system of
the planned dehumanization of their victims
has rightly been said that what people had to face
in the liquidation of the ghettos and on entering a
concentration camp was immeasurable with a],t human
experience and it defies all moral criteria."
However, in concentrating solely on the reaction of
"authentic" Jews, Berkovits fails to acknowledge the
negative theological repercussions of this situation. If
humanity is made in the image of God (Gen. 1: 26), then
the "planned dehumanization" of the victims can be seen as
the de-creation of humanity as God's image. The fact that
some maintained their faith in extremis does not detract
from the fact that the Nazis succeeded in dehumanising
many of their victims. The success of this systematic
dehumanization challenges fundamental beliefs in the
existence of innate human dignity, the progress of
civilization, and the nature of moral behaviour. 48 In
being so selective in his choice of illustrations,
Berkovits ignores the theological challenge of those
victims who lost their faith, or succumbed to the
dehumanization of their situation. Indeed, he fails to
address the question of what "authentic" Jewishness is in
such a situation. The debate between religious and secular
Jews suggests that this is one of the dominant, and as yet
unresolved, issues of the post-Holocaust era.
Berkovits' ambivalence over the uniqueness of the
Holocaust adds to the unease generated by his use of
evidence. It becomes increasingly apparent that his
strategy is to justify his theological conclusions by
reference to historical data, rather than allowing
conclusions to arise from a study of available data. He
thus imposes a theological interpretation upon the
Holocaust. A strategy that, in part, explains his
avoidance of contradictory data. He merely appeals to the
historical data that serves to substantiate his
conclusions. Thus, he draws upon the accounts of Hasidic
and Orthodox Jews, but ignores the more critical accounts
of secular Jews, such as Primo Levi. He also ignores
contradictory Orthodox sources, such as Nissenbaum's
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rejection of Kiddush haShem. Steven Katz concludes that
the misuse of historical evidence remains the crucial
weakness in Berkovits' approach:
the proper procedure is to investigate the
historical structure of the Sho l ah and then to ask,
as a second step, what the theological consequences,
if any, flow from one's judgement regarding the
historical events. Berkovits, however, does not
follow this course. He fails to do the former
because he knows in advance what he wants to protect
vis 1 vis the latter. But this avoidance of the root
issue leaves his conclusions, even when they are
correct, open to criticism, for it appears that they
are cheaply won, predicated on a failure to fgce
what happened to the Jewish people this century.'
The irony is that, in terms of his attitude to the State
of Israel, Berkovits is acutely aware of "what happened to
the Jewish people this century". His failure lies in a
reluctance to confront the theological implications of the
unique elements of the Holocaust.
CONCLUSION: 
Berkovits' aim in Faith After the Holocaust is to
articulate a traditional Jewish theodicy, in response to
the radical suggestions of Richard Rubenstein. However, in
spite of his intentions to the contrary, he only succeeds
in illustrating the inadequacy of the tradition--as it
stands--as the basis for a response to the Holocaust.
Despite his assertion that the Holocaust poses no new
theological challenge, Berkovits is consistently drawn
into reinterpreting the tradition. First, he reinterprets
the covenant in terms of power history and faith history.
The latter concept requires a reinterpretation of the
rabbinic and Lurianic understanding of divine exile.
Second, Berkovits offers a definition of "authentic"
Jewishness. In doing so, he follows Elchonon Wassermann's
distinction between pious Jews engaged in Torah study and
assimilated Jews who had abandoned Torah. However, he
differs from Wassermann in rejecting the traditional
theodicy of "for our sins we are punished". The
distinction between "authentic" and "inauthentic" Jews is
meaningful within Wassermann's work: the latter bring the
Holocaust upon the Jewish people as punishment for
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straying from Torah; the piety of the former serves to
counteract or redeem the sin that incurred such
punishment. However, can such a distinction be said to be
meaningful without the support of traditional theodicy. If
the Holocaust was not a punishment for sin, then what does
it mean to talk of "inauthentic" Jews?
Although Berkovits rejects the suggestion that the
Holocaust was a punishment for sin in favour of an appeal
to free will and Hester Panim, his distinction between
"authentic" and "inauthentic" Jews implicitly passes
judgement upon the latter. However, if the Holocaust was
the result of the abuse of free will, then all the Six
Million were passive victims: the Nazis were the active
agents. If the victims suffered as a result of the actions
of others, then the legitimacy of drawing distinctions
between them is open to question. In praising the
spirituality of the "authentic" Jew, Berkovits implicitly
criticises that of the other victims. In limiting the
scope of his definition of "authentic" Jewishness,
Berkovits limits the scope of his response: he does not
address the situation of those, either during or after the
Holocaust, who could not accept such propositions. Hence
Berenbaum's fear that the Holocaust will be transformed
into a heroic experience. The problem facing religious
belief is generated by the fate of those who died unable
to understand, or accept their fate in faith a problem
that Berkovits totally fails to address. The weakness of
Berkovits' response is thus the total opposite to that of
Richard Rubenstein. In offering a stark alternative
between acceptance of the Holocaust as punishment for sin
and rejection of the covenant, Rubenstein ignores the rich
tradition of covenantal reinterpretation in the face of
counter-testimony. This response is generated by genuine
moral outrage at the suggestion that the suffering of the
Six Million be interpreted as punishment. In emphasising
the resources of the tradition for responding to
historical counter-testimony, Berkovits tends to lose
sight of such moral outrage at the human fate of the
victims. In his analysis, the Holocaust tends to be
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subsumed into general, impersonal concepts of "suffering"
or "counter-testimony", rather than specifically referring
to the historical fate of six million Jews at the hands of
the Nazis. In his concern to reflect the concerns and
dissatisfaction of the non-Orthodox with the traditional
theodicy of "for our sins we are punished", Rubenstein
fails to acknowledge the existence of alternative
interpretations of the covenant. By contrast, in his
concern to defend the tradition, Berkovits fails to
address the genuine concern and questions of the non-
Orthodox over the morality of such traditional responses.
In relying on an appeal to free will and Hester Panim,
Berkovits fails to dispel, or even respond to such moral
qualms. Is such an appeal any more morally or emotionally
acceptable than an assertion that the Holocaust was a
punishment for sin? The assertion of God's self-willed
hiddenness in the face of such suffering raises as many
problems as it solves.
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4. EMIL FACKENHEIM: TO MEND THE WORLD? 
4. 1. INTRODUCTION.
4. 2. UNIQUENESS AND THE HOLOCAUST.
4. 3. COVENANT AND HISTORY.
4. 4. THE 614th COMMANDMENT.
4. 5. TIKKUN OLAM: TO MEND THE WORLD.
4. 1. INTRODUCTION. 
Of those Jewish thinkers concerned with articulating a
religious response to the Holocaust, Emil Fackenheim is
undoubtedly the most prolific. His importance lies, in
part, in his success in giving voice to the concerns of
the North American Jewish community. 1
 Fackenheim himself
divides the development of his thought into three stages.
The first, 1948-1957, was
characterized by an existentialist stance that
accentuated the contradictions in humankind,
history, and the moral life and an insistence on the
need for a leap of faith in God in order for the
individual to arrive at a sense of life's ultimate
significance.'
Fackenheim was primarily engaged in dialogue with the
thought of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Leo Strauss,
Soften Kierkegaard, and Hegel. His aim was to analyse the
post-Kantian internalisation of religious belief, and the
subsequent "recovery" of the "otherness" of God by
Kierkegaard. This project was aborted in order to embark
on an analysis of Hegel's philosophy of religion. 3 The
second stage of development in Fackenheim's thought, 1957-
1967, was marked by the rejection of the implicit
universalism of the first stage. This stage emphasised the
need to identify with, and speak from within, one's
particular faith community. Emphasis is laid upon the
"singled-out" condition of the Jews, and the meaning of
their election.
Fackenheim's work on the Holocaust is confined,
almost exclusively, to the third stage in the development
of his thought. He locates the turning point as his
participation in a symposium on 'Jewish Values in the
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Post-Holocaust Future' (Easter 1967). Fackenheim asserts
that this was the first time he had felt "morally
compelled" to address the "Holocaust-in-particular",
rather than the Holocaust as an example of "evil-in-
general". 4
 This symposium, followed by the Six Day War,
brought the "Holocaust-in-particular" to the forefront of
his work; a place that it has continued to occupy. There
are two stages in Fackenheim's understanding of the
Holocaust: the first is expressed in God's Presence in
History (1970); the second in To Mend the World:
Foundations of Future Jewish Thought (1982). The second
book attempts to rectify the self-perceived weaknesses in
the first.
The transition from viewing the Holocaust as an
example of "evil-in-general" to an emphasis upon the
"Holocaust-in-particular" is integral to Fackenheim's
work. Belief in the uniqueness of the Holocaust is
foundational to his response. The need to reinterpret the
covenant arises only after the event's uniqueness has been
acknowledged. The importance attached to the assertion of
the Holocaust's uniqueness is reflected in Fackenheim's
repeated attempts to define and defend this claim. The
assertion of uniqueness, in turn, informs his
understanding of covenantal faith. In Fackenheim's
analysis,
	 covenantal
	 promise	 derives
	 from	 “root
experiences"; whereas, historical counter-testimony
reflects a series of "epoch-making" events. The Holocaust
is the supreme epoch-making event. Thus, Fackenheim's
interpretation of the Holocaust rests upon the assumption
that history can effect covenantal faith. This assumption
marks a second transition in Fackenheim's thought. In
1964, he asserted that:
Religious faith ... is empirically verifiable; but
nothing empirical can possibly refute it.'
His post-1967 emphasis upon the "Holocaust-in-particular"
is marked by the rejection of this claim:
Doubtless the greatest doctrinal change in my whole
career came with the view that at least Jewish faith
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is, after all, c not absolutely immune to all
empirical events.'
Belief in the uniqueness of the Holocaust thus underpins
Fackenheim's reading of Jewish history in terms of root
experiences and epoch-making events.
There is also a noticeable development in
Fackenheim's understanding of the Holocaust within the
context of covenantal faith. In 1967, he articulated his
response to the Holocaust in terms of a "614th
commandment". The Holocaust bore witness to the
Commanding, but not to the Saving Presence of God. The
essence of the 614th commandment was a prohibition against
giving Hitler posthumous victories. Fackenheim's name is
most closely associated with this formulation. However, he
has since modified this position in response to criticism
and the development in his own thought. Fackenheim
acknowledges that the existence of a Commanding Voice in
the Holocaust is an insufficient basis for belief, unless
accompanied by a Saving Presence, however fragmentary.
Thus, in To Mend the World, he argues that the Holocaust
also bears witness to a fragmentary Saving Presence; a
Presence that forms the basis of subsequent belief. This
Saving Presence is equated with the acts of resistance,
both physical and spiritual, that occurred during the
Holocaust. Such acts bear witness to the Saving Presence
of God, and provide the basis for Tikkun Olam, the Mending
of the World.
Fackenheim's work on the Holocaust therefore only
belongs to one stage, albeit the longest, of his career.
His thought on the subject is continuously developing. The
transition is most conspicuous when God's Presence in
History is contrasted with To Mend the World.
4. 2. UNIQUENESS AND THE HOLOCAUST: 
Only if the Holocaust is "unique" in some
specifiable and demonstrable way are the new and
unusual theological departures advocated by
Fackenheim required or justified. Hence a major tqsk
is set for Fackenheim by his own presuppositions.'
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Having made the transition from viewing the Holocaust as
an example of "evil-in-general" to studying the
theological repercussions of the "Holocaust-in-
particular", Fackenheim now regards universalism (in the
sense of his former position) as a threat to be overcome.
Acceptance of the event's uniqueness is the essential
prerequisite of any response to the Holocaust, or any
analysis of the State of Israel or contemporary Judaism.
Thus, he goes to great lengths, both to attack
interpretations that subsume the Holocaust under extant
categories, and to defend uniqueness against charges of
parochialism or separatism. In addition, he aims to
provide a detailed definition of precisely why the
Holocaust is unique.
Fackenheim is adamant that the Holocaust cannot be
subsumed under existing categories, either religious or
philosophical. Neither the Ninth of Av nor Good Friday are
adequate to the task of representing the counter-testimony
of the Holocaust. He is equally critical of attempts to
regard the Holocaust as an example of "evil / suffering-
in-general". Fackenheim also rejects attempts to regard
the event as one among many examples of twentieth century
inhumanity, alongside Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam,
Biafra, and Cambodia. In doing so, he has been accused of
both parochialism and separatism. 8
 In consequence,
Fackenheim's defence of uniqueness takes the form of an,
at times unconscious, dialogue with his critics. As a
result, he has become increasingly self-conscious
concerning his terminology, asserting that "uniqueness"
and "universality" are inadequate terms for his purpose.
He notes that, if the event is understood solely in terms
of uniqueness, "this cuts it off from preceding and
succeeding history". However, to understand the event as
universal:
makes it merely another example of some such species
as	 'perseclution 1
 ,	 'racism',
	
1 antisemitism i
	or
'genocide'.'
Fackenheim therefore suggests a compromise. Uniqueness is
redefined as the "transmutation"--in qualitative terms--of
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a feature that has been persistent throughout history, and
is thus in some sense universal. The Holocaust therefore
bears witness to the "transmutation" of elements present
throughout history, such as anti-Semitism and mass-murder.
However, this re-definition fails to solve the problem:
Hiroshima could be described as the "transmutation" of war
through the introduction of the atomic bomb. Thus,
Fackenheim is still left with the problem of why the
Holocaust is unique.
His response is to delineate, with variations, five
major elements of uniqueness. 10 In doing so, he offers a
historical and ideological, rather than a theological,
analysis of the Holocaust. The first element of uniqueness
concerns the "radical absurdity" of the Holocaust. 11 As an
illustration of this, Fackenheim frequently cites the
priority given to sending Jews to the gas chambers, rather
than making trains available to the Wehrmacht on the
Eastern Front. He argues that this is proof of the
"radical absurdity" of the Holocaust: more importance was
attached to killing Jews than to winning the war.
The second element in Fackenheim's definition of
uniqueness is intrinsically linked to his emphasis on the
"radical absurdity" of the Holocaust. The Holocaust was an
end in itself, and as such was more important than the war
effort:
The "Final Solution" was not a pragmatic project
serving such ends as political power or economic
greed. Nor was it the negative side of a positive
religioyg or political fanaticism. It was an end in
itself."
The Holocaust differed from the events of 70 or 135, in
that it did not arise from a conflict of interests.
Fackenheim appeals to Jewish powerlessness to support his
thesis, arguing that the Jews were only a threat "in the
Nazi mind". The belief that the Holocaust did not arise
from a conflict of interests, combined with Jewish
powerlessness, gives rise to the assertion that the
Holocaust did not constitute a war. 13 However, such an
argument does not bear close scrutiny. The Holocaust was a
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war, but one of annihilation rather than conquest.14
Second, the Holocaust did serve both pragmatic and
economic interests. Fackenheim is emphatic that the
Holocaust hindered rather than aided the Nazi war aims,
appealing to the diversion of trains from the Eastern
Front to support his argument. However, against this, the
Holocaust provided the Reich with an endless supply of
slave labour, while the confiscation of Jewish assets was
an economic benefit. Further, the Holocaust required the
close cooperation of various sectors of the Reich (the
civil service, the transport networks, industry, the
medical professions); cooperation that benefited the war
effort. The question of the economic and pragmatic
advantages of the Holocaust is not as straightforward as
Fackenheim suggests. The disadvantages (the diversion of
trains, the loss of skilled workmen) have to be weighed
against the advantages. Second, to dismiss the Jews as a
threat only "in the Nazi mind" underestimates the power of
the Nazi Weltanschauung; a fact that Fackenheim later
acknowledges.15
The third element held to constitute uniqueness
concerns the radicality of evil:
In the Holocaust a	 ir was reached that was
hitherto inconceivable.
With the Holocaust, "a previously inconceivable dimension
of evil" became "conceivable". 17
 In effect, Fackenheim is
offering a variation on Rubenstein's argument that having
occurred, the Holocaust sets a precedent. Fackenheim
develops his argument in a second direction that also
unconsciously echoes Rubenstein. He argues that the evil
of Holocaust is encapsulated in the figure of the
Muselmann, the archetypal dehumanized victim of the
deathcamps:
The most characteristic source of the Holocaust
world--other than the screams and gasps of the
children and their mothers--is another new man: the
Muselmann who is already dead while still alive.16
The figure of the Muselmann shows that the "good in man"
can be destroyed through exposure to systematic
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inhumanity. The Holocaust therefore undermines belief in
innate human goodness, a fact particularly relevant to
Judaism and Christianity because of their shared
conviction that humanity is created in the image of God.
The figure of the Muselmann further illustrates
Rubenstein's assertion that human rights are dependent on
consensus, rather than being absolute or innate.
The fourth aspect in Fackenheim's case for the
uniqueness of the Holocaust concerns the Nuremberg Laws.
The Holocaust was unique because the Jews were condemned
to death on the basis of their race. In this respect,
Fackenheim cites the Austrian philosopher, Jean Amery, to
the effect that after the promulgation of the Nuremberg
Laws, the Jews were "corpses on vacation". 19 Against
arguments that the Slays and Poles were also deemed
racially subhuman, Fackenheim argues that there were two
categories of criminals in the Third Reich. The first
included those whose crime was "doing", a category that
included political opponents, common criminals, Jehovah's
Witnesses, and homosexuals. The second category included
those whose "crime" was "being". This group has two sub-
divisions. The first of these includes the Sla ys and the
Poles, and covers those whose "crime" was that their
numbers were too great. As a result, the Sla ys and Poles
were decimated in order to create Lebensraum--living
space--for Germans. The second sub-section includes those
whose "crime" was existence per se:
With the possible exception of the Gypsies, in the
case of Jews alone existence itself was a crime
unpardonabJ,p, and punishable by degradation, torture
and death."
Jews were thus condemned to die on the basis of their
race, rather than their faith, afact that leads directly
into Fackenheim's final element of uniqueness: the
Holocaust deprived the Jews of the possibility of
martyrdom--"Can there be martyrdom when there is no
choice?". All that is left to the Jews is a "faithfulness
resembling" martyrdom. 21 . Fackenheim again unconsciously
echoes Rubenstein, in arguing that the Holocaust differed
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from previous persecutions in eradicating the possibility
of conversion.
Thus, the Jews' fate differs from that of the
Gypsies when set within a religious framework. There are
two aspects to this framework, both reflections of
covenantal faith. First, it is belief in the Jews' status
as Chosen People that leads to the assertion that the
Holocaust was unique:
The fate of Israel is of central concern because
Israel is the elect people of God through whom God's
redemptive work is done in the world....He who
strikes Israel, therefore, engages himself in battle
with God and it is for this reason that tbilq history
of Israel is the fulcrum of world history."
Fackenheim implicitly recognises this when he argues that
the radical absurdity of the Holocaust is most evident
when the event is set within the covenantal framework:
not a single one of the six million died because
they had failed to keep the divine-Jewish covenant:
they all died because their grandparents had kept
it, if only to the minimum extent of raising Jewish
children. Here is tive, point where we reach radical
religious absurdity."
The Holocaust is religiously unique because it bears
witness to the inversion of the covenant: the Jews were
promised life in return for covenantal faithfulness; yet,
in the Holocaust, they died because of the "faithfulness"
of their grandparents. The Holocaust bore witness to
another covenant, in which the Jews were again the Chosen
People, but were elected (or rather selected) for death.
Horowitz dismisses such language on the grounds that it
contains "a dangerous element of mystification" 24 , but it
is arguable that this "mystification" was already present.
There is the suggestion that the Nazis deliberately
subverted the idea of divine chosenness, as illustrated by
the timetabling of selections for the gas chambers on Yom
Kippur, the Day of Atonement; or the start of the final
offensive against the Warsaw Ghetto on the first day of
Passover. The fact that the Jews were condemned to die on
the basis of "race" differs from the similar fate of the
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Gypsies precisely because of the former's unique status as
the Chosen People.
The repercussions of the Nazi assault on humanity, as
illustrated by the figure of the Muselmann, gain their
power from being set within a religious framework. The
figure of the Muselmann inverts the biblical idea of
humanity being created in the image of God. The
Holocaust's uniqueness lies, in part, in the systematic
de-creation of humanity as the divine image. The Nazis, in
their role as 'God', set apart the Jews for dehumanization
or de-creation, thus reversing the humanizing process of
Scripture. The covenant was given to enable the Jews qua
Chosen People to fulfil their role as stewards of
creation. In the deathcamps, the Nazis succeeded in
dehumanizing Jews qua Muselmanner, to the extent that they
became the sub-humans of Nazi propaganda. It is the
inversion of biblical ethics that poses a unique challenge
to both Jewish and Christian belief.
To conclude, the irony lies in the fact that, having
argued so strongly for the historical uniqueness of the
Holocaust,
	 Fackenheim fails
	 to draw the logical
conclusions from this. His theological analysis of the
Holocaust is beset by a constant ambivalence over the
event's status as caesura or rupture; a status that would
appear to follow on from the assertion of the uniqueness
of the Holocaust.
4. 3. COVENANT AND HISTORY: 
Fackenheim's religious response to the Holocaust is
contextualised within an interpretation of Jewish history.
He argues that Judaism arises from "root experiences" and
is develops in response to a series of "epoch-making
events". In many respects, this differentiation is very
similar to Greenberg's analysis of Judaism as a dialectic
between covenant promise and historical counter-testimony.
Root experiences are those events that call faith
into existence or crucially influence it. Judaism's root
experiences are thus the Exodus and the Giving of the Law
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on Mount Sinai. A root experience has three recognisable
characteristics. First, the event is connected with the
present by the reliable testimony of those who witnessed
it. Second, the event must be public. The Crossing of the
Red Sea was witnessed and celebrated by Moses "and the
people of Israel" (Ex. 15:1-18). Third, the event is
accessible through its reenactment in the present. The
Exodus is reenacted every Passover Seder, when it again
becomes a present reality. Such experiences inspire both
joy and terror as they bear witness to the Saving and
Commanding Presence of God. The latter inspires joy and
terror because it both destroys and creates human freedom:
Such a Presence is nothing short of paradoxical.
For being commanding it addresses human freedom. And
being sole Power, it destroys that freedom because
it is only human. Yet the freedom destroyed is also
required."
The covenant bears witness to both the Saving and
Commanding Presence of God. As a result, it revolves
around three contradictions: divine transcendence and
divine immanence; divine power and human freedom; and
divine involvement in history and the continuing existence
of evil. The last of these three contradictions evolves in
response to a series of epoch-making events.
Epoch-making events reflect the counter-testimony of
history: the confrontation between the faith created by
root experiences and the reality of the historical
present. Such events do not constitute root experiences
because they do not initiate a new faith, but inspire the
reformulation of an already existing faith:
In its millennial career the Jewish faith has passed
through many epoch-making events, such as the end of
prophecy and the destruction of the first Temple,
the Maccabean revolt, the destruction of the second
Temple, the expulsion from Spain. These events each
made a new claim upon the Jewish faith and, indeed,
would not be epoch-making if it were otherwise. They
did not, however, produce a new faith. What occurred
instead was a confrontation in which the old faith
was tested in the light of contemporary
experience. z6
Prior to the Holocaust, there were three responses to
epoch-making experiences, each being a development from
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the other. The first interpreted disaster as punishment
for sin. The second rejected this response, preferring to
interpret suffering as the result of the Hiding of God's
Face. The third regarded the Hiding of God's Face as
inadequate, on the grounds that the separation of humanity
from the divine presence appeared to be permanent. The
third response therefore appealed to the concept of the
Shekhinah; the divine presence was with Israel in exile
and shared her suffering. Israel looked forward to a
messianic future when the divine presence would again
become manifest.
Fackenheim argues that rabbinic reliance on Midrash
is a response to the elusiveness of the divine presence.
Midrash is the theological response to a fragmentary
divine presence. The reliance on stories and parables
"points to and articulates a life lived with problems and
paradox". 26
 The response to epoch-making events is
increasingly paradoxical and fragmentary; a fact reflected
in the cautious approach adopted towards the messianic
future:
one wonders whether for the rabbis even the
messianic future, which will reveal all, will
explain all. it explain the death of even a
single child?"
Fackenheim suggests that an ambivalent attitude is adopted
to both moments of promise and counter-testimony: neither
cancels out nor explains the other.
Against this background, the Holocaust is interpreted
as the supreme epoch-making event. The fragmentary divine
presence is in danger of becoming "wholly lost". 29 The
event itself is "unredeemable". 3° As the supreme epoch-
making event, the Holocaust is both meaningless and bears
witness to the Commanding Presence of God. As the former,
it creates a total rupture in the Jewish faith:
The event ... resists explanation--the historical
kind that seeks causes, and the theological kind
that seeks meaning and purpose. More precisely, the
better the mind succeeds with the necessary task of
explaining what can be explained t , the more it is
shattered by its ultimate failure."
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However, despite this rupture, there is an element of
continuity: the Commanding Voice of God is heard even in
the Holocaust. Jewish faith can only continue in response
to this Voice. The question that arises is, if the event
marks total rupture--to the extent that faith is only
possible in response to the Commanding Voice heard in the
Holocaust--then why does Fackenheim not grant the event
the status of a root experience? If the Holocaust
threatens the destruction of the Jewish faith, to the
extent that only a "new revelation"--the "614th
Commandment"--enables it to survive, then does it not
constitute something more than an epoch-making event?
4. 4. THE 614th COMMANDMENT: 
the authentic Jew of today is forbidden to hand
Hitler yet another posthumous victory. ... we are,
first, commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish
people perish. We are commanded, second, to remember
in our very guts and bones the martyrs of the
Holocaust, lest their memory perish. We are
forbidden, thirdly, to deny or despair of God,
however much we may have to contend with Him or with
belief in Him, lest Judaism perish. We are forbidden
finally, to despair of the world as the place which
is to become the kingdom of God, lest we help make
it a meaningless place in which God is dead or
irrelevant and everything is permitted. To abandon
any of these imperatives, in response to Hitler's
victory at Auschwitz, wou14, be to hand him yet
other, posthumous victories."
The "614th Commandment" provided the substance of
Fackenheim's first major entry into the debate concerning
the Holocaust. It has remained both his most well-known
statement on the subject and his most contentious. Michael
Oppenheim suggests that the statement's popularity stems
from the fact that it articulates the concerns of the
North American Jewish community. The 614th Commandment
provides both a justification for remaining Jewish, and an
explanation of what is distinctive about the Jews as a
group: they are those who were potential victims of the
Holocaust. Fackenheim offers a positive sense of identity
to an acculturated community. 33
 It is arguable that he
provides a theological interpretation of the North
American Jews' communal life. 34
 Criticism of the 614th
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Commandment takes two forms: criticism of the concept of
an additional commandment, and criticism of Fackenheim's
four imperatives.
Fackenheim initially argues that the Holocaust bears
witness to the Commanding, but not the Saving Presence of
God: "Transcendence is found at Auschwitz in the form of
absolute command.". 35
 The Commanding Presence in the
Holocaust takes the form of a 614th Commandment
prohibiting granting Hitler "posthumous victories". The
murder of six million Jews was a victory for Hitler, one
that must not be allowed to recur. Fackenheim argues that
this imperative is of parallel importance to the
traditional 613 commandments given on Mount Sinai. He
acknowledges that it would have been preferable if the
commandment was positive rather than negative. The
reference to Hitler is essential as it serves as a
reminder of the unique status of the Holocaust:
although the name of Hitler should be erased rather
than remembered, we cannot disguise the uniqueness
of his evil under a comfortable generality, such as
persecution-in-general, tyranny-in-general, or even
the demonic-in-general.'
As a formula, the 614th Commandment, although inadequate,
must suffice.
General criticism of this formula takes two
directions. The first mistakes Fackenheim's intentions,
assuming that he is arguing that Jews should keep their
faith in defiance of Hitler's attempt to exterminate World
Jewry. Michael Wyschogrod argues that:
What was incumbent upon me was to destroy Hitler,
but once this is accomplished, the free choice of
every individual is restored and no further HitlAr-
derived burdens rest upon the non-believing Jew.''
However, Fackenheim's point is that the Holocaust proves
such "free choice" to be an illusion. The Nuremberg Laws
defined Jewishness on the basis of "race", rather than
religion, thus presenting post-Holocaust Jews with a
dilemma:
if a post-Holocaust Jew continues to bring up
children, he is implicated in the possible murder of
his great-grandchildren, for what was once possible
-100-
is possible ever after. And if, refusing to be
implicated in murder, he has no children, he does
his share in making an end to both Jews and Judaism.
Collectively, then, the post-Holocaust Jew is either
a potgptial murderer or a suicide: either way Hitler
wins.'
In effect, Fackenheim employs the Nuremberg Laws as the
basis of post-Holocaust Jewish existence. The 614th
Commandment is thus an imperative addressed to all those
who would have been considered Jewish by the Nazis. It
ignores the differentiation between secular and religious
Jews.
A second line of criticism arises concerning the
precise status of the 614th Commandment. Is it a literal
or a metaphorical commandment? Traditionally, a mitzvah is
spoken by God. Is the 614th Commandment to be equated with
revelation? Or is it a form of halacha? Fackenheim
acknowledges that the 614th Commandment was neither
spoken, nor received publicly--as in the case of the
Giving of the Law on Mount Sinai. The suspicion remains
that the 614th Commandment represents an existential
response to catastrophe, in the same way that many of the
Midrashim concerning the Shekhinah were written in
response to the destruction of the Second Temple and the
failure of the Bar Kochba revolt. Fackenheim argues that
the 614th Commandment stands apart from such Midrashim: it
is a response to an unprecedented rupture in Jewish
history. However, does the Commandment contain any new
revelation? The command to survive as Jews has been
present throughout Jewish history:
did Judaism and the Jewish people need Auschwitz and
its correlative "commandment" to be under this
obligation? Has not Jewish survival always been
deemed a Divine Imperative by the rabbinic
tradition? How else explain Jewish survival in the
face of all that the Jewish people have
encountered?'
Fackenheim would respond by arguing that the rupture
created by the Holocaust adds a radical sense of urgency.
Richard Rubenstein and John Roth suggest that the
difference lies in the existential impact of the Holocaust
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upon Fackenheim. The 614th Commandment encapsulates a
response to the Holocaust in the language of Jewish faith:
It is perhaps best to see Fackenheim's 614th
commandment as a cri de coeur transmuted into the
language of the sacred. That would at least help tp
explain why it has touched so many Jews so deeply.'
One final criticism of Fackenheim's formulation
concerns the propriety of identifying a Commanding, but
not a Saving Presence in the Holocaust. Michael Berenbaum
notes that the God who commands at Sinai is the same God
who saved at the Red Sea: the power to command arises from
the preceding saving action. Even if the establishment of
the State of Israel is interpreted as a saving action, the
biblical model is still working in reverse. The question
arises as to whether a God who commands and then saves (if
indeed He saves at all) has the same integrity as a saving
God who then commands. 41
 Fackenheim acknowledges the force
of this argument in his subsequent attempts to locate a
divine saving presence in the Holocaust. (see 4. 5)
The 614th Commandment consists of four imperatives.
Of these, the first has provoked the greatest controversy.
1. We are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish
people perish: 
Fackenheim asserts that the post-Holocaust Jew is faced
with a dilemma: if he brings up children, they will be
potential victims of a future Holocaust; if he has no
children, then he contributes "in making an end to both
Jews and Judaism". From this, he concludes that there is
no longer a sharp distinction between secular and
religious Jews:
in the age of Auschwitz a Jewish commitment to
Jewish survival is a monumental act of faithfulness,
as well as a Aonumental, albeit as yet fragmentary,
act of faith.'"
Both religious and secular Jews respond to the 614th
Commandment: the religious Jew through continuing to bear
witness to God's presence in history; the secular Jew
through a commitment to Jewish survival.
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The question arises as to whether an additional
commandment was required to ensure Jewish survival.
Religious Jews have always regarded Jewish survival as a
divine imperative. Neither need the commitment of secular
Jews to Jewish survival be ascribed to a 614th
Commandment:
Jewish secularism, with its national and ethnic
identification, existed long before the Holocaust,
when surely no voice from Auschwitz could be heard.
In such circles, assimilation was resisted, partly
because of a genuine and deep pride in the historic
contribution of the Jewish people to civilization
and, partly because assimilation was never quite
as possngle as Fackenheim would seem to think it was
and is."'
Second, a post-Holocaust commitment to Jewish survival can
be understood without reference to a 614th Commandment.
The Jewish commitment to survival and to the State of
Israel can be interpreted as determination to be self-
reliant. The experience of the Holocaust convinced many
Jews that they could not rely on outside help for their
survival. The reaction of Jews to the events of 1948,
1967, and 1973 can be interpreted without reference to a
wider metaphysical framework:
the engagement of the Sho s ah as "context" for
Israeli behavior, which is always something to be
remembered, does not necessitate the additional
metaphysics of theism and revelation and all that
they entail. Wanting to 1ye, not wanting to be
murdered, is reason enough."
This brief analysis of Fackenheim's position serves to
highlight the truth of Oppenheim's observation that
Fackenheim offers a theological rationale for the actions
of the Jewish community. Jews already regarded Jewish
survival as imperative prior to 1967. Fackenheim's 614th
Commandment offered a justification or explanation for
this commitment, hence its popularity. Thus, the 614th
Commandment expresses the Jewish community's commitment to
survival, rather than calls it into being.
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2. We are commanded to remember in our very guts and
bones the martyrs of the Holocaust, lest their memory 
perish: 
Few, if any, critics would disagree with Fackenheim's
second imperative. The need to remember both the Holocaust
and its victims is a theme that permeates both Jewish
life (the creation of Yom HaShoah, the establishment of
Yad Vashem) and Holocaust literature. The Nazis aimed to
wipe out both the Jews and their memory. Thus, the
testimony of diarists such as Chaim Kaplan, Emmanuel
Ringelblum, and the Sonderkommando constituted an "act of
war against fascism". 45
 In perpetuating the memory of the
victims, post-Holocaust Jews ensure the failure of the
Nazi intention that "Millions would be as though they had
46never been. 11.
3. We are forbidden to deny or despair of God, however
much we may have to contend with Him or with belief in
Him, lest Judaism perish: 
Fackenheim acknowledges that the Holocaust poses a
profound challenge to religious belief. His response is to
appeal to the biblical model of contention with God:
How shall we live with God after Auschwitz? How
without him? Contend with God we must, ap, did
Abraham, Jacob, Job. And we cannot let him go.''
The danger of this position is that it marginalises those
who can "let him go". Rubenstein and Roth suggest that the
result has been
to limit meaningful theological debate on the
Holocaust within the Jewish community to those who
could affirm, as did Fackenheim, that ,he God of
Israel was somehow present at Auschwitz.'
The former is speaking from bitter personal experience,
having been accused of handing Hitler "yet other
posthumous victories". The phrasing of Fackenheim's
imperative is also open to criticism. The implication is
that despair is forbidden out of negative reasons: fear of
the consequences, rather than for any positive reason.49
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4. We are forbidden ... to despair of the world as the
place which is to become the Kingdom of God, lest we help
make it a meaningless place in which God is irrelevant and
everything is permitted: 
As with the above, Fackenheim intends this injunction to
be positive. The danger lies in its negative overtones: it
marginalises those who regard the Holocaust as proof that
"God is irrelevant and everything is permitted". The
problem with both imperatives is that Fackenheim speaks
from within the circle of faith, and fails to acknowledge
the integrity of those who do not share his convictions.
Fackenheim's injunctions against despair are only
convincing to those who share his faith. He suggests that
those who do not hear the Commanding Voice of Auschwitz
choose not to:
In my view, nothing less will do than to say that a
commanding Voice speaks from Auschwitz, and that
there are Jews who hear it and Jews who stop their
ears.5u
Fackenheim ignores the fact that those who "hear" do not
need persuading, whereas those who do not may be genuinely
unable to locate any divine presence in the Holocaust. For
many, the problem is how to continue believing in the face
of the silence of God during the Holocaust. In such a
context, Fackenheim's certitude seems at best misplaced:
to talk of a God of deliverance, no matter how
softly, no matter how tentatively after the
Holocaust is problematic when God did not work His
kindness there and then. To even whisper about
salvation after Treblinka and Maidanek is already to
speak as a man of faith, ppt as a seeker, and even
then one can only whisper.'
As was the case with Berkovits, Fackenheim ultimately
resolves the tension between belief and unbelief in favour
of the former.
Fackenheim could also be accused of failing to draw
the logical conclusions from his own analysis of the
Holocaust. If the Holocaust is unique because it
illustrates a hitherto untapped level of evil, could not
the event bear witness to a demonic, rather than a
commanding Presence? Fackenheim frequently refers to the
-105-
demonic character of Nazism ("evil for evil's sake", "the
demons of Auschwitz", "hell surpassed"), but ignores the
possibility of either a form of dualism, or the existence
of evil within the divine nature:
If we are to count the Sho'ah as revelation is it
not the power of Satan that is disclosed rather than
that of the "living God"? That is to say, does not a
methodology that seeks revelation, a new
commandment, in Auschwitz need to confront the
negative reality there divulggd? And if so what does
this do to the Jewish faith?"
The problem arises, in part, from Fackenheim's insistence
that the Holocaust bears witness to a Commanding, but not
a Saving Presence. Without a corresponding Saving
Presence, the suspicion remains that a Commanding or
revelatory presence in the Holocaust can only be negative.
The 614th Commandment forms the basis of Fackenheim's
response to the Holocaust in God's Presence in History and
The Jewish Return Into History. To Mend the World marks a
significant development in Fackenheim' position: he
introduces the idea of a Saving Presence alongside the
Commanding Voice, thus attempting to respond to some of
the criticisms of the 614th Commandment.
4. 5. TIRRUN OLAM: TO MEND THE WORLD: 
The Nazi logic of destruction was irresistible: it
was, nevertheless, being resisted. This logic is a
novum in human history, the source of an
unprecedented, abiding horror: but resistance to it
on the part of the most radically exposed, too, is a
novum in history. To hear and obey the commanding
Voice of Auschwitz is an "ontological" possibility,
here and now, because the hearing and obeying was
already an "ontic" reality, then and there.'
In To Mend the World, Fackenheim interprets the Holocaust
as a dialectic between rupture and Tikkun. The Holocaust
creates a "total rupture" with all that went before,
throwing human understanding into question. The Holocaust
shatters our philosophical and theological categories, as
in the case of the Muselmann and the "Idea of Humanity".
Fackenheim's defence of the uniqueness of the Holocaust is
employed to support the claim that the event is "total
rupture". The effect of this rupture is to render the
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existing religious framework incapable of incorporating
the Holocaust. The concept of the Shekhinah is no longer
an adequate description of the divine presence, neither is
the Lurianic notion of Tikkun capable of describing the
redemptive task of repair:
For centuries the kabbalists practiced their Tikkun,
their "impulse below"--"Torah, prayer and mitzvot"--
calling forth an "impulse from above": in the
Holocaust their bodies, their souls and their Tikkun
were all indiscriminately murdered. No Tikkun is
possible of that rupture, ever after.'4
By removing the element of choice, the Nazis denied their
victims the possibility of martyrdom, or of a meaningful
religious response: those practising Tikkun, whether the
Hasidic Jews of Eastern Europe or Orthodox Jews such as
Elchonon Wassermann, met the same fate as assimilated or
converted Jews. Those who survived were not the hoped for
"holy remnant", but rather an "accidental remnant".55
The "novum" of this rupture would be sufficient to
end faith, but for the existence of a parallel "novue:
resistance "on the part of the most radically exposed".
Fackenheim acknowledges that a Commanding Presence is an
insufficient foundation for post-Holocaust Jewish
existence, unless he can also point to a Saving Presence.
Such a presence is equated with Jewish resistance, both
armed and spiritual, to the Holocaust. This resistance is
a "novum", because the Nazi system was irresistible. In
the Holocaust, the Nazis employed the legal and physical
resources of the Third Reich. By comparison, the Jews were
isolated, disorganised, and without resources. Since the
Jewish "crime" was existence, resistance took the form of
the Sanctification of Life. Such resistance could take the
form of armed opposition, a commitment to Jewish life (in
the form of the spiritual resistance of religious Jews),
or a commitment to life per se. Thus, Fackenheim defines
resistance to include the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, the
Treblinka revolt, the action of the Sonderkommando in
blowing up one of the crematoria at Auschwitz, and the
prayer, dancing and singing of the Hasidim. Both kinds of
action oppose the planned dehumanization of the Jews.
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Fackenheim concludes that all actions of resistance
constitute Tikkunim- -acts of repair or restoration, and as
such, form the basis of any post-Holocaust Tikkun. Indeed,
Tikkun is only possible after the Holocaust, because such
actions had already occurred during it. Thus, the 614th
Commandment is valid because a similar imperative was
heard during the Holocaust. Fackenheim cites the testimony
of a Polish Catholic in Auschwitz, Pelagia Lewinska:
They had condemned us to die in our own filth, to
drown in mud, in our own excrement. They wished to
abuse us, to destroy our human dignity. From the
instant when I grasped the motivating principle ...
it was as if I had awakened from a dream ... .I felt
under orders to live and if I did die at Auschwitz,
it would„be as a human being. I would hold onto my
dignity. J°
The command to survive as Jews is thus rooted in the
testimony of the Holocaust. Thus, the rupture created by
the figure of the Muselmann is partially mended by the
testimony of Lewinska. Belief in humanity as the image of
God can be restored, in part, because it was repaired by
the Tikkun that took place during the Holocaust:
The Idea of Man can be--has been--destroyed. But
because humanity itself has been mended--in some men
and women bN some men and women--the Idea of Man can
be mended. J/
Fackenheim applies a similar principle to his
understanding of Christianity. The Holocaust is a rupture,
challenging the continuing credibility of Christianity.
However, as with the "Idea of Man", a Tikkun of
Christianity is possible, because acts of Tikkun occurred
during the Holocaust. The existence of Righteous Gentiles
provides the basis for the repair or restoration of
Christianity:
The twelve years of the Third Reich were a unique
devil's kairos in the history of the Christian
church. They were also, potentially a unique kairos
of God, in that even a silent, secret Christian
prayer on behalf of Jews, whenever it was sincerely
spokep a had a redemptive effect on the Christian
soul."
This Tikkun can only be partial: the legacy of Christian
anti-Jewish teaching cannot be forgotten; but serves to
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offer a more positive picture of Christianity's future
than that presented by Eliezer Berkovits.
Fackenheim's position in To Mend the World is both
more positive and more negative than the one he adopted
earlier. It is more positive: he locates a Saving Presence
in the Holocaust, however fragmentary. It is more
negative, because he acknowledges that any post-Holocaust
Tikkun can only ever be partial: "we cannot live, after
the Holocaust, as men and women have lived before".59
Ironically, in responding to his critics by
developing his position, Fackenheim has attracted renewed
criticism: his emphasis on Tikkun has received only
slightly less criticism than that directed at the 614th
Commandment. There is a striking parallel between
criticism of this reliance on Tikkun and that levelled at
Berkovits' distinction between "authentic" and
"inauthentic" Jews: both thinkers are accused of
"privileging" one set of testimony (that of physical and
spiritual resistance) over the mute testimony of the
Muselmanner. For Fackenheim, the consequence of such
"privileging" is to "mend" or undermine the rupture
posited in the first instance.
There are a number of difficulties with Fackenheim's
treatment of resistance. First, in making such resistance
a philosophical category (the basis of post-Holocaust
Tikkun), he removes its context. The examples of
resistance he cites stand out because of their sparsity.
However, in making such acts "The Foundations of Future
Jewish Thought" (to quote the subtitle of To Mend the
World), Fackenheim grants them the status of an absolute;
a fact that loses sight of the ambiguity and abysmal
character of the circumstances that called forth the
response in the first place. 6° Oppenheim suggests that
Fackenheim's strategy be set against the reverence of the
wider Jewish community towards those who did resist the
Nazis:
Fackenheim gives theological expression to the
communal emotions of amazement and awe in response
to those who were able to resist. He puts into words
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the community's sense that such acts had both a
human and a divine source, as well as its belief
that when Jews today act to heal a still broken
world their actions are a continuation of that
earlier resistance to the Nazi ,effort to eradicate
the human element in our world."
Such a positive interpretation is valid, but is only a
partial truth. There is a need to counterbalance such
positive memories with negative ones of the MuselmAnner.
The "foundations of future Jewish thought" have to
incorporate both the positive and the negative testimony
of the Holocaust. Thus, Oppenheim suggests that Fackenheim
misrepresents the reality of the Holocaust by presenting a
partial view. A response to the Holocaust needs to
incorporate both the positive testimony of resistance and
the negative testimony of those who were dehumanized, or
who felt only the divine absence or silence:
in seriously examining the Holocaust we do not have
the power to say that God was there. It was not
enough, because we also sometimes feel driven to say
that God was absent. If Fackenheim were to suggest
that what he is offering is a midrash / story and if
he coupled it with another midrash / story about God
being absent, then we wo11 feel that a fundamental
truth has been expressed.
The problem lies in Fackenheim's programmatic usage of
positive testimony to constitute the "foundations of
future Jewish thought", thus suggesting an absolute status
that is not granted to corresponding negative testimony.
The consequence of Fackenheim's emphasis on positive
testimony is that, despite his intentions to the contrary,
he implicitly denigrates negative testimony. This implicit
denigration occurs despite Fackenheim's definition of the
uniqueness of the Holocaust as the "creation" of the
Muselmann:
However admirable, exemplary and reorienting is the
testimony of resistance, its categorical and
ontological privileging necessarily excludes and
negates the claims of other testimonies to the
event. Although Fackenheim in no way wants to slight
or make secondary the mute testimony of the
Muselmanner, his privileging of physical and
spiritual resistance issues in such a denigration.
This denigration is the other side of the
legislative character of the testimony of resistance
when	 privileged.	 The	 logic	 of	 privileging
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necessarily impliep,that something else is excluded
or made secondary."
By implicitly excluding negative testimony, Fackenheim
ignores those voices that would challenge his theory that
Tikkun is possible on the basis of resistance during the
Holocaust. The logical corollary of this position would be
to argue that Tikkun is impossible because it was
impossible then for the Muselmdnner. Indeed, Fackenheim
alludes to the possibility of this being the case. In What
is Judaism, he remarks :
Only if we share in the anguish of the victims dare
we affirm their resurrection. Only then dare we
affirm the resurrection of anyone. For if the wor10
does not exist for them, it does not exist at all."
The victims incorporate both those who resisted and those
who did not. Is it meaningful to talk of sharing the
anguish of either? The testimony of the Muselmann is mute
by definition, so how is such anguish to be comprehended,
let alone shared?
In considering Fackenheim's treatment of positive and
negative testimony, Susan Shapiro notes that he
effectively ignores the whole question of the state of
language after the Holocaust. In To Mend the World, he
fails to address the question of whether language itself
is ruptured by the Holocaust. Does not language itself
stand in need of "mending", as well as philosophy and
theology? Fackenheim notes that
The Holocaust ... is a whole of horror. A
transcending comprehension of it is impossible, for
it would rest on the prior dissolution of a horror
that is indissoluble."
However, in proposing a Tikkun of philosophy and theology
on the basis of the positive testimony of resistance, he
assumes something analogous to a "transcending
comprehension":
Whereas Fackenheim proclaims that the Holocaust
breaks the continuity between past and present and
totally ends philosophical intelligibility, his
interpretive assumptions assume t1, continuity he
explicitly declares to be ruptured.oto
Shapiro suggests that the conclusion of To Mend the World
marks the "suturing and closing" of the rupture generated
by the negative testimony of the Muselni4nner. Fackenheim
ignores the possibility that the Holocaust might rupture
language itself; a theme that dominates both Holocaust
literature and literary critical accounts of the
Holocaust. 67
CONCLUSION: 
Fackenheim's response to the Holocaust represents a
prodigious effort to grapple with the implications of the
event. It is a response that has touched, or reflects, the
thinking of the wider Jewish community. However, the
difficulty lies, as with Berkovits, in Fackenheim's
orthodoxy. He allows the certitude of faith to result in
the implicit denigration of the negative responses of
those who do not share his faith. In both cases, the
problem is one of being one-sided and saying too much."
In attempting to locate theological meaning in the
Holocaust, both Fackenheim and Berkovits tend to ignore
the integrity of those who cannot identify such meaning.
Fackenheim is aware of the danger of rejecting faith
(Rubenstein) or of a too-easy affirmation of God's
presence (Berkovits):
Not accidentally, "Holocaust theology" has been
moving toward two extremes--a "God-is-dead" kind of
despair, and a faith for which, having been "with
God in hell", either nothing has happened or all is
mended. However, post-Holocaust thought--it includes
theological concerns but is not confined to them--
must dwell, however painfully and precariously,
between the Axtremes, and seek a Tikkun as it
endures them.°'
The irony is that, in seeking such a Tikkun, Fackenheim is
tempted, however unintentionally, to resolve, rather than
endure, this tension.
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PART TWO. ELIE WIESEL: A SHATTERED VISION. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
Ironically, and particularly in the United States, the
most influential thinker on the religious implications of
the Holocaust is neither a theologian nor a philosopher,
but a novelist: Elie Wiesel. The ideas of Wiesel have
proved to have a far greater resonance, among both Jews
and non-Jews, than those of Rubenstein, Berkovits, and
Fackenheim. Peter Haas identifies three major factors in
accounting for Wiesel's greater popularity. First, as a
survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, he speaks from
personal experience of the Holocaust. By contrast,
Rubenstein is a native American, whereas both Berkovits
and Fackenheim were refugees from Nazi Germany prior to
the outbreak of war. The latter was briefly incarcerated
in Sachsenhausen, but neither he nor Berkovits had
personal experience of the ghettos and deathcamps of
Eastern Europe. As a survivor of the deathcamps, Wiesel is
credited with a privileged status the other three lack.
Second, he differs in coming from an Eastern European
background. Rubenstein, Berkovits, and Fackenheim share a
common Western European educational heritage. Their
responses are grounded in Western philosophy. Wiesel comes
from the Shtetl-culture of Eastern Europe, his educational
background being that of the Yeshiva--Talmudic highschool.
His Talmudic background is overlaid by an early immersion
in mysticism, both that of the Witzsnitzer Hasidim and
Lurianic Kabbalah. Although the messianic fervour of his
childhood has gone, the fascination with mysticism
remains. Wiesel differs further in approaching the
Holocaust on a deeply personal, rather than an
intellectual level. In both writing and lecturing, he
shares with his audience both his personal experience and
quest for understanding. Therefore, rather than suggesting
possible foundations for "future Jewish thought", he
reflects the anguish and doubts generated by the Holocaust
among believers. Third, Wiesel's Eastern European
background and personal style combine in his choice of
medium. He articulates his response to the Holocaust
through literature, rather than formal theology or
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philosophy. He is primarily a novelist and essayist,
adopting a style influenced by both Midrash and the tales
of the Hasidic Masters. In the majority of his writing,
Wiesel fuses history and legend in a style reminiscent of
Midrashic embellishments on the biblical stories. He
describes himself as a witness and teller of tales,
believing that it is his vocation to testify to the
counter-testimony of the Holocaust. In doing so, he stands
in the tradition of witnesses to past tragedies, but
differs in that he suspects that the Holocaust shatters
the covenantal framework. Rather than reincarnating the
covenant, Wiesel strives to re-create it in the aftermath
of God's silence during the Holocaust.
Thus, Wiesel does not offer a formal religious
response to the Holocaust. His response gradually emerges
in his writing and lectures. He lacks the confidence of
Rubenstein, Berkovits, and Fackenheim in the continuing
wholeness of belief. Rubenstein is prepared to dispense
with the content, if not the form, of covenantal faith in
its entirety. Although Berkovits and Fackenheim emphasise
the need to be consistent with both the belief and
unbelief generated during the Holocaust, they ultimately
sacrifice the latter in their eagerness to emphasise the
former. Wiesel differs in continuing to testify to the
shattering impact of the Holocaust. His novels and essays
chart the search for a form of belief meaningful after the
Holocaust. He emphatically rejects Rubenstein's break with
the covenantal framework, but is equally adamant in
refusing fully to endorse the tradition. Wiesel strives to
incorporate the anguish of those who lost their belief
during the Holocaust into his understanding of the
covenant, and does this with greater success than either
Berkovits or Fackenheim. Rather than reinterpreting the
covenant, he asks what elements of the tradition continue
to be meaningful in the aftermath of the Holocaust.
Wiesel's religious thought cannot be considered
independently of his literary strategy. Thus, this section
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commences with a survey of Wiesel's literary style, before
proceeding to an analysis of his religious response to the
Holocaust.
-119-
5. ELIE WIESEL: A "DIVIDED VOICE": 
5. 1. INTRODUCTION,
5. 2. THE TELLER OF TALES.
5. 3. WRITING AS A TOMBSTONE TO THE DEAD.
5. 4. THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE.
5. 5. REFORMULATING THE TRADITION.
5. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
Wiesel's work is a sustained dramatization of
counterpositions, a long monologue disguised as a
series of dialogues, revealing his own divided self.
His inconsistency is both real and imagined, the
reflection of a writer who feels trapped by two
necessities--to speak and to hold his tongue--and
who incorporates this, very tension into the
substance of his vision.'
The literary critic, Lawrence Langer coins the term a
Vb
"divided voice" to referAthe series of tensions inherent
in Wiesel's literary style. There is a tension between the
desire to remain silent, out of both respect for the six
million dead and in response to the scale of the disaster,
and the compulsion to speak, both to bear witness to those
who died and to warn against potential repetitions. A
further tension exists between Wiesel's pre-Holocaust
faith and the disillusionment and anguish generated by the
Holocaust. The survivor is further torn between memories
of his past and those who died, and the need to re-create
a life in the present. Wiesel incorporates this series of
tensions into the substance of his vision. His novels, in
particular, can be interpreted as "an act of chorus, of
dialogue" 2 , offering a series of alternative responses to
these tensions.
Wiesel's prolific output spreads over a variety of
genres: novels, plays, essays, and elaborations upon the
biblical and Hasidic stories. However, his style remains
consistent throughout, apart from occasional polemical
essays. Wiesel's approach is primarily that of the
storyteller, employing a fusion of history and legend
characteristic of Midrash and Hasidism. This technique
emphasises both the continuity and discontinuity between
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Wiesel and the tradition. The style is traditional, but
the content differs. Wiesel employs a traditional style to
portray an unprecedented reality, and in so doing
reformulates the tradition, so that biblical and hasidic
tales bear witness to the Holocaust. The testimony of
victims and survivors thus attains a comparable privileged
status--as the "stories of a new Bible".3
Wiesel's literary strategy thus combines a number of
elements. He sees himself as both a witness and a teller
of tales; a self-understanding that governs the nature and
content of his writing. He bears witness specifically to
the Holocaust, both as the destruction of the Shtetl-
culture of Eastern Europe, and as the dehumanization and
extermination of six million individuals. Hence, the
understanding of writing as an act of commemoration and
re-creation: in writing he is building a tombstone to
those who died. Wiesel's understanding of writing as
commemoration and re-creation adds to the tensions
concerning the use of language: can literature convey mass
atrocity, or provide suitable commemoration of the dead?
The inherent tensions in Wiesel's literary style become
most evident in his use of Scripture and its archetypes.
5. 2. THE TELLER OF TALES: 
Let us tell tales so as not to allow the executioner
to have, the last word. The last word belongs to the
victim."'
In assuming the role of witness and teller of tales,
Wiesel acknowledges his continuing attachment to the
Jewish tradition. As Chosen People, the Jews were called
to bear witness to God's presence in history. The Jewish
paradigm is one of testimony: the Exodus as the central
event in Jewish history both establishes the covenant and
calls the Chosen People to be witnesses. The centrality of
the Exodus as testimony is reflected in the annual re-
enactment of the Passover Seder. In the Torah and Talmud,
a witness is one who both sees an event and reports it.
Such a witness can be positive or negative. The Passover
Seder constitutes a positive witness. The memory of
historical disaster forms a negative witness. Hence, the
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importance attached to remembering those who died for
their faith, whether famous martyrs such as Rabbi Akiba,
or those who were the victims of the numerous pogroms
through the ages. In identifying the function of the
teller of tales as the preservation of the victim's
memory, Wiesel stands firmly within the Jewish tradition.
This tradition gained a new dimension in the
Holocaust. The extermination of the Jews was intended to
be, in Himmler's words, a "glorious, never to-be-written
page in history". The Nazis went to great lengths to
ensure that no trace would remain of their Jewish victims;
hence the decision to cremate the bodies and scatter the
ashes, either over the fields or in rivers, and the
attempt to disguise the site of extermination camps such
as Sobibor. Their victims responded by going to great
lengths to record their own extermination, both in the
ghettos and deathcamps. Many of these accounts were only
uncovered after the war. 5 . Bearing witness was both an
attempt to combat Nazi policy, and an attempt to forge a
link with the future:
They knew they would not survive, and most of them
did not. But they wanted,to be remembered. They
wanted the tale to be told.°
In writing, the survivor strives to fulfil this aim.
However, there is also a radical difference between the
witness of a survivor, and that of a victim. The survivor
lacks the "innocence" of the victim: he knows the end of
the story and is aware of the full scale of the Holocaust.
Wiesel suggests that a further difference lies in the fact
that bearing witness offers the survivor an opportunity to
impose meaning on his survival. Fackenheim noted that the
survivors were an "accidental" rather than a "holy"
remnant. Bearing witness offers a means of making
sense of this accidental survival. Both Wiesel and Primo
Levi espouse this point of view:
having survived by chance, I was duty bound to give
meaning to my survival, to justify every, moment of
my life. I knew the story had to be told.'
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Having decided to bear witness to the Holocaust, the
question remains as to how this is to be done. Wiesel
adopts literature as the most appropriate medium. He
comments that his aim had always been to be a writer, but
prior to the Holocaust, his goal had been to be a Talmudic
scholar:
the pattern of my future had then seemed clear. I
would pursue my studies in the same surrgundings
with the same zeal, probing the secret texts°'
His experience of the Holocaust led him to abandon this
goal for that of a novelist. Wiesel chooses this form,
rather than the more formal disciplines of philosophy or
theology, because it allows him to explore possibilities
without elaborating a systematic response:
Where are questions allowed to rplain unanswered? In
art, particularly in literature.'
Particularly in his novels, Wiesel considers a series of
possible responses to the Holocaust. He avoids suggesting
a programme for "future Jewish thought", preferring
instead to consider the options open to survivors.
Thus, although Wiesel is considered a Holocaust
writer, only one of his books directly addresses the
subject. Night is both Wiesel's first book, and his only
detailed account of his experiences in Auschwitz and
Buchenwald. His subsequent books concentrate upon the
options open to survivors after liberation. He suggests
that Night is both the centre and a condensation of his
work:
All the stories are one story except that I build
them in concent#c circles. The center is the same
and is in Night.'
The experience of the Holocaust is assumed or alluded to.
Subsequent novels adopt and elaborate upon one of the
responses suggested in Night. The novels form two series.
The first is a trilogy: Night, Dawn, The Accident (Le Jour
in the original French), and concentrates on negative
responses to the Holocaust. Night ends by comparing the
author's appearance to that of a corpse. 1 ° Dawn and The
Accident portray survivors who are incapable of dealing
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positively	 with	 their	 memories.	 Hence,	 Wiesel's
description of such survivors as	 . "spiritual cripples"
and "living dead":
These people have been amputated; they haven't lost
their legs or eyes but their will and their taste
for life. The things they have i qeen will come to the
surface again sooner or later."
The subsequent novels explore possibilities for a more
positive accommodation between past and present. The
survivor remains haunted by his memories, but these act as
a spur toward reintegration into the community.
Wiesel's literary style is reminiscent of the Hasidic
tale. Sidra Ezrahi notes three stylistic similarities: the
relationship of master and disciple; the presence of a
mysterious stranger, credited with mystical powers; and
the recurrence of mystical attempts to force the Coming of
the Messiah. 12 The majority of Wiesel's novels are
dominated by dialogues between the protagonist and a
mysterious stranger, who becomes a master-figure: Gad in
Dawn; Pedro in The Town Beyond the Wall and Twilight;
Gavriel-Gregor in The Gates of the Forest; Katriel in A
Beggar in Jerusalem; and David Aboulesia in The Testament.
Each of these figures is credited with exceptional powers
and understanding. Each novel similarly portrays a mystic,
modelled on the character of Moshe the Madman in Night.
The emphasis upon mysticism is more obvious in some
novels than others, forming the dominant theme in the
last third of The Town Beyond the Wall and The Gates of
the Forest. 13
Each novel constitutes a dialogue between a number
of possible responses to the Holocaust. The majority of
these responses were hinted at in Night, and are then
addressed in turn at greater length. Thus, Dawn considers
the option of political action, in the form of involvement
in the struggle to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.
The Accident is concerned with the question of suicide as
a response to the Holocaust. The Town Beyond the Wall and
Twilight consider the attraction of a mystical form of
madness. The Town Beyond the Wall marks a turning point in
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Wiesel's fiction. In the previous two novels, the
protagonist rejects any sense of responsibility to others.
From The Town Beyond the Wall onwards, Wiesel's
protagonists acknowledge their responsibility to others,
and search for a means of combining their memories of the
dead with a positive interest in the fate of others. The
Town Beyond the Wall; The Gates of the Forest; A Beggar in
Jerusalem; and The Oath all end with the protagonist
committing himself to the well-being of one other
individual; although all four novels end on an ambivalent
note: there is no suggestion as to whether the commitment
has positive results. The four novels end with this
gesture of commitment; the suggestion being that such an
act is an end in itself. The Testament and The Fifth Son
extend the spectrum of response to include the children of
survivors; a category briefly considered in The Oath.
In many cases, Wiesel's characters are little more
than a voice, articulating a possible response. Hence
Langer's assessment of Wiesel's work as "a long monologue
disguised as a series of dialogues". The aim is to
discover a way of bridging the gulf between pre and post-
Holocaust life. Wiesel's protagonists are haunted by a
sense of loss--of the Shtetl culture of Eastern Europe, of
family and friends, and of the belief and values that
shaped them. In this sense, his novels reflect his own
literary strategy: he employs literature as a vehicle for
exploring the tensions between the belief of his
childhood, and the anguish and disillusionment generated
by the Holocaust. In addition, Wiesel uses his novels to
re-create both the Shtet1 culture of Sighet where he was
born, and the people who lived there. 14
 Thus, Wiesel's
adoption of the role of witness and teller of tales is
intrinsically bound up with his understanding of
literature as an act of commemoration and re-creation
5. 3. WRITING AS A TOMBSTONE TO THE DEAD: 
for me writing is a matzeva, an invisible tombstone
erected to the memory of the dead unburied. Each
word corresponds to a face, a prayer, the opg
needing the other so as not to sink into oblivion.'
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For many Holocaust writers, literature offers a means of
commemorating the culture, communities, and individuals
who were wiped out by the Nazis. A witness has been
defined as one who both sees an event and reports it.
However, the majority of those who saw and bore witness to
the Holocaust were also among its victims. Judaism has a
longstanding tradition of lamentation literature: the poet
or writer giving voice to the community's sense of
desolation and loss. However, what happens when both
writer and audience are among the victims? The Holocaust
bore witness to the extermination of roughly one third of
World Jewry, including virtually the entire Shtetl-
community of Eastern Europe. In addition, the Eastern
European Jewish community was widely regarded as the
spiritual centre of World Jewry. Thus, Holocaust writers
of an Eastern European background feel compelled to both
commemorate and strive to re-create the culture that was
destroyed. The image of writing as a "tombstone" to the
dead reflects the thorough nature of the Nazi policy of
extermination: no trace was to be left, either of the
process of extermination, or its victims. The thoroughness
of the Holocaust combined with its scope, particularly in
Eastern Europe, is reflected in the predominant use of
graveyard-related imagery to depict the Holocaust. Eastern
Europe was the cemetery of the Shtetl-culture, and yet the
cremation of the victims' bodies meant that there were no
physical remains. Thus, Sidra Ezrahi suggests that, for
the Eastern European writer in particular, writing becomes
a substitute for the formalities of mourning: it is
necessary to re-create the victims' fate before mourning
can take place.16
There is a longstanding lamentation tradition within
Judaism. The biblical precedent is found in the book of
Lamentations. Subsequent disasters were mourned through
their commemoration in both liturgy and literature:
The massacres, forced conversions, crusades,
expulsions, and pogroms that punctuate Jewish
history from the time of the destruction of the
First Temple till modern times were the subject of
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an unbroken chain of liturgical elqgies (selihot and
kinot) and folktales (midrashim).."
The names of victims were remembered through their
incorporation into the liturgy. Thus a selihah
commemorating the victims of the Chmielnicki massacres was
incorporated into the Lithuanian selihot liturgy. However,
such lamentational literature combined the commemoration
of the victims with a collective affirmation of faith. The
liturgical commemoration of the victims was paralleled by
a poetic commemoration, that did not necessarily
incorporate a similar affirmation. The poet was regarded
as the voice of the community's anguish. The most famous
exponent of this public role was the poet, Chaim Nachmann
Bialik (1873-1934). His poem "1.14evh, of Slaughter"
documents the pogrom that took occurred in Kishinev at
Passover, 1903, when forty nine Jews were killed. In the
words of Yitzhak Katzenelson:
Bialik saw our anguish, expressed it, and captured
it for all times to come .Thanks to Bialik, our
most profound [experiences] have been given etecgal
form and this has lifted a great burden from us.'
The effectiveness of this strategy for expressing public
grief is evinced by the popularity of Bialik's work in
the ghettos of Eastern Europe during the Holocaust.
The Jews in the ghettos, particularly those involved
in armed resistance, looked for a poet of equal stature to
Bialik to express their community's anguish. The Zionist
youth organisations reprinted his poems. In his diary,
Chaim Kaplan pleads that a poet will emerge of similar
stature to Bialik to give voice to Warsaw Jewry's agony:
Our forefathers ... who were experienced in
adversity, immortalized their sufferings in
lamentations ....A catastrophe that becomes part of
poetry, even non-religious poetry such as Bialik's
"The City of the Slaughter," which commemorated the
Kishinev pogrom, spreads among the people and is
transmitted to future generations. A poet who
clothes adversity in poetic form immortalizes it in
an everlasting monument.
Who will write of our troubles and who will
immortalize them?
Poet of the poeple, were art thou?19
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A possible answer was provided two and a half years later
by the Warsaw resistance fighter, Mordecai Tenenbaum who
hailed Yitzhak Katzenelson as the Bialik of his
generation:
We furnished him with the debris of our misery, and
he made JA eternal, sang of it, it was our common
property.
Katzenelson's "Song of the Murdered Jewish People" is thus
seen as the Holocaust equivalent of "Upon the Slaughter".
However, there are also profound differences between the
two. Only forty nine people were killed in the Kishinev
pogrom; six million were exterminated during the
Holocaust. The use of the term, "exterminated" highlights
a further profound difference: the sporadic brutality of
the Kishinev pogrom is far removed from the "unceremonious
production of death" that took place during the
Holocaust. 21 Lastly, Bialik wrote "L‘4.. dv7 ot Slaughter"
after the event: he had not witnessed the pogrom at first
hand. Katzenelson wrote "Song of the Murdered Jewish
People" in Vittel, a transit camp for Auschwitz, where he
later died. "Song of the Murdered Jewish People" is thus
written during the Holocaust, about a fate that the poet
knew he was soon to share:
No work before or since ever tried to encompass
more: the loss of wife and children as an emblem of
genocide; the premonitions of destruction that had
gone unheeded; the abortive attempts to flee
eastward when the war broke out; the Nazi terror in
the first months of occupation; the German acts of
sacrilege in every place inhabited by Jews; the
internal life of the ghetto; the failure of Jewish
politics; the role of the Jewish police and the
Judenrat; the armed resistance; the Great
Deportation ... the death of the children--"the
first to go"; the gas chambers; the German people as
the persongication of evil; the uniqueness of the
Holocaust."
Katzenelson differs from Bialik in that he offers an
account of the people' anguish during the Holocaust. He
cannot offer a perspective on the event for those coming
afterward--for the very reason that he did not survive.
Yet, in attempting to provide such a perspective,
the survivor-writer is faced with an additional problem:
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he writes in awareness of the extent of the Holocaust.
The survivor writes with the knowledge that, even though
defeated, Hitler succeeded in exterminating six million
Jews, and effectively wiped out Eastern European Jewry:
The survivor is one who lives with the knowledge
that the angel of wrath and evil has won an
irrevocable victory during the Holocaust. The
battlefield is strewn with six million corpses.
Subsequent affirmations of the spirit, human or
divine, exist in the shadow of this fact."
Thus, a Wiesel lacks the innocence of a Chaim Kaplan. The
latter could write that, although individuals would
perish, the Jewish community would live on. 24 The survivor
from Eastern Europe knows that their Jewish communities
did not live on, or lived on in unrecognisable forms. The
survivor-writer is thus haunted by images of the Nazis'
success in destroying the Shtetl-culture of Eastern
Europe. His writing is therefore bound by two conflicting
claims: the need to acknowledge that this destruction has
taken place, and the compulsion to commemorate and re-
create the vanished communities. Thus, in Israel and the
United States, there is a concerted attempt to resurrect
Yiddish as a literary language. There is a need to re-
create Yiddish precisely because of its status as "the
embodied spirit of a dead people.". 25 However, the success
of this attempt can only ever be partial: the community
that gave Yiddish literature its vitality no longer exists
so Yiddish is no longer the predominant language spoken by
one third of World Jewry.
Wiesel's writing is thus dominated by the
acknowledgement of what has been lost and the futile
attempt to re-create the Shtetl-culture of his childhood.
He defines the uniqueness of the Holocaust in terms of the
problem posed to the Jewish tradition by the utter
annihilation of the victims:
This was an entirely new crime: an absolute crime.
Absolute since the killers made the corpses
disappear. For the first time iq c our history, the
victims could not even be buried."
However, it was not only the corpses that disappeared. In
many cases, no trace was left of the Jewish communities. A
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recurring theme in Wiesel's novels and essays is that of
the Jews' return to their hometown, only to find that
there is no trace of a Jewish community ever having lived
there. 27 Writing thus serves two functions for Wiesel.
First, it enables him to bear witness to "the scorched
vestiges" of the passing of the Eastern European Jewish
communities. 28 Second, writing becomes a means of
commemorating those communities and individuals that
vanished. In this respect, Wiesel's work supports Ezrahi's
contention that writing becomes a substitute for the
"elegies of properly mourned death":
the act of writing is for me often nothing more than
the secret or conscious desire to carve words on a
tombstone: to the memory of a town forever vanished,
to the memory of a childhood in exile, to the memory
of all those I loved and wimk, before I could tell
them I loved them went away."
The act of commemoration is not entirely negative: in
commemorating the dead individuals and communities, the
writer re-creates them. In doing so, he both keeps their
memory alive and tries to rehumanize the victims. The
Holocaust is symbolised by the figure of six million dead.
This figure serves to render the victims anonymous, so
that although the event is remembered, the individual
victims become lost within the concept of mass atrocity.
In commemoratively re-creating the victims, the writer
strives to restore their individuality and to reverse the
process of dehumanization central to life in the ghettos
and deathcamps. Hence, Wiesel's apologia as a writer:
If I were to define my own role, my purpose and
aspirations as a writer, they would be to try not to
build but to rebuild a vanished universe; instead of
creating characters and situations, I try to
recreate them book by book, story by story, tale by
tale--be they biblical, Talmudic, Hasidic, or
modern. My goal is always the same: to bring back,
at least for a while, some of the men and womqn the
killers robbed of their lives and their names."
Thus, many of Wiesel's characters are built upon
individuals from his home town of Sighet, who are first
described in Night and Legends of Our Time: every mystic
in Wiesel's novels is a reflection of the original Moshe
the Madman described in Night. Similarly, every Shtetl is
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a reflection of Sighet. Wiesel's collections of Hasidic
essays strive to relate the tales as he heard them from
his grandfather, the Witzsnitzer hasid, Dodye Feig. In
retelling the stories, he attempts to forge a link between
the pre-Holocaust past and the post-Holocaust present:
My, father an enlightened spirit, believed in man.
My, grandfather, a fervent Hasid, believed in God.
The one taught me to speak, the other to sing.
Both loved stories.
And when I tell mine, I hear their voices.
Whispering from beyond the silenced storm,
they are what links the survivor to their memory.31
Thus, the act of re-creation or re-telling offers a means
of bridging the rupture generated by the Holocaust between
past and present.
For Wiesel, the destruction of both the six million
individuals and the Shtetl culture was an absolute
injustice. Literature is employed as a weapon to combat
the "absolute crime" of the Holocaust:
I believe the purpose of literature is to correct
injustice. People were killed ... I try to bring
them back to,fe or at least to bring their death
back to life.
'W.
In re-creating the town and characters of his childhood,
Wiesel resurrects the innocence of his past and returns to
a time when the Holocaust was not yet envisaged as a
possibility. The act of re-creation is an abortive attempt
to suspend history; to rescue the victims from their fate.
However, in acknowledging that he can, at best, only bring
the victims' "death back to life", he concedes that this
act of re-creation is ultimately futile: in re-creating
the victims, Wiesel also has to reenact their death once
more. 33
 Thus, the very act of re-creation serves to
highlight further the rupture between the pre-Holocaust
past and the post-Holocaust present. It only serves to
highlight what has been lost. In describing this rupture,
the narrator of Twilight effectively describes Wiesel's
own literary strategy:
As a child, he imagined the future. Now, he
reinvents the past. His reinvented past is sheltered
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from disaster. The enemy never left his lair. The
dead are not dead and God still inspires faith.J4
However, Wiesel remains acutely conscious that this is a
reinvented past; in reality, the dead remain dead and he
is still striving to rekindle the faith of his childhood.
5. 4. THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE: 
The struggle to re-create the individuals and communities
that perished during the Holocaust illustrates the
limitations of language: the re-creation remains fictional
and thus falls short of the intention of the writer. Thus,
before he puts pen to paper, the Holocaust writer is aware
that he will not, indeed cannot, fulfil his primary aim. A
second aim is to give voice to the six million who died.
Again the writer is doomed to fail: his very situation as
a survivor gives him a different perspective to those who
died. He can only give voice to the suffering of those who
died through the exercise of imagination. Yet, how can he
who survived imagine the thoughts of those who "touched
bottom"? 35 Third, does language have the facilities to
portray mass atrocity on the scale of the Holocaust? This
question arose in connection with the mass slaughter of
World War I. It applies even more in the context of the
industrialised slaughter of six million civilians.36
If literature is understood as the re-creation of the
individuals and communities that perished in the
Holocaust, then the writer has to find a means of
communicating "the silence left behind by millions of
unknowns". 37 Yet, how is such silence to be decoded?
Strictly speaking, it cannot be understood by the
outsider, whether a survivor or one with no direct
experience of the Holocaust. The survivor cannot
comprehend the experience of the Muselmann, and the non-
survivor cannot comprehend the experience of either
survivors or victims. It is for this reason that Wiesel
periodically suggests that silence is the most appropriate
response to the Holocaust: it reflects both the silence of
the victims and the incomprehensibility of the experience.
However, Wiesel is also quick to acknowledge that a policy
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of silence would be self-defeating: speech is essential if
the experience of the Holocaust is to be communicated; to
re,,atAsilent would be a betrayal of those victims who
insisted upon testifying to their experience. He suggests
that the use of language is inevitable, but that it is
essential to recognise its limitations:
What else is there except language? It is the only
tool given to us--communication• • • • Nevertheless it
is inadequate, and nevertheless we must do,§omething
with it ... hence the existential dilemma.'
Wiesel's response to this dilemma is to attempt to
incorporate it within his fiction.
The conflicting claims of speech and silence dominate
The Oath, where an entire community takg- a solemn oath
to abdicate the role of witness: any survivors of the
imminent pogrom are forbidden from testifying to the fate
of the community. 39 However, the novel concludes with the
sole survivor of the pogrom breaking his oath in order to
save another's life: by handing on the role of witness, he
provides another with the motivation to continue living.40
Wiesel's fiction is also sprinkled with mute figures who
serve to illustrate both the negative and positive
implications of silence. Negative silence represents a
refusal to communicate, and thus a refusal to acknowledge
one's responsibility to others. The Town Beyond the Wall
closes with the protagonist striving to communicate with a
fellow prisoner, a catatonic youth. Positive silence is a
mystical form of communication, following the tradition
that silence is plenitude rather than absence. In this
tradition, words are a lesser form of communication: what
can be said is of less significance than that which is
beyond words. An illustration of this is found in the ban
on naming God: God is beyond words and thus cannot be
named. The Testament symbolises the communicative role of
silence by giving the role of witness to a mute. A third
literary device employed by Wiesel to incorporate silence
into his fiction is the use of dialogues with the dead.
The dialogue partner can be a rhetorical device, as in
the case of the three dialogues in A Jew Today between a
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father and son, a mother and daughter, and a boy and his
younger sister (the dialogues being easily identifiable as
being between Wiesel and his father, his mother and
younger sister, and himself and his sister) .42 An
alternative is to have a character engage in conversation
with the dead. 42 Thus, Wiesel strives to symbolise the
silence of the dead within his usage of language.
One final caveat over the use of language centres
upon the use of metaphor. The Holocaust writer faces a
dilemma: is he justified in using metaphorical language
when, in the Holocaust, the distinction between figurative
and literal language was often blurred. There are two
parts to this dilemma. First, the writer is haunted by the
fact that, in the Holocaust, what had previously been a
metaphor became reality. To illustrate this point, the
literary critic, Alvin Rosenfeld cites two poems entitled
"Smoke". The first, by Henry David Thoreau was written in
the nineteenth century:
Light-winged Smoke, Icarian bird,
Melting thy pinions in thy upward flight,
Lark without song, and a messenger of dawn,
Circling above the hamlets as thy nest;
Or else, departing dream, and shadowy form
Of midnight vision, gathering up thy skirts;
By night star-veiling, and by day
Darkening the light and blotting out the sun;
Go thou my incense upward from this hearth,
And ask the gods to pardon this clear flame.
The second poem is by the Yiddish poet, Jacob Glatstein,
and bears witness to the literal realization of this
metaphor in the Holocaust:
From the crematory flue
A Jew aspires to the Holy One.
And when the smoke of him is gone,
His wife and children filter through.
Above us, in the height of sky,
Saintly billows weep and wait.
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God, wherever you may be,
There all of us are also not.43
Having occurred once, the writer suspects that any future
use of metaphor contains the seeds of its own realization:
"figurative speech thus becomes haunted by the implicit
44threat of its actualization. 11.
The second part of the Holocaust writer's dilemma is
a direct consequence of this blurring of figurative and
literal language. The fragility of language is recognised:
language no longer possesses the innocence that
accompanied non-actualised metaphors. Even though he must
continue to use language, because silence is the only
alternative, the writer remains acutely conscious that the
Nazis succeeded in subverting language by transforming
metaphor into reality. This subversion also took another
form: the Nazis succeeded in subverting Jewish covenantal
language:
When the Chosen People became the people chosen,
when "selection" replaced "election" as the key term
to describe the future of a human being, we might
have been forewarned of the fragility of a
vocabulary of decent assurance when coAfronted by
the murderous ambitions of indecent men:"
Thus, the Holocaust writer of a religious background or
persuasion is confronted by the subversion of his
fundamental stock of images: the Nazis assumed the divine
prerogative of choosing who would live and who would die.
This subversion of religious vocabulary combines with the
counter-testimony of the Holocaust to threaten to shatter
the affirmation of faith. The writer is thus forced to
reformulate his religious vocabulary in the light of the
Holocaust. For the majority of writers, there is no
alternative but to continue to employ covenantal
metaphors: they have no other vocabulary available to
express their anguish. However, they respond to the
Holocaust by either reformulating or subverting these
images.
5. 5. REFORMULATING THE TRADITION: 
Only today, after the whirlwind of fire and blood
that was the Holocaust, do we grasp the full range
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of implications of the murder of one man by his
brother, the deeper meaning of a father's questions
and disconcerting silences. Only as we tell them in
the light of certain weriences of life and death,
do we understand them.4°
The Bible and covenantal faith provide Wiesel's basic
vocabulary. In one sense, his work can be seen as a
microcosm of the dialectic between promise and counter-
testimony. However, Wiesel differs from the tradition in
two ways. First, covenantal promise is located almost
entirely in the past: it has to be re-created by the
writer in the present. Second, Wiesel suspects that the
Holocaust as counter-testimony is sufficient to shatter
the covenantal framework irrevocably. As a result, the
language of the Bible and the covenant has to be
recovered: the gulf separating past and present has to be
bridged. Wiesel adopts two complementary strategies in
attempting to bridge this gulf. He highlights the way in
which the Holocaust stands as counter-testimony to
particular covenantal claims. Alternatively, Wiesel
recovers the tradition by reformulating it in the light of
the experience of the Holocaust: rather than interpreting
the present in terms of the biblical past, the past is
interpreted in the light of the post-Holocaust present.
All Wiesel's writing is dominated by a radical sense
of rupture between the belief of his childhood and the
doubt and questioning engendered by the Holocaust. He
offers frequent nostalgic accounts of his pre-Holocaust
faith, the most relevant being in the first essay in A Jew
Today, "To be a Jew". Wiesel portrays the security that
comes with an all-enveloping world-view. The covenant
provides a paradigm for the religious life:
Once upon a time, in a distant town surrounded by
mountains, there lived a small Jewish boy who
believed himself capable of seeing good in evil, of
discovering dawn within dusk and, in general, of
deciphering the symbols, both visible and invisible,
lavished upon him by destiny.
To him, all things seemed simple and miraculous:
life and death, love and hatred. On one side were
the righteous, on the other side the wicked
	
And
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God in His Helcen kept accounts in a book only He
could consult.''
The study of Torah, Talmud and Kabbalah provided the
believer with the knowledge necessary to decipher the
"visible and invisible symbols". In this passage, Wiesel
connects covenantal faith with the straightforward
theodicy of "for our sins we are punished": the world is
divided into the righteous and the wicked. This theodicy
is counter-balanced by his immersion in rabbinic theology,
Lurianic Kabbalah, and the stories of the Hasidim which
offered a more complex response to the problem of evil.
Wiesel's pre-Holocaust faith combines the fervour of the
Hasidim with a belief in a clearly ordered universe
reflecting the nature of its Creator:
Yes, long ago in distant places it all seemed so
simple to me, so real, so throbbing with truth. Like
God, I looked at the vgrld and found it good,
fertile, full of meaning."
However, the emphasis on the fact that he believed in this
way "long ago", reflects Wiesel's conviction that such
belief is no longer possible.
In both Night and "To be a Jew", Wiesel expresses his
conviction that the Holocaust cannot be explained in terms
of the covenantal framework. He rejects all the Orthodox
responses to the Holocaust:
And the adolescent in me, yearning for faith,
questioned: Where was God in all this? Was this
another test, one more? Or a punishment? And if so,
for what sins? What crimes were being punished? Was
there a misdeed that deserved so many mass graves?
Would it ever again be possible to speak of justice,
of truth, of divine charty after the murder of one
million Jewish children?'
Wiesel's inability to give a positive answer to these
questions shatters his childhood faith: "The student of
the Talmud, the child that I was, had been consumed by the
flames.". 5° However, unlike Rubenstein, he does not
respond by rejecting covenantal faith. Wiesel's reaction
is to strive to re-fuse the shattered fragments of his
childhood faith, and to rediscover his pre-Holocaust
fervour: "I still believe, but now chiefly in the hope
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that faith will restore the old fervor.". 51
 Thus, Wiesel's
fictional writing has increasingly been paralleled by a
series of essays on biblical and hasidic figures,
reflecting the desire to re-fuse the fragments of faith
shattered during the Holocaust.52
Wiesel responds to the perceived shattering of the
covenantal framework in two ways, one positive, one
negative. The negative response is to continue to employ
covenantal language, but to subvert it to highlight the
depth of the rupture generated by the Holocaust. He
emphasises the irony inherent in the Nazis displacing God
as the arbiters of life and death: selection replaces
election. Wiesel is tempted to conclude that this
displacement disproves fundamental covenantal beliefs:
I believed, I was taught to believe, that man is
good, that he is superior not only to the animals
but also to the angels. What is our religion if not
the exaltation of man, gle basis for God's glory?
Could I have been wrong?'
The memory of the Muselmiinner tempts him to reply in the
affirmative. The displacement of God by the Nazis is
reflected in Wiesel's language. He employs biblical and
liturgical images, but subverts both the context and
meaning. Thus, the crematoria at Auschwitz are likened to
a Hannukah lamp with six candles rather than the
traditional seven: the seventh symbolises the day of rest
which was negated at Auschwitz--both the crematoria and
the inmates worked seven days a week. 54 The crematoria
also inspire a subversion of the biblical image of the
pillar of fire and the cloud of smoke. In the Exodus, God
protects and leads the Israelites through the wilderness
as a pillar of fire by night and a cloud of smoke by day
At Auschwitz, the pillar of fire, rather than symbolizing
the divine presence, issues day and night from the
crematoria. Similarly, rather than reflecting the divine
presence, the cloud becomes a symbol of the ashes of the
cremated Jews:
They took a people and turned them into flames and
the flames, in turn, turned them into clouds....in
Scripture the clouds were meant to protect the
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Jews....But now they did not cprotect them. How could
they? They were the clouds."
The inadequacy of the covenantal framework to contain the
experience of the Holocaust is illustrated by the
subversion of traditional imagery.
A more positive response to the acknowledgement of
this inadequacy is to reformulate the tradition in the
light of the Holocaust. Thus, rather than formulating the
Holocaust in the light of the tradition; the tradition is
reformulated in the light of the Holocaust. Biblical
characters and situations can only be fully understood in
the light of the Holocaust: "some biblical metaphors
become clear only when used within our own experience."56
In the introduction to Messengers of God, Wiesel claims
that his aim is
to reacquaint himself with the distant and haunting
figures that moulded ,y_m... .and eventually insert
them into the present.'
However, rather than placing the biblical figures in the
present, Wiesel inserts the experience of the Holocaust
into the past. The biblical figures are redrawn in the
light of the experience--particularly Wiesel's experience-
-of the Holocaust. 58 Thus, Cain's murder of Abel is the
first genocide; Isaac: the first survivor; Jacob: the
first child of a survivor. Wiesel's reformulation of the
tradition is most apparent in his treatment of the Akedah-
-
the Binding of Isaac (Gen. 22: 1-19); Job, and Jeremiah.
The Akedah stands as the traditional archetype for
the test of faith: by demanding the sacrifice of Isaac,
God presents Abraham with the supreme test. This test can
be interpreted negatively or positively. In the positive
reading, Isaac is shaken but alive and spends the years
unaccounted for in the Bible in a Yeshiva. The negative
reading is more predominant: the Akedah becomes the Jewish
community's archetype for describing catastrophe. This
negative reading depends on the biblical reference to
Abraham descending alone from Mount Moriah (Vayashav
avraham el nearav); the harmony of the journey and the
ascent is broken. In interpreting the Akedah as the
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archetype of catastrophe, the biblical story is often
subverted: the sacrifice takes place. The negative reading
of the Akedah renders it the most obvious archetype for
attempting to understand the Holocaust. Thus, the poets
Uri Zvi Greenberg, Amir Gilboa, and Jacob Glatstein all
offer negative reworkings of the event.
Wiesel differs from traditional readings of the
Akedah as the archetype of catastrophe in invoking the
Holocaust in order to comprehend the full meaning of the
biblical story. In reading the biblical text, he
translates le'olah--offering--in the light of the greek
holokauston--Holocaust:
Take your son and bring him to Me as an offering.
The term used is ola, which means an gfering that
has been totally consumed, a holocaust."
In employing the term "holocaust", Wiesel makes it
impossible to read the text without hearing an echo of the
the extermination of six million Jews. Such an allusion is
only available to the Holocaust or post-Holocaust reader
of the text, and is thus an example of eisegesis rather
than exegesis. Such a textual reading reflects Wiesel's
own existential situation: "When I think of Abraham, I
60think of a father and son during the Holocaust. 11.
Indeed, it is possible to read Night as a reworking of the
Akedah. The narrative is build around the testing of the
relationship between father and son. The relationship
between father and son depicted in the Akedah is
subverted. Whereas, Abraham and Isaac ascend Mount Moriah
in harmony, at Auschwitz, the son is advised to abandon
his father in order to survive:
Don't forget that you're in a concentration camp.
Here, every man has to fight for himself and not
think of anyone else. Even of his father. Here,
there are no fathers, no brothers, no„friends.
Everyone lives and dies for himself alone."
Night charts the relationship of Wiesel and his father
after their arrival in Auschwitz. This relationship is
contextualised against a series of incidents concerning
fathers and sons: Bela Katz who, as a member of the
Sonderkommando, cremated his father's body; a son killing
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his father for a piece of bread; and a son deliberately
running on ahead and abandoning his father when he proved
unable to keep up on the forced march from Auschwitz.62
The last of these three episodes ends with the comment:
And in spite of myself, a prayer rose in my heart,
to the God in whom I no longer believed.
My God, Lord of the Universe, give me stygngth
never to do what Rabbi Eliahou's son has done."
However, later on awakening to discover that his father
has been taken away to the crematory during the night,
Wiesel's response belies this prayer:
I did not weep, and it pained me that I could not
weep. But I had no more tears. And, in the depths of
my being, in the recesses of my weakened conscience,
could I have searched it, I mi&t perhaps have found
something like--free at last!'
Night subverts even the negative reading of the Akedah. In
the negative reading, Abraham returns from the mountain
disillusioned and alone. In Night, Abraham dies and Isaac
survives, but without any will to live, hence the
reference to the protagonist looking like a corpse. Wiesel
develops this analogy in his essay, "The Sacrifice of
Isaac: A Survivor's Story", where Isaac also dies, and the
altar itself is destroyed:
We have known Jews who, like Abraham, witnessed the
death of their children; who like Isaac lived the
Akeda in their flesh; and some who went mad when
they saw their father disappear on the altar, with
the altar, in a blazing f4q whose flames reached
into the highest of heavens.'
Thus, the use of the Akedah as an analogy for the
Holocaust serves to highlight the rupture between past
faith and the present. The memory of the Binding only
serves to highlight the fact that the sacrifice was
demanded by the Nazis and not by God, and there was no
divine intervention to save the victims.
A second biblical archetype used in Holocaust
Literature is that of Job. The Book of Job illustrates:
the eternal problem of immanent and transcendent
justice on a human scale: Job, friend ofman, tested
by God, did not deserve his punishment.'
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However, in Wiesel's reading, Job is both a positive and a
negative archetype. He is a positive archetype because he
symbolises humanity's right to contend with God over
suffering. Job is also a negative archetype: he accepts
God's "answer" from the depths of the whirlwind and is
silent. In Wiesel's view, such acceptance is unjustified;
the divine response fails to address Job's individual
complaints:
God said nothing that Job could interpret as an
answer or an explanation or a justification of his
ordeals .... He dealt in generalities, offering
nothing but vast simplifications. Job's individual
experience , his personal misfortunes mattered
little; what mattered was the context, the overall
picture .... God spoke to Job of everything except
that which conpprned him; He denied him his right to
individuality.°°
Therefore, although Berkovits employs Job as a paradigm
for victims and survivors of the Holocaust, Wiesel rejects
such a strategy. Job is an inappropriate model because of
his failure to continue interrogating God. Hence, the
criticism of Job in The Town Beyond the Wall:
That biblical rebel should never have given in. At
the last moment he should have reared up, shaken a
fist, and with a resounding bellow defied that
transcendent, inhuman Jusce in which suffering has
no weight in the balance.°'
In addition, Job is an inappropriate archetype for the
victim or survivor interrogating God because the latter
receive no answer, however inadequate, from out of the
whirlwind.
Wiesel's preferred model for the Holocaust victim /
survivor interrogating God is the prophet Jeremiah. The
Prophet becomes the archetypal witness of catastrophe, who
both sees and reports the event:
He is ... a survivor, a witness. Of all the
prophets, he alone predicted the catastrophe,
experienced it, and lived to tell the tale. He alone
sounded the alarm before the fire, and after being
singed by its flaAps went on to retell it to anyone
who would listen.°°
Thus, the portrait of Jeremiah is redrawn in the image of
the survivor-witness. The destruction of the First Temple
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is depicted in terms of a conflagration: the Prophet
becomes the teller of tales "singed by its flames". Wiesel
sees a further parallel in the response to Jeremiah.
Jeremiah was either reviled or ignored by his
contemporaries. Wiesel detects a parallel with those who
escaped from the camps to warn communities still in the
ghettos, but were disbelieved or ignored." The Prophet
can also stand as a model for the survivor-witness in this
respect. Jeremiah continues to preach despite the
hostility or lack of interest of his audience. He does so
because of his integrity as a witness: the prophet speaks
God's word, a function that is addressed to, but is not
dependent on his audience. The function of spokesman for
God provides a rationale for his life, and particularly
for his survival when many of his contemporaries had
perished:
He knows his voice will not carry, and yet: he
yells, shouts, warns, pleads, prays. He has no
choice: he must do something with his life. If he
survives, it must be for a reason; he must do
something with wry minute--for every minute is a
minute of grace.''
As with the Akedah, the portrait of Jeremiah is
reformulated in the light of Wiesel's own experience. The
above description is very similar to his explanations of
why he feels compelled to continue to testify to the
Holocaust. There is a striking similarity between the
portrait of Jeremiah and one of Wiesel' favourite stories,
offered as a rationale for continuing to bear witness
despite a continually negative response:
One of the Just Men came to Sodom, determined to
save its inhabitants from sin and punishment. Night
and day he walked the streets and markets preaching
against greed and theft, falsehood and indifference.
In the beginning, people listened and smiled
ironically. Then they stopped listening....
One day a child, moved by compassion for the
unfortunate preacher, approached him with these
words: "Poor stranger. You shout, you expend
yourself body and soul; don't you see that it is
hopeless?"
"Yes, I see," answered the Just Man.
"Then why do you go on?"
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"I'll tell you why. In the beginning, I thought I
could change man. Today, I know I cannot. If I still
shout today, if I still screamta it is to prevent man
from ultimately changing me."."
CONCLUSION: 
I am a student of the ancient prophetic texts; every
prophet had to be both a seer of pain and a
consoler. I wish I had the power to console. I try,
meaning I 49sperately seek hope. The emphasis is on
desperate.''
The year spent in Auschwitz and Buchenwald proved the most
fundamental experience of Wiesel's life, creating a
rupture between life before and after. Writing is both a
response to this rupture and an attempt to bridge it.
Wiesel attempts both to give voice to the pain of the
victims and survivors, and to find some positive means of
coping with it: writing both commemorates what has been
lost, and strives to find a language capable of
communicating the survivor's experience.
The difficulties facing the writer are most apparent
in Wiesel's assessment of literature as an act of
commemoration and re-creation; and in his dialogue with
the biblical archetypes of the covenantal tradition.
Unlike Berkovits and Fackenheim, Wiesel is never tempted
to bridge the rupture created by the Holocaust. He
persistently maintains the tension between belief and
unbelief. Indeed, he could be said to read the anguish of
Holocaust survivors back into the biblical accounts. Thus,
the Akedah gains an echo of the anguish of fathers seeing
their sons die during the Holocaust. However, the
treatment of biblical characters reflects the hopelessness
of the attempt to re-create the communities and
individuals wiped out by the Nazis. Rather than
resurrecting individuals, literary re-creation only
forces the writer to kill the victims a second time: the
attempt to suspend or re-write history is ultimately
doomed to failure. Similarly, Wiesel retells the biblical
stories in the hope of finding an adequate religious
response to the Holocaust. However, rather than finding
this response, he feels compelled to retell the biblical
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stories in such a manner that they foreshadow the
Holocaust. Therefore, rather that standing as examples of
faith in extremis, the Akedah and the story of Job appear
as ominous warnings of the future for God's Chosen People.
The biblical scholar, Andr g Neher suggests that it is
precisely the inevitable failure of this strategy that
accounts for the power of Wiesel's work. As with the
preaching of Jeremiah or the Just Man of Sodom, all his
efforts meet with no response:
The tragic grandeur of Wiesel's work lies in this
desperate effort to make the Bible, in the face of
Auschwitz, say what it cannot say, because it said
what it did when Auschwitz had not yet came into
existence; and the painful emotions aroused by Elie
Wiesel's ... books are largely due to this endeavor
to place the words of the witness of Ausc4witz
within a Book which can finally only be silent."
Wiesel's continuing dialogue with the Bible represents
both a search for answers, and an attempt to recover the
innocence of pre-Holocaust faith: the Bible belongs to a
time when the Holocaust was not even envisaged and God
both spoke to His people and inspired faith.
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6. THE TRIAL OF GOD: THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF ELIE WIESEL. 
6. 1. INTRODUCTION.
6. 2. THE SILENCE OF GOD.
6. 3. THE DISPLACEMENT OF GOD.
6. 4. SINAI AND AUSCHWITZ.
6. 5. HUTZPA VLAPEI SHAMAYA: BOLDNESS WITH REGARD TO
HEAVEN.
6. 6. "WHAT IS THERE LEFT FOR US TO DO?".
6. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in
camp, which has turned my life into one long night,
seven times cursed and seven times sealed. Never
shall I forget that smoke. Never shall I forget the
faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned
into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.
Never shall I forget those flames which consumed
my faith forever.
Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which
deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to
live. Never shall I forget those moments which
murdered my God and my soul and turned my dreams to
dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I
am condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.'
The above passage from Night encapsulates the major
elements of Wiesel's religious thought. The experience of
the Holocaust generates an irreparable rupture between
past and present. This rupture is caused by the belief
that the death of six million Jews in the Holocaust
represents an injustice--countenanced by God. God's
silence in the face of the Holocaust renders this
injustice absolute, thus generating the rupture.
Despite his assertion that the Holocaust generates an
irreparable rupture, Wiesel refuses to follow a parallel
course to Rubenstein and abandon the covenantal framework.
His whole approach is dependent on the acceptance of the
covenant: God's silence in the Holocaust is unacceptable
precisely because He had promised to protect His Chosen
People. The Holocaust is interpreted within the dialectic
of promise and counter-testimony. However, does the
Holocaust mark a further stage in the reinterpretation of
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the covenant, or the point where promise dissolves under
the pressure of the counter-testimony of history? Wiesel
offers three, not necessarily exclusive, interpretations
of the event. First, the Holocaust poses a greater threat
than previous disasters: the ghettos and deathcamps formed
a self-enclosed world in which the Nazis displaced God.
Previous disasters were either limited in scope (local
pogroms), or culminated in exile (the destruction of the
First and Second Temple, the Expulsion from Spain). The
aim of the Holocaust was the extermination of world Jewry.
Thus, the apparent displacement of God during the
Holocaust has greater repercussions for the Jewish
understanding of God's presence in history: rather than
being hidden, the divine presence has been supplanted or
displaced. Second, in failing to fulfil His covenantal
duty to protect His Chosen People, God has broken the
covenant. Rather than accepting the traditional theodicy
and identifying the Jews as the guilty party, Wiesel
suggests that the Chosen People were innocent, whereas God
was guilty of failing to fulfil His responsibilities.
Third, the believer responds to the Holocaust by placing
God on trial. The believer proclaims his innocence and
indicts God for His silence during the Holocaust.
Wiesel's response to the Holocaust takes the form of
an ongoing dialogue with the Jewish tradition. The "Trial
of God" takes a similar form to his reformulation of the
biblical stories. There can be no satisfactory answer
found in the tradition, as it was formulated in times when
the Holocaust was not a problem on the religious agenda.
The tradition responds to the problem of evil, but does
not envisage innocent suffering on the scale of the
Holocaust. The past bore witness to analogous, but not
identical catastrophes, and thus can only offer related,
but not explicitly relevant responses. Wiesel responds by
striving to locate an explicit foreshadowing of the
religious problems posed by the Holocaust. However, this
can only be achieved by reformulating the tradition in the
light of the Holocaust.
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6. 2. THE SILENCE OF GOD: 
How does one answer the person who demands an
interpretation of God's silence at the very moment
when man--any man, Jew or non-Jew--has greAter need
than ever of His word, let alone His mercy?'
For Wiesel, the problem of the silence of God arises from
his belief in the covenant and in divine omnipotence. It
is because God is all-powerful, and had promised to
protect His Chosen People, that His silence during the
Holocaust is so problematic. Wiesel refuses to resolve the
dilemma by relinquishing belief in God as Lord of History,
or in the Jews' election as the Chosen People. God's
"nocturnal silence" is incompatible with His promise to
protect His Chosen People, and is thus sufficient to
shatter faith.
Wiesel is adamant in rejecting any interpretation of
God's silence that diminishes divine omnipotence. He
follows the Hasidim in emphasising God's role as Creator
and Master of the Universe, with responsibility to ensure
the well being of His Chosen People. God intervened in the
past to protect His people--at the Red Sea. The fact that
He chose not to do so during the Holocaust serves to
illustrate "the enigma of God's action in history. 3 The
need to reinterpret the covenant in response to historical
counter-testimony arises, in part, from this inconsistency
of divine intervention. Berkovits' argument that the
Parting of the Red Sea was a miracle--outside history--and
thus does not set a precedent for subsequent divine
intervention fails to resolve the dilemma: if such a
miracle could occur once, it could occur again. However,
Wiesel is not concerned with the logic of divine
intervention in history; he is concerned with the justice
of God's silence during the Holocaust. The Prophets
present the relationship between God and Israel in terms
of that between a husband and wife, or a father and son
(Hos. 1: 2-20, 11: 1-9); but: "Would a father stand by
quietly, silently, and watch his children being
slaughtered?". 4 . God's silence suggests that, "Either He
dislikes His chosen people or He doesn't care about
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them.". 5 The dominant question throughout Wiesel's work is
whether God's "nocturnal silence" is consistent with His
love for His Chosen People.
This question dominates Wiesel's memoir, Night: "I
did not deny God's existence, but I doubted His absolute
justice.". 6 Night charts the shattering, instantaneous
impact of the Holocaust on his childhood faith:
I believed in man and even more in what transcended
him. Then abruptly, all my ties were cut. Overnight,
I was robbed of even the smallest point of reference
or support, I was confronted with emptiness.
Everywhere.'
Wiesel illustrates the rupture between past faith and the
present by continuing to employ covenantal language, but
subverting its content. Thus, he first questions the
relevance of his childhood faith to his present situation
on arrival at Auschwitz, when he refuses to say the
Kaddish- -the Jewish prayer for the dead, ("May His Name be
blessed and magnified..."):
For the first time, I felt revolt rise up within me.
Why should I bless His name? The Eternal, Lord of
the Universe, the All-Powerful an Terrible, was
silent. What had I to thank Him for?'
In refusing to join in the Kaddish, he disassociates
himself from "that solemn affirmation, filled with
grandeur and serenity, by which man returns to God His
crown and His scepter". 9 To say Kaddish in Auschwitz
would be a "blasphemy": it would imply that the
systematic, dehumanized slaughter of millions could be
incorporated within the same liturgical framework of
mourning as the death of an individual. For Wiesel, the
recital of the Kaddish is a liturgical vehicle of
continuity: a son says Kaddish annually on the anniversary
of his father's death; to say Kaddish for himself or his
father would be to imply that there is no difference
between death in Auschwitz or Buchenwald, and that of
previous generations. To say Kaddish in Auschwitz would be
to deny the rupture generated between past and present:
The Holocaust defies reference l analogy. Between the
death of my father and that of his, no comparison is
possible. It would be inadequate, indeed unjust, to
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imitate my father. Tfo 
should have to invent otherprayers, other acts.
Wiesel's objections to
the Kaddish--as an adequate
liturgical response to the death of the Six Million--
parallels the difficulties he faces in regarding writing
as a "tombstone to the dead". Ultimately, both the Kaddish
and a commemorative literary strategy are adopted, despite
ra.se-A
their inherent inability to fulfil their purpose,kbecause
their is no satisfactory alternative.
Liturgy's limited capacity in the face of God's
silence during the Holocaust is reflected further in the
context of camp services for Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New
Year. How can there be a meaningful celebration of New
Year in Auschwitz, amid a constant struggle for survival?
The service becomes "a mirage", where once it was central:
Once, I had believed profoundly that upon one
solitary deed of mine, one gylitary prayer, depended
the salvation of the world."
The reference in the past tense to Tikkun--the recovery of
divine sparks--further serves to illustrate the rupture
generated between past and present: in the context of
Auschwitz, individual acts of piety no longer strike
Wiesel as being of cosmic significance--what is the value
of liberating a messiah who does not come in the face of
such suffering? 12 His Rosh Hashanah prayer echoes the
earlier Kaddish, in subverting covenantal language:
Blessed art Thou, Eternal, Master of the Universe,
Who chose us from among the races to be tortured day
and night, to see our fathers, our mothers, our
brothers, end in the crematory? Praised be Thy Holy
Name, Thou ylo hast chosen us to be butchered on
Thine altar?1J
In Auschwitz, where selection has replaced election, there
can be no reprieve.
The account of the Rosh Hashanah services follows the
sole allusion to the divine presence suffering alongside
the Chosen People in the Holocaust: the child-hanging
scene. A scene that has attracted a wealth of comment.
Wiesel describes the public hanging of two men and a
child, accused of the sabotage of a power station at Buna:
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The three victims mounted together on the chairs.
The three necks were placed at the same moment
within the nooses.
'Long live liberty!' cried the two adults.
But the child was silent.
'Where is God? Where is He?' someone behind me
asked.
At a sign from the head of the camp, the three
chairs tipped over.
Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon
the sun was setting.
'Bare your heads!' yelled the head of the camp.
His voice was raucous. We were weeping.
'Cover your heads!'
Then the march past began. The two adults were no
longer alive. Their tongues hung swollen, blue-
tinged.
But the third rope was still moving; being so light,
the child was still alive....
For more than half an hour he stayed there,
struggling between life and death, dying in slow
agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in
the face. He was still alive when I passed in front
of him. His tongue was still red, his eyes were not
yet glazed.
Behind me, I heard the same man asking:
'Where is God now?'
And I heard a voice within me answer him:
'Where is He? Here He is--He is hanging here on
this gallows
That night the soup tasted of corpses.14
There have been numerous interpretations of this passage,
both Jewish and Christian. On the Jewish side, it has been
suggested that the passage is a parody of the crucifixion
(NEHER) 15 ; that God is powerless in the Holocaust
(FACKENHEIM) 16 ; or that God is continually dying, but is
never dead (SHERWIN). 17 . On the Christian side, the
passage has been interpreted as an expression of a
theologia crucis (MOLTMANN / BAUCKHAM)
the passage is seen as the supreme expression of
Godforsakenness (ECKARDT) 19 ; the death of the aspect of
God that can be loved by humanity (ROTH) 2() ; or the divine
• 18 Alternatively,
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embodiment of death and impotence in the face of evil
(BROWN) 21
In view of this gamut of interpretation, what is the
author's own view? First, it is important to note the
positioning of the text. The child-hanging scene is
juxtaposed between an account of another hanging and the
celebration of Rosh Hashanah. The first hanging scene
parallels the second, except for the fact that the victim
is an adult who dies proclaiming defiance. Rather than
discussing the presence or absence of God, the
conversation centres on whether the hanging will delay the
evening's soup ration. The scene closes with Wiesel's
comment: "I remember that I found the soup excellent that
evening....". 22 The difference between the two scenes
lies in the presence of a child: it is the agonising death
of the child that inspires Wiesel to reply "Where is God?
Here He is--He is hanging here on this gallows.". For
Wiesel, "the death of a child is the death of innocence,
the death of God in the heart of man.". 23 His own
childhood faith is shattered by the sight of "the little
faces of children, whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths
of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.".
The child-hanging scene is immediately followed by
Wiesel's subversion of traditional Rosh Hashanah prayers.
These prayers, addressed to the "Eternal, Master of the
Universe", do not suggest a concept of a powerless God
(FACKENHEIM). For Wiesel, God's silence is a problem
precisely because He is not powerless: He intervened in
history in the past and could have done so again. Thus,
of those interpretations offered, John Roth's suggestion
seems closest to Wiesel's intention: belief in God's
justice and love for His people is under threat. However,
Roth is incorrect in suggesting that the aspect of God
capable of being loved is dying. The love for God remains,
as can be seen in Wiesel's portraits of the Hasidim. It is
the worthiness of God to be a recipient of that love that
is questioned: is a God who remains silent while children
are burned alive, or take half an hour to die on the
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gallows, worthy of His people's love? Thus, the child-
hanging scene can be seen as a radical alternative to
Berkovits' interpretation of "authentic" Judaism: is God
worthy of the fervour and love of the Jews who died
proclaiming His name.
To offer too strict an interpretation of the child-
hanging scene is to misunderstand Wiesel's intention, both
in this passage and in the whole of Night. The memoir
constitutes an indictment of God's justice and love for
His people. Such questions would never have occurred to
Wiesel in Sighet, prior to deportation: the universe was
ordered and reflected God's love for His Chosen People.
The declamation in Night marks the shattering of these
convictions. The determination never to forget God's
"nocturnal silence" plants an irresolveable tension at the
heart of Wiesel's faith. In Night, he continues to believe
in God's existence, but radically questions divine
justice. The questioning of God's justice and love for His
people subverts the covenantal framework: the attributes
of justice and compassion belong to the Chosen People;
whereas God fails to fulfil His covenantal
responsibilities. Thus, it is the Jews, qua upholders of
the covenant, who judge God. Night marks the negative
extreme of Wiesel's religious thought. In his subsequent
work, he searches for a positive counter-balance to the
silence of God during the Holocaust. The positive values
of the covenant are gradually reclaimed, alongside the
continued affirmation of the negative witness of the
Holocaust.
6. 3. THE DISPLACEMENT OF GOD: 
my father gave back his soul at Buchenwald. A soul
useless in that place, and one he seemed to want to
give back. But, he gave it up, not to the God of his
fathers, but rather to the imposter, cruel and
insatiable, to the enemy God. They had killed his
God, they had exchanged him for another.'
Wiesel draws two negative conclusions from the "nocturnal
silence" portrayed in Night. First, the Holocaust bears
witness to the displacement of God by the Nazis. Second,
God's silence constitutes a failure to fulfil His
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responsibilities, and thus marks the breakdown of the
covenantal relationship.
The Nazis displaced God: they attained absolute power
over the life and death of their victims. The ghettos and
deathcamps formed a self-enclosed world, l'univers
concentrationnaire. Within this world, the Nazis assumed
the role of God. The divine election of the Chosen People
was paralleled by the Nazis' selection of the Jews as the
primary victims for extermination. The experience of this
displacement shatters the believer's faith.
The absolute power of the Nazis over their victims is
well documented. Selection replaced election--"the
Biblical curses had become reality." (Deut. 28:15-68).25
The l'univers concentrationnaire was a self-enclosed world
with its own laws, the sole aim of which was the
duhumanization and mass slaughter of its inmates. The sole
authority in this world was that of the Nazis, who assumed
the sovereign power of God:
in dealing with the victims, in an effort to break
their morale before annihilating them, the
executioners assumed the role of God. They alone
could, by decree, proclaim the limits of good and
evil. Their _idiosyncrasies were law and so were
their whims.2b
The Nazis role as God was deliberately emphasised in the
holding of selections on Yom Kippur—the Day of Atonement,
and the timing of final assault on the Warsaw Ghetto in
1943 to coincide with the beginning of Passover.
The displacement of God has inevitable repercussions
for covenantal understanding. In the face of the
remorseless selection of the Nazis, the believer was
confronted by the silence of God. This silence seemed
incompatible with the covenantal promise of protection.
Wiesel suggests that many continued to affirm the
traditional theodicy of "for our sins we are punished",
because it at least offered an explanation of their fate:
It was better to believe our punishment had meaning,
that we deserved them; to believe in a cruel,,but
just God was better than not to believe at all."
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The believer who rejected this theodicy was confronted
both by a meaningless fate, and a God acting in a manner
inconsistent with covenantal expectations. Thus, belief no
longer provides consolation, but rather serves to
exacerbate the situation:
Everyday I was moving a little further from the God
of my childhood. He had become a stranggr to me;
sometime, I even thought he was my enemy."
A God who is omnipotent, but silent in the face of the
Holocaust, cannot be concerned with the fate of His Chosen
People. Such a God is "cruel and insatiable", rather than
the father or husband envisaged by Hosea; the Nazis,
rather than covenantal ethics, come to represent the
image of God.
The Nazis assume the divine attribute of
unchangeability, or consistency. God is presented in the
tradition as being concerned with His people's fate. Yet
such concern appeared to be lacking during the
Holocaust. 29 This apparent lack of divine concern for the
Jews qua Chosen People is reflected in the inconsistency
of God's presence in history. The Nazis are the more
consistent in their attitude to the Jews, and assume the
unchanging character of God:
I've got more faith in Hitler than in anyone else.
He's the only one who's kept 114, promises, all his
promises, to the Jewish people."
The believer is confronted with both God's failure to
fulfil His covenantal promise to protect the Jews, and His
continuing silence in the face of the Nazis' determination
to fulfil their promise of utter annihilation. He is faced
with the possible displacement of the Sinai covenant by
that between the Nazis and the Jews; the crucial
difference being that in the latter covenant the Jews are
singled out for death rather than life.
Thus, the Holocaust is not only another world; it
constitutes a negative Neilsgeschichte
Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka. Belsen, Ponar,
Sobibor. Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Chelmno: nocturnal
capitals in a strange kingdom, a bewitched, immense
and timeless kingdom. A biblical kingdom, where
death as sovereign appropriated God's face as well
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as his attributes 4p heaven and on earth and in the
very heart of man.'
Covenantal faithfulness proves inadequate in the face of
this appropriation of power: belief cannot alter the Nazi
decree as to who shall live and who shall die. This
appropriation of power continues even after the Holocaust.
Covenantal faith proves incapable of incorporating the
Holocaust within its traditional lamentational and
liturgical framework. The Kaddish offers an inadequate
vehicle for mourning the death of the Six Million. Can
the negative memory of the Holocaust be incorporated
within the positive framework of covenantal promise? There
are occasions when Wiesel suggests that it cannot.
6. 4. SINAI AND AUSCHWITZ: 
Berkovits and Fackenheim claim that a religious response
to the Holocaust must incorporate both belief and
unbelief. In practice, both resolve this tension in
favour of belief. Berkovits' concept of "authentic"
Judaism inevitably excludes, or minimises, the loss of
belief. Fackenheim's privileging of spiritual and armed
resistance, as the basis of a partial Tikkun, again
excludes the negative witness of those who "touched
bottom". Despite emphatically defending the uniqueness of
the Holocaust, Fackenheim refuses to grant the event the
status of a root experience. The insistence that the
Holocaust is the supreme epoch-making event is
inconsistent with the claim that it generates an
irreparable rupture between past and present. In
Fackenheim's analysis, the Holocaust does not merely test
and refine faith, it demands that it be re-created. Both
Fackenheim and Berkovits fail to address seriously
Rubenstein's claim that the Holocaust marks the the end
of the covenant. Yet, in rejecting the covenant,
Rubenstein ignores the dialectical nature of the tradition
and its capacity to absorb and respond to historical
counter-testimony. Of the four thinkers, Wiesel stands
alone in acknowledging the logical consequences of the
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Holocaust for belief within the context of the covenantal
tradition.
Unlike Fackenheim, Wiesel is prepared to draw a
parallel between the Holocaust and the Exodus. The
Holocaust is both counter-testimony and anti-revelation:
the event offers a potential alternative Heilsgeschichte
to that of the covenant. For Wiesel, the Holocaust is the
"most important event in Jewish history and human history,
with the possible exception of the Revelation at Sinai".32
There are two occasions when Wiesel considers the
potential repercussions of this statement: the
possibility that the anti-revelation of the Holocaust
cancels out the revelation of Sinai. He first addresses
the issue in the symposium, 'Jewish Values in the Post-
Holocaust Future' (1967); and then again in A Beggar in
Jerusalem (1970).
In 'Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future',
Wiesel suggests that the covenant was broken during the
Holocaust. He develops this suggestion by reference to a
Midrash contrasting the festivals of Hanukka and Purim: on
the first occasion, the Jews employed miltary means to
defend themselves against a spiritual threat; on the
second, they employed spiritual means to defend themselves
against a physical threat. The two responses serve to
illustrate the covenantal relationship:
The Jewish people entered into a covenant with God.
We are to protect His Torah, and He, in turn,
assumes responsibility for Israel's presence in the
world. Thus, when our spirituality--the Torah--was
in danger, we used force in protecting it; but when
our physical existence was threatened, we simply
reminded God of His duties and promises deriving
from the covenant.
Well, it seems that, for the first time in our
history, this very covenant was broken. That is why
the Holocalmt has terrifying theological
implications."
God's silence during the Holocaust is interpreted as the
failure to fulfil His covenantal responsibility to protect
His Chosen People.
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Wiesel's argument runs counter to that of Isaac
Nissenbaum. The latter argued that Kiddush ha-hayyim, the
sanctification of life, was the appropriate response to a
physical threat to Jewish survival: the Jew protected that
which the enemy wished to take from him. Wiesel's
argument is closer to that of Eliezer Berkovits. He echoes
the latter's claim that emunah-- trust / steadfast faith--
and kiddush haShem form the appropriate response to
threats to Jewish survival. However, the two differ in
the interpretation given to the reason for such trust.
Wiesel argues that God had promised to protect His people,
if they fulfilled their role as witnesses to the divine
presence in history. Berkovits differs in arguing that
divine intervention in history cannot be regarded as a
norm. The divine presence in history is hidden. Emunah is
the believer's trust in God despite the counter-testimony
of history. Wiesel is emphatic that such trust is
dependent on God's covenantal promises to protect His
people.
Therefore, despite the apparent similarity between
Berkovits and Wiesel, their conclusions differ radically.
Berkovits rejects the notion that the Holocaust is unique,
arguing that the "authentic" Judaism of the ghettos and
deathcamps, and the establishment of the4Israel in 1948,
are proof of the continuing validity of the covenant.
Indeed, the return to Eretz Israel is a messianic, and
thus miraculous, divine intervention in history; and as
such, is an event of promise that serves as a positive
counter-balance to the Holocaust. For Wiesel, the
Holocaust marks God's failure to fulfil His covenantal
responsibility to protect His people, and as such, is "the
first time in our history this very covenant was broken.".
In suggesting that the covenant is broken, Wiesel
employs similar language to Richard Rubenstein.However, he
differs in considering the repercussions of a broken
covenant within the covenantal framework. In granting the
Holocaust the status of a root experience, he incorporates
the loss of belief or emunah experienced by both victims
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and survivors within the covenantal framework. Michael
Berenbaum suggests that Wiesel's post-Holocaust vision is
that of the void. The Midrashic framework is in danger of
collapse: to talk of God's presence, or the covenantal
relationship, is so problematic in view of the divine
silence at Auschwitz that the temptation is to follow
Rubenstein in rejecting the covenantal framework. Wiesel's
response to the void is to posit an additional covenant:
God can no longer be relied upon as a covenantal partner,
but Israel renews its mission of Tikkun in spite of the
void. 34 However, is this interpretation valid? The void,
understood as the loss of fervour in response to God's
silence at Auschwitz, is a dominant motif in Wiesel's
work. However, this motif gains its force from the
constant evocation of the covenantal framework, as
symbolised by Wiesel's childhood in Sighet. Wiesel's
religious thought can be seen as an attempt to restore the
covenant broken at Auschwitz, thus recovering the lost
fervour. It would be more consistent with the rest of
Wiesel's work to interpret the breaking of the covenant in
terms of the believer's loss of emunah--absolute trust--in
God's faithfulness toward His people.
Wiesel refers again to the breaking of the covenant
in his novel, A Beggar in Jerusalem (1970). However, less
explicit language is employed: the Torah is "taken back".
Written in the aftermath of the Six Day War (1967) and the
retaking of the Old City, the novel considers the
possibility that the State of Israel offers a messianic
I/
answer
II
 to the Holocaust. The passage we are concerned
with contains a visionary account of the convergence of
Jews on the Western wall, after the retaking of the Old
city:
Men, women and adolescents of every age, every
origin and speaking every language, and I see them
ascending toward the Wall, toward all that remains
of their collective longing. Just like long ago, at
Sinai, when they were given the Torah. Just like a
generation ago, in the kingdom of night, when it was
taken back. Once again the exiles are being gathered
in, the knot is being knotted--le end is rejoining
the beginning and justifying it.
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There have been two interpretations of this passage--one
Christian, one Jewish. The Christian theologian, Roy
Eckardt suggests that Wiesel is referring to the
"recantation of the covenant". The covenant was rescinded
by God, either as a punishment for sin--an interpretation
Eckardt rejects; or in acknowledgement of His own failure
to fulfil His covenantal responsibilities. If the second
alternative is adopted, then the covenant is no longer
binding on the Jews, and God can only show penitence for
His failure to protect His people. This interpretation is
inconsistent with Wiesel's thought in one crucial respect:
Wiesel's perspective is that of the believer after the
Holocaust. His concern is with the breakdown of emunah, as
a consequence of God's silence during the Holocaust. The
Torah was "given" and "taken back". The use of the passive
voice suggests that the perspective is that of the Jews,
rather than that of God. Wiesel's concern is with the
human response to God's failure to fulfil His promise to
protect His people. Eckardt reverses this perspective: the
focus is on God's response to this failure; a position
Wiesel explicitly refuses to adopt.36
Michael Berenbaum offers a very different analysis of
the passage , He suggests that Wiesel's intention is
to offer a literary, even symbolic, account of the
retaking of the Old City; an account that interprets the
event as Israel's confrontation with her historical past-
-as symbolised by the Western Wall. The Wall symbolises
the Jews' "collective longing". As all that remains of
the Second Temple, the Western Wall has come to symbolise
both historical catastrophe and exile. The retaking of
the Old City has messianic overtones: it marks the end of
exile. In addition, the Wall symbolises the Jews'
unfulfilled messianic hopes: in some traditions, the
Messiah first appears at the Wall. In the light of this
reading, the retaking of the Old City is interpreted as a
confrontation with the memory of the divine presence
(located in the Holy of Holies, and accessible through the
cult), and lost religious fervour. The memory of the
divine presence (symbolised by Sinai and the Temple)
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confronts the counter-testimony of the Holocaust. The
Return to the Old City suggests the possibility that the
gulf between the two can be bridged; that an affirmation
of covenantal faith might again prove possible. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the understanding of the
breaking of the covenant in terms of the loss of emunah.
However, can the Return to the Old City signify a
restoration of emunah? In this passage, Wiesel appears to
suggest the possibility that the shattered fragments of
faith might be re-fused: "the end is rejoining the
beginning and justifying it." Should this remark be taken
as acceptance of Berkovits' suggestion that the Return is
an event of messianic promise, and as such counter-
balances the negative testimony of the Holocaust? Wiesel
acknowledges the messianic dimension of the Return.
However, A Beggar in Jerusalem is the only instance when
he alludes to the possibility that the State of Israel
bridges the rupture generated by the Holocaust. The
suggestion of completion or wholeness implicit in this
passage is rejected in the novel's closing pages:
Victory does not prevent suffering from having
existed, nor death from having taken its toll ....Of
course, the mystery of good is no less disturbing
than the mystw of evil. But one does not cancel
out the other.''
The positive testimony of the Return to the Old City does
not cancel out the negative counter-testimony of the
Holocaust; the two co-exist. In rejecting the covenant,
Rubenstein ignores the positive testimony of Sinai and the
Return. If negative evidence is allowed to count against
the covenant, then positive testimony is also admissible.
The retaking of Jerusalem offers a counter-balance to
despair, without cancelling out the negative witness of
the Holocaust.
A further analogy serves to highlight Wiesel's
understanding of the relationship between Sinai and the
Holocaust:
The story I try to tell is, first of all, a story of
night which the kabbalah calls shvirat hakelim—the
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breaking of the vessels--that something happened at
the origin of creation, a cosmic cataclysm.
Our story is of the same nature. Something
happened a generation ago, to the s wayld, to man.
Something happened to God. Certainl<hapPened to the
relationg obetween man and God, man and man, man and
himself.'
In utilizing the analogies of Sinai and the Breaking of
the Vessels, Wiesel strives to express the effect of the
Holocaust on "the relations between man and God, man and
man, man and himself."; in doing so, he employs the frame
of reference that ordered these relationships prior to the
Holocaust. The impact of Auschwitz is expressed in terms
of the faith that has been shattered. Thus, Luria's image
of cosmic evil is employed as an analogy for the apparent
displacement of God by the Nazis. The challenge posed to
belief by the perverse parallels between election and
selection is conveyed by means of an analogy between Sinai
and the Holocaust. Wiesel employs the seminal vocabulary
of the Jewish tradition to provide an analogy, not an
equation with the Holocaust: "Our story is of the same
nature". The nature of these analogies reflects the
continuity between Wiesel and the tradition: he continues
to express himself in covenantal language, even though
emunah is no longer a part of the relationship between
humanity and God. The retention of covenantal language is
significant. Even if broken, the covenant relationship is
essential to Wiesel: it provides the criteria for
criticising God's silence during the Holocaust. It is only
possible to talk of the covenant being broken from within
the covenantal framework: the covenant informs both God's
expectations of humanity, and humanity's expectations of
God.
Thus, Wiesel differs from Rubenstein in his
understanding of the religious problem posed by the
Holocaust. Rubenstein, confronted by the Holocaust,
perceives a stark alternative--between the affirmation
that the Holocaust was a divine punishment for sin, and
the rejection of the covenant. Either the Chosen People
were guilty of sin and deserved to be punished, or there
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is no covenant and no election. Wiesel differs in refusing
to see the dilemma posed by the Holocaust in terms of an
alternative. The dilemma facing the believer is created
by the expectation, on the basis of covenant faith, that
God will intervene in history to protect His Chosen
People, and the divine failure to meet this expectation.
For Wiesel, God's silence during the Holocaust is a
problem precisely because of the covenantal framework.
Thus, the dominant theme in Wiesel's work is the
believer's loss of emunah in response God's silence. The
covenant remains the governing framework of belief, but
the vital ingredient of trust is absent. After the
Holocaust, the relationship between the Chosen People and
God is one where the former interrogate, rather than
trust, the latter. The believer questions both God and the
tradition, in the hope that answers will be forthcoming
that will allow the relationship of emunah to be re-
established-- that God will act in the manner expected of
Him on the basis of the covenantal relationship with His
Chosen People.
6. 5. HUTZPA K'LAPEI SHAMAYA: BOLDNESS WITH REGARD TO 
HEAVEN. 
we must ... recognise the possibility and indeed the
necessity of turning against God--the God of
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob--and remember
that so many Abrahams, so many Jacobs, and so many
Isaacs were not saved on the altar. There was no
angel to come and save them. I dp, not know the
reason and I do not know the answer.-"
Contention with God--the individual's demand for justice--
is a long standing, albeit minority tradition within
Judaism, and represents one response to the problem of
evil. This tradition often takes the form of a trial. The
believer indicts God for His failure to fulfil His
covenantal promise to protect His people. Byron Sherwin
suggests that God is a "person" in Jewish law: He is a
party to an agreement, and as such can be tried for
breaking that agreement. 39 The covenant is binding on both
parties. God can judge human beings if they sin, and
humanity can judge God if He fails to fulfil His
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responsibilities. As the initiator of the covenant, more
seriousness is attached to God's failure. In challenging
God, Wiesel stands within the tradition of contention with
God. However, the radical counter-testimony of the
Holocaust also sets him apart from previous examples of
contention: the covenantal framework is shattered and the
relationship of emunah between humanity and God is lost.
Hutzpa Vlapei Shamaya, boldness with regard to
Heaven, forms a consistent thread throughout the Jewish
tradition. The biblical tradition of contention begins
with Abraham protesting against the decision to destroy
Sodom and Gomorrah:
"Wilt thou indeed destroy the righteous with the
wicked? Suppose there are fifty righteous within the
city, wilt thou then destroy the place and not spare
it for the fifty righteous who are in it? Far be it
from thee to do such a thing, to slay the righteous
with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the
wicked! Far be that from thee! Shall not the Judge
of the earth do right?" And the LORD said, "If I
find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will
spare the whole place for their sake.". (Gen. 18:
16-33)
The Prophets protest in similar fashion over the fate of
the innocent. Moses protests on behalf of both the
innocent and the guilty, persuading God to rescind His
judgement against the Israelites for the creation of the
Golden Calf (Ex. 32: 7-14). One midrash comments:
God says, "I rule mankind. Who rules Me?--T1AA
righteous. For I make a decree and they annul it."'
The school of Rabbi Ishmael suggests that contention with
God is justified in the face of God' silence:
"Who is like unto Thee among the mighty (elim) 0
Lord?" (Ex. 15: 11). Said Rabbi Ishmael: Read rather
"Who is like unto Thee among the silent (elmim), 0
Lord--seeing the ,quffering of His children and
remaining silent?"'
In contending with God, the believer hopes that, like Job,
he will receive an answer; that God will no longer remain
silent in the face of innocent suffering.
Contention with God formed a central part of early
Hasidism. Part of the laddik's function was to intercede
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with God on behalf of his community. He implored or
demanded that God intervene in history to prevent His
Chosen People suffering further. Hasidism concentrated on
the morality of God's continuing silence in the face of
His people's suffering. The most extreme exponent of
Hutzpa Kqapei Shamaya was the Hasidic Master, Levi-
Yitzhak of Berditchev (1740-1809). The continued suffering
of the Jews provides sufficient "evidence" for Levi-
Yitzhak to find God guilty of failing to fulfil His
covenantal function. Thus, rather than talking of Yom
Kippur (singular), he refers to Yom Ha-kippurim (plural)--
a day of atonement for both God and humanity.42
Wiesel explicitly associates himself with Levi-
Yitzhak of Berditchev by adopting the latter's definition
of contention as his own:
Jewish tradition allows man to say anything to God,
provided it be on behalf of man• • • • It all depends on
where the rebel chooses to stand. From inside his
community, he may say anything. Let him step outside
it, and he will be denied this right. The revolt of
the believer is not that of the renegade; 4e two do
not speak in the name of the same anguish."
Levi-Yitzhak's definition of contention serves to explain
the hostile reaction to Rubenstein's work: he is seen as a
"renegade", as one who steps outside his community. By
contrast, Wiesel is a "rebel", but one who speaks from
"inside his community". He agrees with Levi-Yitzhak that
contention is a characteristic of the Jewish tradition; a
characteristic that gains its legitimacy from its position
inside the covenantal framework:
man must interrogate God, as did Abraham; articulate
his anger, as did Moses; shout his sorrow, as did
Job. But only the Jew opts for Abv0am--who
questions--and for God--who is questioned."
Thus, contention is an expression of faith: the believer
articulates his anger or disappointment at God's failure
to act in the manner expected of Him.
Although Wiesel adopts Levi-Yitzhak's definition of
contention as his own, there are also striking differences
between their two positions. Wiesel differs in making
contention--the Trial of God--the dominant motif in his
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religious thought. In the light of the believer's loss of
emunah, contention becomes the only meaningful expression
of faith:
only those who do not believe i7 ii God will not cry
out to him in wrath and anguish.'
The Trial of God that runs throughout Wiesel's work has
its roots in an incident witnessed in Auschwitz:
inside the kingdom of night, I witnessed a strange
tri4.1. Three rabbis--all erudite and pious men--
decided one winter's evening to inikict God for
allowing his children to be massacred.'
This trial is imposed retroactively on the tradition.
Thus, the question posed by the Akedah incorporates that
posed by the death of the Six Million; Job's failure to
persist in questioning God is all the greater in the light
of subsequent Jewish suffering; Jeremiah's anguish at the
Fall of Jerusalem incorporates that of the survivor-writer
after the Holocaust. The questioning of the Hasidic
Masters gains an added sense of urgency: the struggle
against melancholy is as much Wiesel's as it is theirs.
Wiesel differs from Levi-Yitzhak's definition of
contention in one further crucial respect--his
identification of legitimate contention. He radically
redefines the identities of the "rebel" and the
"renegade". Wiesel acknowledges the common ground between
the post-Holocaust Trial of God and the metaphysical
"rebellion" of an Ivan Karamazov or an Albert Camus.47
Such agnostic or atheistic rebellion reflects similar
moral outrage and humanitarian concern, even though the
framework of the protest differs. Thus, rather than
differentiating between those who are "inside" the
community and those "outside", Wiesel distinguishes
between those protests that are "on behalf of man" and
those that are not. The authenticity of contention can no
longer be judged on a purely religious basis: there is a
protest that transcends the boundaries between belief and
unbelief:
He who says today that he is at peace with himself
and with God is estranged from both. Today, the
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angry believer, and perhaps the Angry non-believer
may be called the true believers.'
Rather than following Berkovits and Fackenheim in
privileging the "authentic" belief of the Hasidim and
Orthodox Jews in the ghettos and deathcamps, Wiesel
strives to incorporate both belief and unbelief into his
response to the Holocaust. Both constitute equally
legitimate reactions to the injustice of the event, and
neither should be privileged at the expense of the other.
In attempting to maintain the legitimacy of both belief
and unbelief, Wiesel suggests that a religious response to
the Holocaust should inhabit the borderlands between the
two. The protest atheism of Albert Camus and Ivan
Karamazov inhabits a similar borderland area to the
believer contending with God: a protest is registered
against the injustice of innocent suffering.
The "angry believer" and the "angry non-believer"
share a refusal to accept answers or resolutions of the
problem of innocent suffering. 49 Wiesel is adamant that
there can be no answer to the problem posed by God's
silence during the Holocaust. God could have intervened
during the Holocaust, but failed to do so; a failure that
cannot be rectified in the messianic future. God remains
omnipotent, but is bound by His chosen course of action.
Having elected to remain silent during the Holocaust, God
can do nothing to minimise subsequently the injustice of
that silence:
God himself cannot change the past; even he cannot
negate the fact that the killer has killed six
million times. How could he redqgm himself. I do not
know. I suppose that he cannot."
Thus, neither God nor the writer can re-create the lives
of the individuals and communities that were wiped out
during the Holocaust--the memory of injustice remains. As
a consequence, there can be no resolution to the Trial of
God: the injustice of the Holocaust cannot be redeemed,
yet the believer continues to hope for the restoration of
emunah to the covenantal relationship. The fact that
contention continues serves to emphasise the believer's
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commitment to covenantal ethics, even though the element
of trust in the relationship has been shattered. The Jews
assume God's role as the unchanging, consistent partner in
the covenant; whereas God is presented as fickle in His
commitment to His Chosen People:
In the endless engagement with God, we proved that
we are more patient than He, more compassionate,
too. In other words, we did not give up on
Him....For this is the essence of being ewish:
never to give up--never to yield to despair."
To give up on the covenant would be to break with the
positive values of the past.
Wiesel's definition of the essence of Judaism as a
refusal to yield to despair should not be confused with
Fackenheim's 614th Commandment, with its prohibition
against despair. Wiesel interprets Judaism as an "endless
engagement with God". Rather than accepting that
historical counter-testimony marks the end of the
covenant, the Jews consistently reinterpret the tradition
in the light of catastrophe. The reinterpretation of
covenantal faith is inspired by a refusal to accept that
historical catastrophe is justified. Within the broad
dialectic of covenantal promise and historical counter-
testimony, the individual continues to protest his
innocence. In the Bible, the demand for justice is both on
behalf of the community (Abraham, Moses), and on behalf of
the individual (Job). Thus, a religious response to the
Holocaust has to be both a communal and an individual one.
The establishment of Yom HaShoah, the Holocaust
Remembrance Day, bears witness to the community's desire
to remember the injustice of the Holocaust. The Trial of
God serves to give expression to the individual's sense of
outrage. After each catastrophe, there was the temptation
to yield to despair and acknowledge that historical
counter-testimony had rendered continued covenantal faith
impossible. Refusing to yield to despair constituted an
affirmation of the positive content of that faith. The
response to catastrophe was thus to reinterpret the
tradition in a way that was meaningful in the aftermath
of disaster. The refusal to yield to despair was never an
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end in itself. Wiesel's opposition to despair co-exists
with the recognition that it constitutes a valid response
to the silence of God in the face of the Holocaust. Thus,
the rejection of despair should be interpreted as an
intrinsically illogical affirmation of hope, based on the
positive values of covenantal faith and the memory of the
fervour generated by the relationship of emunah that once
existed between God and His Chosen People.
6. 6. "WHAT IS THERE LEFT FOR US TO DO?": 
So be it! ... He's guilty; do you think I don't know
it? That I have no eyes to see, no ears to hear? ...
Yes, He is guilty. He has become the ally of evil,
of death, of murder, but the problem is still not
solved. I ask you a question and de you to answer:
'What is there left for us to do?''
The bulk of Wiesel's work is concerned with how the memory
of God's silence, and the subsequent loss of emunah in the
covenantal relationship, is to be absorbed into post-
Holocaust existence. All the protagonists in his novels
struggle to resolve the tension generated between the
positive qualities of covenantal faith and the injustice
of God's silence during the Holocaust. Wiesel differs from
%A
Rubenstein, Berkovits and Fackenheim A refusing to resolve
the tension between promise and counter-testimony: to do
so would be to privilege either those who lost faith or
those who continued to have faith during the Holocaust. In
rejecting the covenant, Rubenstein disassociates himself
from the Jewish past,and implicitly minimises the faith of
those who continued to believe, both before and during the
Holocaust. In reaffirming the covenant, Berkovits and
Fackenheim implicitly privilege faith over unbelief or
the loss of faith. In focussing upon armed and spiritual
resistance, both thinkers unintentionally minimise the
negative testimony of the muselmiinner, those who "touched
bottom". Wiesel strives to articulate a response that
incorporates both negative and positive witnesses to the
Holocaust, while privileging neither.
Wiesel's response is less grandiose in its conception
than that of Rubenstein, Berkovits, or Fackenheim.
Although his work is dominated by the problems facing the
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believer confronted by God's silence, he does not attempt
to articulate a post-Holocaust philosophy or theology.
Wiesel does not claim to possess the authority to define
the nature of "faith after the Holocaust", either in terms
of "covenantless" or "authentic" Judaism. As a result of
his personal experience of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, he is
reluctant to theorise over which reaction constitutes the
"authentic" response. When he speaks of faith after the
Holocaust it is on an intensely personal level; a fact
that partly accounts for his greater popularity. Through
his novels and essays, he shares a personal quest for a
meaningful faith, that neither denies the injustice of
God's silence during the Holocaust, nor minimises the
positive heritage of the tradition.
Wiesel emphatically refuses to reject traditional
covenantal faith, despite the failure of God's failure to
fulfil His covenantal promise to protect His people. This
refusal has to be understood within the context of the
belief that "the essence of Jewish history is mystical
and not rational.". 53 Wiesel is adamant that "a Jew is
never alone": he is "surrounded, if not shielded, by his
community, both physically and spiritually". 54 There, are
two levels to this "mystical" understanding of history.
The Jew exists as an individual, but within the context of
his community. He has a responsibility both to himself and
the community that moulded him. As a survivor and writer,
Wiesel has the responsibility of bearing witness to the
loss of his home town, Sighet , and to the teachers who
had a profound influence upon his Jewish self-
understanding. 55
 The solidarity between the individual and
his community reflects that between the individual and
the historic Jewish community:
Man is not alone. God makes us remember the past
so as to break our solitude. Our forefathers stand
behind us, some of them tested or chosen by God.
Whatever they 4A, they did for us. Whatever we do,
we do for them.-'°
The individual Jew is a representative of the
covenantal community; a community that incorporates both
those who affirmed their faith in the face of suffering
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(Rabbi Akiba), and those who repudiated faith in response
to catastrophe (Elisha ben Abuya). In refusing to
privilege either faith or unbelief as an appropriate
response to the Holocaust, Wiesel remains consistent with
this "mystical" reading of Jewish history: the post-
Holocaust Jew stands as a representative of both the faith
and unbelief of the past, and the faith and unbelief
generated during the Holocaust.
However, in spite of this mystical solidarity, Wiesel
acknowledges that the Holocaust did generate a rupture
between past and present: the tradition no longer means
what it once did; it has to be recovered and reformulated.
In the light of this acknowledgement, is it not more
logical to follow Rubenstein in asserting that the
covenant no longer forms a meaningful vehicle for
religious belief? Wiesel demurs: although the covenant is
broken--in the sense that the element of emunah is no
longer part of the covenantal relationship--the tradition
still provides a meaningful way of responding to
catastrophe. The interpretation of the covenant as a
dialectic between promise and counter-testimony provides
analogies for responding to the Holocaust. The rabbinic
response to the disasters of 70 and 135, and that of Isaac
Luria to the Expulsion from Spain, offer precedents for
the further reinterpretation of the covenant after the
Holocaust. However, such precedents serve to highlight
both the continuity and the discontinuity between the
Holocaust and previous catastrophes. Does the Holocaust
mark a further stage in the reinterpretation of the
tradition, or the point at which the covenant finally
collapses under the weight of historical counter-
testimony? Wiesel responds by arguing that, although
humanity's trust that God will fulfil His covenantal
responsibilities is shattered, the human commitment to
covenantal ethics remains. The tradition is reformulated
in the light of this loss of emunah, and serves as both a
reminder of past closeness in the covenantal relationship,
and a basis for responding to catastrophe in the present:
-175-
Traditions no longer mean what they once did.
Nevertheless, they are significant in allowing a
person to face his ,gate. They allow one to
reappropriate the past.''
Wiesel's Biblical and Hasidic essays can be interpreted as
an attempt to relate the anguish of the believer in the
present to that expressed in the tradition. He then
strives to apply traditional responses to innocent
suffering to the present.
Wiesel builds his response to the Holocaust around
the traditional concept of contention with God. However,
he is adamant that this cannot be regarded as an end in
itself. Contention with God is only valid if it is
located within a concern for others: Abraham protested
over the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah; Moses and Levi-
Yitzhak of Berditchev contended with God over the fate of
the Chosen People as a whole. The lesson of the book of
Job is that "it is given to man to transform divine
justice into human justice and compassion". 58
 Contention
is only a valid response to God' silence if protest
finds practical expression in "human justice and
compassion". Wiesel contextualises contention within an
understanding of Tikkun. The need for Tikkun is all the
greater after the Holocaust, in the light of both God's
silence and humanity's abandonment of the victims to their
fate. The responsibility for Tikkun is entirely human, and
devolves upon every individual. Restoration and repair are
not the sole responsibility of the :Zaddik. He adopts and
paraphrases Pinhas of Koretz' definition of Tikkun:
It is to be concerned not only with yourself but
with everything that goes on around you; help others
and you will help yourself. YouNant to serve God?
Start with serving his children."
In Wiesel's first two novels, Dawn and The Accident, the
protagonist allows the memory of the dead to isolate him
from his contemporaries. The later novels reject this
perspective. In The Town Beyond the Wall and subsequent
novels, the protagonist signals his commitment to life by
acknowledging his responsibility for the well-being of at
least one other individual. The memory of the dead is
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still dominant, but serves either to alert the
protagonist to injustice (The Oath), or is channelled into
a commitment to others: "the way to fight death is to
create life". 60
Wiesel is adamant that the most positive response to
the Holocaust is Tikkun, understood as compassion for
others and opposition to injustice. He offers an ethical
or humanitarian , rather than a strictly theological
response to the Holocaust. He does not privilege belief
over unbelief, and thus offers a response that is
meaningful to both religious and secular Jews, albeit not
necessarily to Orthodox Jews. The appropriate response to
the Holocaust is an increased sensitivity to injustice,
rather than a theological explanation of the silence of
God--whether in terms of the end of the covenant, Hester
panim, or the Commanding Voice of Auschwitz:
In the face of suffering, one has no right to turn
away, not to see. In the face of injustice, one may
not look the other way. When someone suffers, and it
is not you, he comes first.... To watch over a man
who grieves is a more urgent duty than to think of
God.°1
Wiesel's emphasis on increased sensitivity to injustice is
informed by his acute memory of the Holocaust victims'
isolation: neighbours looked "the other way" while they
were being deported. 58 As a result, he attaches great
importance to showing solidarity with the victims of
injustice, even if such support has no immediate practical
results: it is essential to show the victims that they are
remembered, that they are not alone. 63
 Thus, Wiesel's
religious response to the Holocaust incorporates both his
writing and his human rights campaigning, the two
activities are intrinsically related: "My life is a
64 Hiscommentary on my books, not the other way round. 11.
popularity is related to the fact that he offers a
personal response to the Holocaust that is also practical:
he suggests ways in which both Jews and Christians can
practically channel what is primarily an emotional
response.
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CONCLUSION: 
Elie Wiesel's influence on Jewish and Christian responses
to the Holocaust is undeniable. As a writer and speaker,
he has achieved widespread popularity, particularly in the
United States. His influence on academic thinking on the
Holocaust has been acknowledged. 65 Rubenstein, Berkovits,
and Fackenheim acknowledge his influence. How is this
popularity and influence to be accounted for? Haas
suggests that Wiesel's popularity arises from his personal
style, his mysticism, and his refusal to adopt a formal
philosophical or theological approach." Wiesel's personal
experience lends his voice greater authority. However,
other survivors have written and spoken of the Holocaust,
but only Primo Levi has attained an equivalentx of
popularity. The major factor contributing to Wiesel's
influence is his choice of medium: storytelling, rather
than formal philosophy and theology. First, this makes his
work more accessible than that of Rubenstein, Berkovits,
and Fackenheim. Wiesel's Night and Levi's If This is a Man
have become two of the most influential texts in
discussions of the Holocaust. These two memoirs have
provided two of the now-paradigmatic texts for discussion
of a religious response to the Holocaust: the child-
hanging scene and the definition of a muselmann.
Second, literature appears to be a more appropriate
medium for a response to the Holocaust. The weakness of
Berkovits' and Fackenheim's approach lies in the
unintentional privileging of the "authentic" testimony of
armed and spiritual resistance. Both claim to adopt a
dialectical approach that incorporates both positive and
negative testimony, but ultimately sacrifice the latter to
protect the former. Rubenstein's weakness lies in his
refusal to adopt a dialectical approach: he ignores both
the dialectical nature of a major strand within covenantal
thought, and % t 	 challenge posed by the existence of are5•0e
spectrum ofhresponses during the Holocaust. In rejecting
the covenant, he implicitly privileges the rejection of
belief over faith. All three thinkers ultimately resolve
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the conflicting claims of belief and unbelief; Rubenstein
in favour of unbelief (or at least the rejection of
covenantal faith), and Berkovits and Fackenheim in favour
of belief. Wiesel adopts literature as a medium precisely
because it allows him to leave such tensions unresolved.
Irving Greenberg suggests that, after the Holocaust, the
storyteller becomes the authoritative teacher in Judaism:
in a time of the silence of God and the consequent break
in the covenant, all that remains are fragments of
faith. 67 Such a fragmented faith is essentially
dialectical, being beset with tensions; for example,
between promise and counter-testimony; faith and unbelief;
past and present; fervour and the loss of emunah; humanity
as the image of God and the muselmann; election and
selection; language and silence. As a medium, literature
allows these tensions to be explored, but does not require
that they be resolved. For Wiesel, the only possible
resolution of these tensions would require the reversal of
history, and the restoration of the dead to life; a
reversal that he knows to be impossible. In the absence of
this reversal, no resolution is possible, therefore the
Trial of God continues. To abandon or affirm the covenant
would be to accept a partial resolution of the rupture
generated by the Holocaust, and would thus minimise the
injustice of God's silence during the Holocaust.
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PART III. CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TO THE HOLOCAUST. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
The Holocaust stands as radical counter-testimony to the
revelatory promise of Judaism and Christianity. Both
religions "proclaim a God who cares and the preciousness
of the human in the image of God.". 1 The Holocaust,
typified by the muselmann, challenges both these claims.
Thus, Jewish and Christian responses to the Holocaust
reflect a common concern over the continued meaningfulness
of the covenantal framework, and the claim that humanity
is created in imago del. However, Jewish and Christian
responses differ radically in perspective.
A Jewish response to the Holocaust, as Fackenheim is
swift to point out, reflects the perspective of a real, or
potential victim of Nazism. The framework of a religious
response to the event is provided by the covenant: God's
silence is problematic precisely because of His covenantal
promise to protect His Chosen People. The Jews' status as
victims during the Holocaust stands as radical counter-
testimony to their election as Chosen People. By contrast,
a Christian response to the Holocaust is articulated from
within a religious and cultural tradition that was a
causal factor in the event taking place. Thus, in addition
to acknowledging the Holocaust's status as counter-
testimony to covenantal promise, it is necessary to
acknowledge the existence of a persistent thread of anti-
Judaism within Christian theology and Church history. A
Christian response to the Holocaust has both an external
and an internal character; constituting a dialogue with
both the counter-testimony of the event, and an internal
dialogue with the Christian tradition that seeks to
identify and expurgate those elements that contributed
towards theological anti-Judaism. A Jewish response is
concerned with whether the covenantal tradition continues
to provide a valid basis for post-Holocaust Judaism. A
Christian response is handicapped by the fact that the
tradition is held to be flawed. Christian theology is not
only challenged by the counter-testimony of the Holocaust,
it is implicated: Christian anti-Judaism was a significant
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contributory factor in enabling the Holocaust to take
place.
The key question concerns the centrality of anti-
Judaism within the Christian tradition. Is it possible to
articulate Christianity in a way that does not denigrate
both Jews and Judaism? Those who articulate a Christian
response to the Holocaust reply in the affirmative to this
question, but demand that theology be reformulated in the
light of the event--to a greater or lesser extent. 2 In an
Anglo-American context, the two most influential
reformulations of Christian theology are those of Rosemary
Radford Ruether and Jiirgen Moltmann. 4 Both responses arise
from a concern with political and liberation theology--
understood in terms of messianic faith. 3 However, Ruether
and Moltmann differ in the significance they attach to the
Christian legacy of anti-Judaism. Ruether asserts that
anti-Judaism is an integral part of christology. If anti-
Judaism is to be eliminated from Christian theology, it is
essential to reformulate this central doctrine. Moltmann
differs in seeing anti-Judaism as a distortion, rather
than an essential part of the tradition. Thus, whereas
Ruether responds to the Holocaust by offering a defence of
her thesis that anti-Judaism is an essential part of
traditional Christian theology, Moltmann sees himself as
reclaiming a traditional (Pauline / Lutheran)
understanding of the Cross that provides a sufficient
basis for responding to the Holocaust. Ruether would also
claim to be recovering and restating a vision already
present. However, she would locate this as existing prior
to the corruption of the tradition.
Rosemary Radford Ruether and Jiirgen Moltmann mark
opposite ends of the spectrum. Ruether argues that the
tradition is incapable of responding to the Holocaust,
unless a radical reformulation takes place. Moltmann
argues that a reformulation is required, but that this
takes the form of a recovery of the biblical, particularly
the Pauline, understanding of the Cross. Christology,
correctly understood, provides the basis for a Christian
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response to the Holocaust. Between these two poles, there
is a third strategy--that of Johann Baptist Metz. Metz is
aware of the work of both Ruether and Moltmann, and
suggests an approach that combines the emphases of both.
He strives to combine the former's emphasis on the
centrality of anti-Judaism in Christian theology with the
latter's strategy of reformulation and recovery. This
approach has received less attention than either Ruether's
or Moltmann's, but marks an attempt to incorporate the
strengths of both thinkers, while striving to eradicate
the weaknesses. An analysis of the theological responses
of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Jiirgen Moltmann, and Johann
Baptist Metz serves to represent the spectrum of
strategies for reformulating the Christian tradition in
the light of the Holocaust.
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7. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER: FAITH AND FRATRICIDE. 
7. 1. INTRODUCTION.
7. 2. THE CRITICAL TRANSFORMATIVE VISION.
7. 3. "THE LEFT HAND OF CHRISTOLOGY".
7. 4. ANTI-JUDAISM IN CHURCH HISTORY.
7. 5. CHRISTIANITY AND THE HOLOCAUST.
7. 1. INTRODUCTION. 
The question of Christian anti-Judaism is only one among
many themes running throughout the work of Rosemary
Radford Ruether. Her study of Christian anti-Judaism
arises out of a more general concern with "the
interconnection between theological ideas and social
practice.", inspired in turn by the American civil rights
movement, the peace movement, and the Second Vatican
Counci1. 1 In Ruether's analysis, all forms of social
injustice are reflections of an hierarchical society:
racism, religious bigotry (and the combination of the two
in anti-Semitism); sexism, and ecological damage are all
forms of institutional violence in a hierarchically
ordered world. Thus, the analysis of the Holocaust and
Christian anti-Judaism is contextualised within a broader
systematic theology.
Ruether's thesis is that institutional injustice is
hierarchical, reflecting the division of an original unity
into "head" and "body". The former is separated from, and
deemed superior to the latter. Thus, the "head" is
identified with: whites, Christians, men, the First World,
and humanity; whereas, the "body" is identified with:
blacks, non-Christians, women, the Third World, and the
natural world. The unity of creation is divided into a
hierarchy, in which the "head" assumes all positive
qualities, and the "body" is identified with all that is
negative. Thus, hierarchy is understood as a form of
dualism between good and evil, truth and falsehood.
In reading social injustice in terms of a descent
from unity to hierarchy, Ruether offers a variant on the
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Fall. Her methodology calls for a critique of ideology, in
the hope of returning beyond ideology to a paradisal state
of unity. She acknowledges the arbitrary nature of this
portrayal of paradise-Fall-Return: the ideal exists only
in the imagination; in effect, it is a statement of value.
The ideal is posited to justify the eradication of
perceived hierarchical injustice. In theological terms,
the myth of a non-hierarchical ideal serves to justify the
uprooting of the tradition: the tradition itself is
hierarchical and thus corrupt. The myth of paradisal unity
justifies the selective use of the tradition. Those
elements of the tradition deemed non-hierarchical are
retained; those elements considered "corrupt" are
rejected:
In the literal sense of the word, there is no
possibility of return to some period of the
tradition that predates the intervening history. So
the myth of return to origins is a way of making a
more radical interpretation of the revelatory
paradigm to encompass contemporary experiences,
while discarding institutions and traditions ,that
contradict meaningful, just, and truthful life.'
In Ruether's view, the "contemporary experiences" that
demand incorporation into the tradition are primarily
those of women and blacks--the primary victims of
hierarchical injustice. The spirituality and religious
experience of such groups is privileged over the
theological tradition. The latter is only valid to the
extent that it supports the former.3
The critique of the tradition takes place on the
basis of a "critical transformative vision" culled from
the Old and New Testaments. There are four elements in
this vision:
(1) God's defense and vindication of the oppressed;
(2) the critique of the dominant systems of power
and their powerholders; (3) the vision of a new age
to come in which the present system of injustice is
overcome and God's intended reign of peace and
justice is installed in history; and (4) finally,
the critique of ... religion ....Prophetic faith
denounces religious ideologies and systems that
function to justify and sanctify the dominant,
unjust social order.'
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Such a vision has its roots in the teaching of the
Prophets and is developed in the New Testament. The
teaching of the Prophets is perceived as primarily
hierarchical, criticising, but not rejecting the existing
social order. Jesus' teaching rejects hierarchy: "The
division of humanity into separate races is seen as
overcome, symbolized by the division into Jew and Greek".5
However, the Early Church either spiritualised this
equality ("we are all one in Christ"), or projected it
into the eschatological future, thus ensuring the survival
of hierarchical structures. Ruether responds to her
critics by acknowledging that her "critical transformative
vision" has no clear exegetical basis in the biblical
tradition; but argues that, in view of the flawed,
hierarchical nature of the tradition, such a failure is
inevitable. In arguing that the religious experience of
oppressed groups is "the starting point and ending point
of the hermeneutical circle", Ruether creates a
methodology that excludes external criticism. 6 Criticism
on the basis of the tradition is equated with the
perpetuation of hierarchical injustice: the tradition
itself is deemed intrinsically corrupt.
Ruether's analysis of Christian anti-Judaism can be
seen as her critique of hierarchy in microcosm. Her
analysis imagines a similar pattern of ideal-Fall-Return,
achieved through the recovery of the "critical
transformative vision". The relationship between Church
and Synagogue is one between "head" and "body", with a
critical equality being transformed into a destructive,
hierarchical inequality. Little weight is attached to
traditional biblical scholarship or to classical
christology: both are reformulated in the light of
Ruether's hierarchical thesis. As a result, the positive
contribution of Ruether's trenchant analysis of Christian
anti-Judaism is undermined by her failure to seriously
engage with any evidence that counteracts her thesis.
7. 2. THE CRITICAL TRANSFORMATIVE VISION: 
the New Testament conflict with the dominant
religious authorities of Judaism operated in the
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mission of Jesus and the earliest Christians as a
criticism of fossilised religion to call Judaism
itself back to its prophetic-messianic mission. But
when Christianity moved to become a separate Gentile
religion and, eventually the dominant religion of
the Roman Empire, this same language was used to
express both the rejection of Judaism itself as an
inferior religion and the chauginist triumphalism of
the Church over the synagogue.'
Christianity initially emerged as a messianic renewal
movement within Judaism. Anti-Judaism developed as
Christianity increasingly became an independent movement.
Hence, Ruether's use of the image of fratricide: anti-
Judaism is understood as a form of sibling rivalry. The
relationship between the Church and the Synagogue is
interpreted in hierarchical terms: the early Christians
moved away from the original unity of Jesus' prophetic
critique (arising from and addressed to a Jewish matrix)
towards a dualistic separation of "head" and "body". Jesus
dialectical critique is dislocated from its original
setting: the twin prophetic elements of judgement and
promise come to be identified with the historical fates of
two distinct communities. The negative elements of Jesus'
message are perceived to be addressed to the Jews;
whereas, the positive elements are assumed to relate to
the early Christians. This process begins in Pauline
theology, but does not achieve its fully fledged form
until after the conversion of Constantine in the Patristic
Adversus Judaeos tradition.
Ruether suggests that Jesus' ministry should be
viewed in the context of criticism of the Jerusalem
Temple--by the Essenes and Zealots. In this scenario,
Jesus is a critic of the alliance between the religious
authorities and the state. As a critic of the established
order, Jesus stands in the tradition of the Prophets. The
Cross represents the culmination of this confrontation
with the existing hierarchy. The Early Church emerges as a
11
countercultural" movement within first century Judaism.8
Although simplistic (Ruether pays scant attention to the
spectrum of opinion within Jerusalem itself, notably the
tension existing between the Sadducees and Pharisees),
-191-
such an analysis falls within mainstream New Testament
scholarship. 9
 It is the detail of Ruether's analysis that
is considerably more controversial, notably her insistence
that anti-Judaism arises from the transformation of Jesus'
prophetic, dialectical style of teaching into a series of
dualisms.
Ruether argues that Jesus' message and that of the
early Christians developed around a series of dialectical
pairings--between judgement and promise, law and grace,
letter and spirit, particularism and universalism. This
dialectical style has prophetic roots: the deuteronomic
history is rooted in a series of blessings and curses;
covenantal faithfulness meets with prosperity,
faithlessness with disaster (Deut. 28; Josh. 7-8). The
prophetic critique of religious and social corruption is
balanced by the assurance that a faithful remnant will
survive the coming disaster (Isa. 1; Hosea 1-2; Amos 9).
Prophetic judgement is contextualised within the
covenantal framework. The Early Church increasingly came
to present Jesus' message as an external critique of both
Jews and Judaism. The dialectical nature of prophetic
criticism is displaced by the polarization of dualisms, in
which "one member of each becomes inordinately valued, the
other correspondingly disvalued.
Thus, judgement and promise, rather than forming the
basis of covenantal life, become polarised: promise is
applied exclusively to the Church, while judgement is
passed on Judaism. The Church becomes heir to the
covenantal promise (Rom. 4). As a consequence, Judaism is
superseded by the Church: election passes from the former
to the latter (Gal. 3:10-29 1
 4:21-31, 5:12). The military
defeats of 70 and 135 were interpreted as proof of God's
judgement on the Jews for their rejection of Jesus as
Messiah. As inheritors of the promise, the Church alone is
able to interpret Scripture: the key being faith in Jesus'
messiahship.
The key question concerns the point at which this
development began to take place. Ruether acknowledges that
11•1 0
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fully fledged anti-Judaism does not arise until
Christianity became predominantly Gentile, and--after the
conversion of Constantine--the state religion of the Roman
Empire. Controversy surrounds the precise nature of the
relationship between the post-Constantine, Patristic
Adversus Judaeos tradition, and the anti-Judaism in the
New Testament. Ruether claims that, although the Adversus
Judaeos tradition is a later, gentile construct, it has
firm roots in the New Testament, particularly in the
Pauline and Johannine texts. The biblical text reflects
the basis themes of the later Patristic tradition: the
insistence that the death of Jesus be interpreted as the
culmination of the Jewish people's hostility to the
Prophets (Acts 7:51-2; 1 Thess. 2:14-6; Matt. 23:30-6).
Jesus' critique of hierarchical religions is developed by
Paul to suggest that the Law has no positive redemptive
role, apart from the revelation of sin (Rom. 7:7-24; Col.
2:8, 20; Gal. 4:3; 2 Cor. 3:7-18). Ruether concludes that:
the view of both Paul and the New Testament as a
whole is that the Jews have lost their election. The
covenant with Moses has no power to save. The
promise resides solely in the church, and only by
repenting and joining the church can the Jews be
saved (Acts 28:28; Rom. 9-11). The destruction of
Jerusalem is the sign c'f11their present reprobate
status (Matt. 23:36-24:2) .
In the period between the second and fifth centuries, the
Adversus Judaeos tradition "greatly elaborated" these
themes in a way that "hardened the lines" between the
Jewish and Christian communities.
Ruether's analysis of the relationship between New
Testament and Patristic anti-Judaism is misleading: while
emphasising the lines of continuity, she pays insufficient
attention to the elements of discontinuity. However
negative, the New Testament references to the Jews still
fall within the parameters of an inner, dialectical
critique of Judaism. There is a qualitative distinction
between New Testament and later, Gentile anti-Judaism:
the earliest Christians were Jews, and however
harshly a Jew may criticize his own people, his
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stance is vastly different from that of a gentle
using the same proof texts and interpretations,'4
The New Testament texts were written against the gradual
demarcation of boundaries between the Jewish community and
the Early Church. Thus, many of Paul's negative referencer
to the Jews and the Law have to be set within the context
of his disputes with "Judaisers" over entrance
requirements for converts. This dispute is one internal to
the Early Church: the question being whether gentile
converts have to be circumcised and observe the food laws
(Acts 15:1-30; Gal. 2:1-10). The Johannine references to
the Jews have to be set against the background of
increasing tension and separation between the Early Church
and the Jewish community. 13 Thus, although the New
Testament references to the Jews are later employed
within a dualist context (the Adversus Judaeos tradition),
they are not, in themselves, dualist.
Thus, the New Testament pairings of judgement and
promise, law and grace, letter and spirit, reflect the
Early Christians' attempts at self-definition within a
predominantly Jewish matrix. Jesus emerged as the
charismatic leader of a messianic, renewal movement within
first century Judaism. This renewal movement was one among
many in the first century, all identifying themselves over
and against the Jerusalem religious establishment. As the
Early Church's membership became predominantly gentile,
the demarcation between the Church and the Jewish
religious community became increasingly apparent. The loss
of their original Jewish context caused the above pairings
to be seen in increasingly polemical and dualist terms.
The historical and social separation of the two
communities was reflected in a dislocated reading of such
theological pairings. The historical ascendancy of the
Early Church was identified with the positive symbols of
promise, grace and spirit; whereas the military defeats of
70 and 135, and subsequent exile, were retroactively
interpreted as judgement on the Jewish failure to
recognise Jesus as Messiah.
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7. 3. "THE LEFT-HAND OF CHRISTOLOGY": 
Theologically, anti-Judaism developed as the left-
hand of christology. Anti-Judaism was the negative
side of theChristian affirmation that Jesus was the
Christ. 14
Ruether's thesis is that anti-Judaism emerged as the Early
Church became increasingly gentile and lost sight of its
Jewish roots. One consequence of this process was the
distortion of Jesus' dialectical, prophetic critique into
a series of dualisms. A more disturbing consequence was
the increasingly triumphalist character of the Church's
self-consciousness. Judaism was deemed to be an
"inferior", "fossilized" religion: the Law had no
redemptive significance, other than to reveal sin. The
destruction of the Temple was interpreted as divine
judgement on the Jews' failure to recognise Jesus as
Messiah. Ruether suggests that there was a parallel
development in the Church's christological understanding.
Jesus saw himself as an eschatological prophet or
forerunner, paving the way for the imminent coming of the
Messiah. The Church transformed this hope into a doctrine
of fulfilled messianism centred on the figure of Jesus.
The future hope of Jesus and his earliest followers is
held to be fulfilled in the cross and resurrection, and in
the subsequent life of the Church. Anti-Judaism gains its
greatest impetus from this transition from future to
realised eschatology. In order to eradicate anti-Judaism
from Christian theology, it is necessary to recover Jesus'
original message; such a recovery requires the rejection
of traditional christology in favour of a paradigmatic and
proleptic interpretation of his ministry.
The key to Ruether's analysis lies in her assertion
that anti-Judaism is intrinsically linked to christology:
The anti-Judaic patterns of Christian theology were
and are still today tied to a dogma of fulfilled
messianism. So it is not possible to rethink these
anti-Judaic patternq, without questioning its
christological basis.'
The assertion that Jesus did not make any messianic claims
about his own person is foundational to this thesis.
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Ruether adopts a stance akin to that of Albert Schweitzer:
she emphasises the imminent eschatological hope of Jesus
and his earliest disciples, rejecting any suggestion that
the resurrection marks the fulfilment of this
expectation. 16
 Rather than claiming to be Messiah, Jesus
either saw himself as the eschatological prophet preparing
the way for the One who was to come, or saw his lordship
as belonging to the future.17
On the basis of this reading of Jesus' self-
understanding, Ruether asserts that any doctrine of
realised eschatology is a distortion of the original
kerygma. She rejects any messianic interpretation of the
resurrection:
the Resurrection is not the final happening of the
eschatological event, but the proleptic experiencing
of the final future of mqpkind in advance, we affirm
Jesus' hope in his name.1°
The resurrection is to be interpreted proleptically: as
the basis for hope in an as yet unrealised messianic
future. In proclaiming Jesus as Messiah and the fulfilment
of the messianic proof texts of the Old Testament, the
Early Church radically altered the meaning of the term. In
a Jewish context, the coming of the Messiah is marked by
the physical establishment of the kingdom of God on earth.
The earliest Christians lived in the expectation, first
that Jesus would establish the kingdom of God in his
lifetime (Mk. 10:35-46, 11:1-10, 15-19); and subsequently,
in his imminent return in glory (Mk. 9:1, 13:30; Matt.
10:23; Lk. 22:18; 1 Thess. 4:13-8). However, neither of
these hopes was fulfilled: the world remains in travail.
Ruether suggests that the Church responded to this
challenge by suppressing "the social justice dimension
fundamental to the entire prophetic tradition of messianic
hope.". 19
 The establishment of justice on earth is
dislocated from the fulfilment of messianic hope. Thus,
the resurrection can be interpreted as the fulfilment of
messianic hope regardless of the unredeemed state of the
world. Ruether suggests that it is this equation between
the resurrection and the fulfilment of messianic hope that
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results in the adoption of a triumphalist approach to
other faiths, and particularly towards the Jews.
Both Ruether's thesis and her reconstruction of early
Christian origins are highly problematic. In effect, she
relies upon a distinction between the Jesus of history and
the Christ of faith. Her thesis requires the existence of
a moment in Jesus' ministry, or Christian history, that is
free of anti-Judaism--"within the teachings of Jesus
himself I would find nothing of what I would call
Christian anti-Judaism." 20 . However, such a quest appears
futile in the light of the disparity of recent attempts to
define Jesus' self-understanding:
The enormous variety of Jesus-images in modern
scholarship suggests that we should limit ourselves
to speaking of sayings and stories in circulation
before the written gospels, sopi of which may well
go back to the figure of Jesus."
The difficulties inherent in the search for "the real
Jesus" or the "original gospel" are reflected in Ruether's
reconstruction. On the one hand, she presents a portrait
of Jesus as eschatological prophet, in language akin to
that used to describe John the Baptist (Mk. 1:4-8; Matt.
3:1-13).	 However,	 in doing so,	 she ignores	 the
considerable number of texts, particularly parables, that
ax
suggest some form of realised eschatology.' . Second, if
Jesus made no messianic claims for himself, in what way
does he differ from other teachers, such as Hillel,
Shammai, or Akiba? Yet, if Jesus did make messianic claims
concerning his future "lordship", in what way does he
differ from other failed messiahs, such as Bar Kochba or
Shabbetai Zvi? Why is Jesus, as opposed to Shabbetai Zvi,
to be regarded as the basis of our future hope? Even as
the leader of a renewal movement within Judaism, there
must have been some element in Jesus' teaching or self-
understanding that was distinctive. Ruether fails to
identify what element in Jesus' message was sufficient to
lead to the creation, and continuing existence of a
separate, non-Jewish religious group: what is specifically
Christian about Christianity?
-197-
Ruether calls for a proleptic and paradigmatic
interpretation of the resurrection in place of classical
christology. The resurrection is to be understood
proleptically: the Church continues to proclaim Jesus'
hopeifOds name. The resurrection is interpreted
paradigmatically: the countercultural equality of the
original Jesus-movement becomes the paradigm for a
reformulated, non-hierarchical Church. However, what
exactly is the nature of this hope that is being
proclaimed in Jesus' name, until such time when justice
will be established on earth? In Sexism and God-Talk, she
identifies Christian hope as a non-hierarchical society of
equals. Ruether suggests that Jesus offers a critique of
the "deformations of messianic language": the Old
Testament vision of the New Age envisions a "triumphant
reversal of domination" (Zech. 14:16-9); whereas Jesus
offers a non-hierarchical, messianic vision, with neither
oppressors, nor oppressed. The discussion over power with
the sons of Zebedee encapsulates Jesus' rejection of "the
triumphalistic concept of messianism": power is identified
with service (Matt. 20:17-28). 23 However Ruether
acknowledges that such a critique of hierarchical power
can only be found in fragmentary form in the biblical
tradition. The hope of a New Age of non-hierarchical
equality functions as an external critique of the
tradition, and is capable of existing independently on the
basis of the religious experience of oppressed and
marginal groups. Thus, the lack of a developed,
alternative christology in Ruether's theology arises
precisely because it is an inessential part of her
theology: Jesus' message is read and reformulated in the
light of contemporary religious experience, and thus, does
not rest upon a christological basis.
Ruether's reformulation of Christianity arises as the
logical consequence of her demand that the resurrection be
reinterpreted as both proleptic and paradigmatic. Thus,
her theology rests upon the assumption that traditional
christology is a hierarchical corruption of Jesus'
original message; anti-Judaism being one manifestation of
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this corruption. However, in dispensing with classical
christology, Ruether never engages with it. The tradition
becomes a picture of unrelieved blackness, save for those
elements that reflect Ruether's concerns with equality and
service. She never seriously considers whether it is
possible to 56-y within the tradition, and yet remain
free of anti-Judaism. A similar one-sidedness dominates
Ruether's reading of Church history: she concentrates on
negative attitudes to the Jews to the effective exclusion
of the positive traditions within Christian theology.
Second, although acknowledging that theological anti-
Judaism emerged within the context of conflict between the
early church and the Jewish authorities, Ruether never
considers the extent to which theological developments
were dependent on this context: to what extent did anti-
Judaism arise as a result of the sociological context,
rather than because of the theological content of the
Christian tradition?
7. 4. ANTI-JUDAISM IN CHURCH HISTORY: 
Since the fourth century after Christ, there have
been three anti-Jewish policies: conversion,
expulsion, and annihilation. The second appeared as
an alternative to the first, and the third emerged
as an alternative to the second The missionaries
of Christianity had said in effect: You have no
right to live among us as Jews. The secular rulers
who followed had proclaimed: You have no right to
live among us. The German Nazis at la 0 decreed: You
have no right to live. (Raul Hilberg)''
The thesis that there is a logical progression from
Christian and secular anti-Jewish legislation to the
Holocaust forms the basis of Raul Hilberg's magisterial
work, The Destruction of the European Jews. Hilberg's
thesis forms the basis of Ruether's reading of Church
history. The Holocaust is presented as the logical
consequence of the Adversus Judaeos tradition, and its
social and political application. The presence of elements
of continuity between Christian anti-Judaism and Nazi
anti-Semitism is not disputed. Controversy surrounds the
degree of continuity 1 discontinuity. The weakness of
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Ruether's approach is that she emphasises continuity at
the expense of the discontinuity.
Theological anti-Judaism reached its most developed
form in the Patristic Adversus Judaeos tradition; a
tradition that is encapsulated in St. John Chrysostom's
Eight Orations against the Jews (386-7)--the "most violent
and tasteless of the anti-Judaic literature of the
period". 25 There are three major strands in this
theological tradition, all of which have their roots in
the New Testament. First, Jewish history is presented as a
catalogue of crimes: the rejection of the prophets
culminates in the rejection and murder of the Messiah.
This history serves to justify God's rejection of the Jews
as Chosen People in favour of the Church (Rom. 1:28-32, 2:
1-11; Gal. 3: 19-22; Acts 3:12-20, 6:39-43). Second, this
catalogue of crimes culminates in deicide, God-killing.
The entire Jewish people, past, present and future is
guilty of the murder of the Messiah (Matt. 27:24-6).
Ruether suggests that the higher the christology, the
greater the guilt attached to the Jews: the destruction of
Jerusalem and eternal exile are the Jews' punishment for
the death of the Son of God:
It is because you killed Christ. It is because you
stretched out your hand against the Lord. It is
because you shed the precious blood, that there is
now no restoration, no mercy anymore and no
defense. 26
Third, the interpretation of Jewish history as a catalogue
of crimes and the charge of deicide combine in the
accusation that the Jews are innately sinful:
the synagogue is not only a whorehouse and a
theater; it is also a den of thieves and a haunt of
wild animals	 not the cave of a wild animal, but
of an unclean wild animal The Jews have no
conception of [spiritual] things at all, but living
for the lower nature, all agog for the here and now,
no better disposed than pigs or goats, they lixq by
the rule of debauchery and inordinate gluttony."
Although extreme, the Eight Orations against the Jews
encapsulate the major themes of the Patristic Adversus
Judaeos tradition.
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The three themes of the Adversus Judaeos tradition
form the basis of subsequent Christian anti-Judaism. The
charge of deicide persisted, to such an extent that
Vatican II felt compelled to reject the imputation of
guilt to "all Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor
against the Jews of today.". 28 The Patristic imagery of
the Jew as innately sinful merged with folk imagery of the
Wandering Jew, and medieval imagery of the devil:
The image of the Jew deteriorated in the minds of
Christians to that of a deformed monster, with
horns, tail, cloven hoofs, and sulphuric m4or to
betray his fundamentally diabolic character."
The increasingly virulent nature of anti-Judaic imagery
was reflected in the attribution of supernatural powers.
Anti-Judaism reflected the prevalent interest in
witchcraft and the devils. Charges were rife that the Jews
were responsible for outbreaks of plague and famine;
fouling wells; and desecrating the eucharistic host. The
Middle Ages also marked the emergence of the "blood
libel"--the accusation that Jews killed Christian boys and
drank their blood at Passover.
The development of theological anti-Judaism both
influenced, and was fed by the social ostracization of the
Jews within Christian society. With the conversion of
Constantine, Christianity became the established religion
of the Roman Empire, and was thus able to reflect its view
of the Jews in law:
The basic principle of this legislation was that the
Jews should be allowed only the bare minimum of
continued rights to worship and exist, but should
have no honor in Christian society and should be
deprived of any possibility of holding authority
over Christians.81
The Codes of Theodosius and Justinian (fifth and sixth
century) "laid the basis for the debasement of the civic
and personal status of the Jews in Christian society"31
that was to continue until the emancipation of the
nineteenth century. Jews were forbidden from owning
slaves, and later serfs; barred from holding civil or
military office prohibited from repairing existing
synagogues or building new ones; compelled to wear
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distinctive clothing, and live in segregated areas of
towns and cities. Ruether's thesis echoes that of Raul
Hilberg: both cite the manner in which Nazi anti-Jewish
legislation built upon precedents in the Christian past.32
The key question concerns the degree of both
continuity and discontinuity between Christian anti-Jewish
legislation and the Holocaust. Hilberg points to the
elements of continuity, but argues that bureaucratic,
large-scale extermination was unique to the Holocaust.33
Ruether differs in suggesting that past legislation,
specifically the Spanish statutes of the Purity of Blood
(Toledo, 1449), constitute a "dress rehearsal" for Nazi,
racial anti-Semitism. 34 Although noting the discontinuity
between Christian anti-Judaism and Nazi anti-Semitism,
Ruether does this within the context of emphasising the
continuity:
although Christian theology decreed misery for the
Jews, it did not decree extermination. In fact it
demanded their ongoing existence, although in a
status of reprobation, as the continuing witness to
the triumph of the church and as the final witness
to Christ at the end of time. The paradox of the
church's attitude to the Jews was that it was
simultaneously committed to their preservation, and
to making them exhibit externally the marks of their
reprobation. It was out of this contradiction that
the tragic hj.ptory of the Jews in Christian society
was to flow."
However, as the Jewish historian, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi
notes, the final sentence is "at least a partial non-
sequitur": the tragedy arose from only one side of the
paradox, "reprobation". The Holocaust was possible, in
part, because the Christian tradition of "preservation"
had fallen by the wayside. 36 Thus, the weakness of
Ruether's thesis lies in its "unrelieved blackness"; in
its "failure to balance the picture with the grays and
whites of Christian-Jewish relations.". 37 "Reprobation" is
stressed at the expense, apart from a few cursory
references, of "preservation".
The tradition of "preservation" was not a form of
philo-Semitism. However, it did serve to limit the scope
of anti-Jewish persecution.	 If the tradition of
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reprobation was as widespread as Ruether suggests, the
question arises as to why the Church did not destroy the
Jews. Whereas, the penalty of heresy was death, the rights
of Jews were defined and preserved. In interpreting the
Theodosian and Justinian Codes in a purely negative light,
Ruether ignores the fact that such legislation served to
preserve Judaism's status as a religio licita. However
much the Christian authorities denigrated and legislated
against the Jews, they continued to recognise their legal
right to exist:
That Jews are to be tolerated in the midst of
Christendom, that they have the right to regulate
their internal affairs according to their law, that
they are entitled to a basic protection of life,
property, and the free exercise of their religion so
long as it does not directly interfere with the
dominant faith--these principles remained corAtant
in Christian law down through the Middle Ages.'
Thus, the Jews' position was considerably more stable than
that of heretical groups, such as the Donatists.
Yerushalmi suggests that if the Marcionite interpretation
of Scripture had prevailed, with its denigration of the
Old Testament, then the Jews might have shared the fate of
other early heretical groups.39
Second, Ruether's emphasis upon the "unrelieved
blackness" of the reprobation of the Jews is reflected in
her monolithic presentation of the Church. Great emphasis
is placed upon local attacks on synagogues; pogroms during
the crusades; the blood libel; and legislation such as the
statutes of the Purity of Blood. However, such inordinate
emphasis on the reprobation of the Jews results in an
unbalanced picture of the authorities' attitude towards
the Jews. Yerushalmi suggests an alternative reading of
the same events. He notes that, in the Middle Ages, the
lower clergy were perceived as hostile by the Jewish
community, whereas the bishops and papacy were thought of
as protectors: the Constitutio pro Judaeis, despite its
pejorative tone, provided the basis for the legal
protection of Jewish life and property. Excesses, such as
the blood libel, were condemned, however half-heartedly,
in official pronouncements. Those responsible for issuing
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the initial statutes of the Purity of Blood were
excommunicated, and the legislation denounced, by Pope
Nicholas V. In spite of legal, social, and religious
denigration of the Jews, there was no widespread policy of
enslavement (as in Visigothic Spain), or forced baptism
(as in fifteenth century Spain under Ferdinand and
Isabella) .40 It is also inaccurate to suggest that
theological anti-Judaism necessarily manifested itself in
hostility to local Jewish communities: in spite of being
theologically anti-Judaic, Bernard of Clairvaux issued an
influential call against the massacre of the Jews that
accompanied the Second Crusade. 41 Thus, Yerushalmi
concludes that Christian anti-Judaic attitudes were
considerably more complex than Ruether allows.
Ruether concludes that "Modern anti-Semitism is both
a continuation and a transformation of the medieval
theological and economic scapegoating of the Jews.".
Modern anti-Semitism is a "transformation" of medieval
scapegoating": it "builds upon the medieval image of the
Jew as a dangerous disease and demonic power", rather than
taking its rationale from "the Jewish refusal to accept
Jesus as the Christ and enter the church" . 42 However, does
the use of the term "transformation" suggest that modern
anti-Semitism is "merely a metamorphosed medieval
Christian anti-Semitism"7 43 Yerushalmi suggests that
Ruether fails to explain why the physical extermination of
the Jews was not envisioned earlier, if it is so obviously
the logical extension of Christian anti-Judaism:
There is no question but that Christian anti-
Semitism through the ages helped create the climate
and mentality in which genocide, once conceived,
could be achieved with little or no opposition. But
even if we grant that Christian teaching was a
necessary cause leading to„the Holocaust, it was
surely not a sufficient one."
The crucial difference between modern, racial anti-
Semitism and Christian anti-Judaism lies in the fact that,
while the tradition of reprobation continued, that of
preservation lapsed almost entirely. Whereas the ultimate
Medieval anti-Judaic measure was expulsion, or forced
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conversion, the Holocaust was a state-instigated programme
of genocide. Ruether fails to acknowledge, or explain, the
gulf between the two. Why, for instance, did Nicholas V
feel compelled to denounce the statutes of the Purity of
Blood, whereas Pius XII did not feel compelled to protest
explicitly over the Nuremberg Laws, and the subsequent
extermination of six million Jews? To suggest that there
is a radical discontinuity between traditional Christian
anti-Judaism and the Holocaust is not to minimise the
importance of the former; it is to attempt to comprehend
the specifically modern character of the latter.
7. 5. CHRISTIANITY AND THE HOLOCAUST: 
At its root anti-Semitism in Christian civilization
springs directly from Christian theological anti-
Judaism. It was Christian theology which developed
the thesis of the eternal reprobate status of the
Jew in history, and laid the foundation for the
demonic view of he Jews which fanned the flames of
popular hatred.'"
Rosemary Ruether regards it as axiomatic that Christian
anti-Judaism bears the fundamental responsibility for
creating "the climate and mentality in which genocide,
once conceived, could be achieved with little or no
opposition.". She is prepared to concede that there are
elements of discontinuity, but argues that even these have
their roots in the Christian past. Thus, the racial nature
of Nazi anti-Semitism is held to have precedents in both
the medieval demonization of the Jew, and in the Spanish
statutes of the Purity of Blood. However, in placing such
a one-sided emphasis upon the elements of continuity,
Ruether inevitably distorts the reality of the Holocaust.
Fackenheim, Rubenstein, and Yerushalmi suggest that
the Holocaust's uniqueness lies, in part, in the absence
of choice: previously, the options of conversion or
apostasy remained open. The Holocaust marks a break with
traditional anti-Judaism: "The issue is physical
extermination. Not reprobation, discrimination, or any
variety of opprobrium, but—genocide." Ruether cedes that
modern,	 racial	 anti-Semitism	 constitutes	 a
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"transformation" of Christian anti-Judaism; one that
excludes the options of apostasy and conversion:
In Nazism the Christian demonization of the Jews'
spiritual condition was converted into spiritual
demonization of their biological condition. Hence
the Nazi final solution to the Jewish question was
not religioAs conversion, but physical
extermination.4°
However, despite this concession, she insists that the
demonization of the Jews' "biological condition" has its
roots in Patristic and Medieval anti-Judaic imagery. The
image of the Jew as demonic, vermin, or contagious disease
recurs throughout the Adversus Judaeos tradition. Thus,
the theory employed by Nazi anti-Semitism was already
present; uniqueness lay in the "transformation" of theory
into practice.
In proffering this interpretation, Ruether fails to
explain why a widespread policy of extermination did not
emerge until the twentieth century. Little or no
significance is attached to the fact that the Holocaust
occurred in the twentieth century, and not in the Middle
Ages. If the theory behind the Holocaust was already
present in the Adversus Judaeos tradition, why was it not
put into practice earlier? In emphasising the elements of
continuity, Ruether glosses over crucial elements of
discontinuity. Despite the similar use of imagery, the
contexts of Christian anti-Judaism and Nazi anti-Semitism
differ radically. Christian anti-Judaism was rooted in a
religious context: it was primarily applied to those Jews
who persisted in remaining Jews. The same strictures were
not applied to converts; the descendants of converts, or
those who intermarried--save in exceptional cases, as in
Spain. The context of Nazi anti-Semitism was provided by
the psuedo-scientific ideology of history as a biological
struggle between various racial groups. 47 Thus, the
"purity" of the Aryan Volk was perceived to be under
threat from the bacillus of World Jewry. In the context of
such a theory, the beliefs or practices of the individual
Jew were irrelevant: the same threat was posed by the
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nun, Edith Stein, as by the Hasids and Orthodox Jews of
Eastern Europe.
Ruether identifies a further line of continuity in
the reaction, or non-reaction, to the Holocaust on the
part of the majority of Christians:
the Church must take responsibility for the
perpetuation of the demonic myth of the Jew that
allowed the Nazis to make the scapegoat of their
project of racial purity. This Christian tradition
also promoted an antipathy in Christians who too
often felt little need to resporpcl, to the
disappearance of their Jewish neighbors.'"
Few critics would argue with either of these two
statements. The problem lies in the fact that Ruether does
not balance either with possible counter-testimony. In
Approaches to Auschwitz, Richard Rubenstein and John Roth
offer- supporting evidence for Ruether's claims. They note
that the lack of widespread opposition to the Holocaust
arose because the "Jews were not considered as existing
within the Christian universe of moral obligation".49
Thus, while Church leaders felt compelled to protest over
the fate of Jewish converts, they felt no similar
obligation to protest over the fate of the Jews. Those who
did protest, or offer aid to Jews were the exception
rather than the rule. 5° In explanation of this lack of
widespread opposition, Rubenstein and Roth suggest it is
legitimate to draw parallels between the number of Jews
killed and the pre-war level of anti-Semitism. 51 However,
they also insist that it is necessary to take a variety of
other factors into account. The level of Jewish
victimization also correlates with the intensity of Nazi
occupation: the Jewish death toll was at its highest in
Eastern Europe and Western Russia. Other factors, such as
nationalism and patriotism also have to be taken into
account, particularly in the context of the German Church
Struggle.52
Historical and political analyses of Nazi anti-
Semitism and the Holocaust serve further to undermine
Ruether's thesis. Sarah Gordon's analysis of the German
response to the events of Kristallnacht, the Night of
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Broken Glass, supports the suggestion that the lack of
opposition was due to the discontinuity between the
Holocaust and previous, Christian-inspired pogroms. She
notes that the events of Kristallnacht inspired
considerable complaint, mostly concerned at the damage to
property, vandalism, and general lawlessness. However, the
events of 9 November, 1938 were in the tradition of the
pogrom (looting shops; burning synagogues; acts of
violence against individual Jews). Kristallnacht, and the
reaction to it, resulted in a power struggle over control
of the "Jewish Question" between Goebbels on the one hand
(as instigator of the event), and Goering and Himmler on
the other. The latter triumphed; a victory that marked the
transition to the bureaucratically administered, and
strictly legal, "Final Solution".53
A consideration of the reactions to Kristallnacht
succeeds in highlighting Ruether's failure to consider the
essentially modern, technocratic nature of the Holocaust.
In stressing the theological antecedents of the event, she
fails to pay sufficient attention to historical and
political analysis: by interpreting the causality of the
Holocaust in primarily religious terms, she presents a
distorted picture of both the event, and the social and
political reality of Nazism. Her analysis of the lack of
Christian opposition to the Holocaust fails to pay even
minimal attention to the pressures exerted by a
totalitarian state.54
Second, the emphasis placed upon the continuity of
medieval and Nazi "demonization" of the Jew serves to
direct attention away from the fundamentally pragmatic
character of the Holocaust. Ruether asserts that the
deathcamps had "the character of a gigantic demonic
ritual". 55 On one level, such a suggestion can be
supported by reference to the view that the Nazis
displaced God during the Holocaust: the deathcamps
constituted a self-enclosed universe in which the Nazis
assumed the role of God, subverting biblical concepts such
as election and the imago dei. However, on another level,
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Ruether's interpretation serves to distort the functional
and technocratic character of the Holocaust. The decision
to hold selections and aktions on Jewish Holy Days can be
interpreted pragmatically: the timing serves to emphasise
the extent of Nazi power over their victims. In exercising
such power over Jewish life and death, the Nazis succeeded
in assuming one divine attribute. However "demonic" in
character, the deathcamps were primarily functional: they
represented the culmination of a process of
experimentation to discover the most efficient method of
resolving the "Jewish Question". Alternative policies had
been tried and found wanting: emigration, expulsion, a
state-inspired pogrom (Kristallnacht); mass-shootings.
These alternatives were deemed inadequate, either because
the numbers involved were too small (emigration,
expulsion); or public reaction (Kristallnacht); or the
effect on the perpetrators (the mass-shootings of the
Einsatzgruppen). The deathcamps themselves were refined
continuously in order to maximise efficiency. Chelmno,
Belzec, and Treblinka provided the prototype for
Auschwitz, which was designed to be both efficient and
financially self-sufficient. 56 Thus, however demonic in
intent, in practice, the deathcamps represent an exercise
in bureaucratic planning, modern technology, and business
acumen.
It is the essentially modern--bureaucratic and
technocratic--character of the Holocaust that suggests the
answer to Yerushalmi's challenge to Ruether--that she
explain why something comparable had not occurred earlier,
if the Holocaust constitutes the logical culmination of
the Christian tradition of social and theological
vilification of the Jews. The Holocaust differed from
previous, sporadic, "Christian" persecution of the Jews in
being the state-controlled, bureaucratically administered,
racially based, mass-production of death.
CONCLUSION: 
Ruether's enterprise in Faith and Fratricide, and
subsequent essays on anti-Semitism, has two primary aims.
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First, to analyse and highlight the role of Christian
anti-Judaism in creating an environment and atmosphere in
which the Holocaust could take place. Second, to highlight
the damaging repercussions that result from a corrupt and
distorted, hierarchical reading of Christianity. Thus,
Faith and Fratricide stands as an integral part of the
attempt to reformulate Christian theology on a non-
hierarchical basis. The privileging of the religious
experience of the oppressed over theology results in a
consciously selective attitude to biblical and theological
texts: Ruether only employs those texts that support her
thesis. Thus, those texts that contradict her reading of
"christology" and the resurrection are rejected as later,
corrupt deviations from Jesus' original message.
The advantage of Ruether's approach lies in the
emphasis placed upon the Christian antecedents of Nazi
anti-Semitism. Faith and Fratricide has effectively set
the agenda for subsequent discussion of anti-Judaism
within Christian theology and Church history, and the
extent to which this created an atmosphere and environment
in which the Holocaust could take place with little or no
opposition. 57 However, the single-minded emphasis upon
the continuity between Christian anti-Judaism is also a
disadvantage: it results in an over-simplistic reading of
both historical anti-Judaism and the Holocaust. Ruether
acknowledges that Christian anti-Judaism has its context
within a paradox of reprobation and preservation. In
concentrating on the tradition of reprobation to the all
but total exclusion of that of preservation, she glosses
over the gulf separating traditional Christian anti-
Judaism and the modern anti-Semitism that culminated in
the Holocaust. In conferring a legally recognised, albeit
reprobate status upon the Jews, the Christian authorities
ensured their survival. This conferral of legality stood
in stark contrast to the authorities' attitude to
heretical groups within Christianity. It was the Christian
preservation of the limited, but legally recognised,
rights of the Jewish community that provided the basis for
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Jewish survival within Christendom. The Nuremberg Laws
denied the Jews any such rights.
To acknowledge the "positive" elements within
Christian anti-Judaism is not to minimise the Church's
culpability with regard to the Holocaust. However, the
fact that Christian theology did not envisage the
widespread extermination of the Jews remains significant;
even more so, if Ruether's contention that such a vision
constitutes the logical outcome of the Adversus Judaeos
traditioni, For all the verbal and social vilification of
the Jews, the Church stopped short of supporting either a
systematic policy of forced conversion or annihilation.
The "unrelieved blackness" of Ruether's presentation of
Christianity's anti-Judaic record serves to support her
rejection of traditional theology and ecclesiastical
authority as irrevocably corrupt: a religious tradition
that culminates in the Holocaust is an unworthy basis of
modern belief and praxis. Thus, she never addresses the
question as to whether it is possible to formulate a
Christian theology, on the basis of the New Testament and
within the tradition, that is not anti-Judaic. As a
result, the negative critique of Christian anti-Judaism
remains valid, whereas her positive suggestions for the
reformulation of theology only have appeal for those
prepared to dispense with classical Christianity.
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8. JURGEN MOLTMANN: A POST-HOLOCAUST THEOLOGIA CRUCIS? 
8. 1. INTRODUCTION.
8. 2. THE CRUCIFIED GOD.
8. 3. THEOLOGIA CRUCIS AND THE HISTORY OF SUFFERING.
8. 4. MOLTMANN'S APPROPRIATION OF NIGHT
8. 5. THE FATE OF THE CROSS AS SYMBOL.
8. 1. INTRODUCTION. 
As a German, protestant, theologian, Jiirgen Moltmann
approaches the Holocaust from a perspective substantially
different to that of Rosemary Radford Ruether. Whereas,
Ruether's professional interest in theology was aroused by
the events surrounding Vatican II and the American civil
rights movement, Moltmann dates his interest in theology
to the Allied bombing of his home town, Hamburg, in July
1943, and his experience as a prisoner of war (February
1945-April 1948). Ruether's writing on Christian anti-
Judaism forms part of a more general critique of
hierarchical belief and practice. Moltmann's emphasis on
the need to articulate a post-Holocaust theology arises
from a consciousness of individual and collective, German
experiences of guilt and suffering". 1 Such experiences
take two forms. First, the experience of the German people
in rebuilding their nation under Allied occupation, in the
aftermath of defeat. Moltmann cites the disillusionment of
his generation; returning from prisoner of war camps,
convinced that they had been sacrificed by the Nazi
leadership: they were sent to fight when the war was
already lost. Second, he asserts that guilt and alienation
emerge as a consequence of Germany's "unmastered past"
(the refusal to acknowledge the degree of popular support
for the Nazi r‘gime and its actions). The temptation is to
confine the attribution of guilt to the Nazi hierarchy:
the majority were obeying the orders of the legally
constituted government; responsibility therefore belongs
to the government, rather than to the population as a
whole. Film of Nazi atrocities was dismissed by many
Germans as Allied propaganda; and the war was viewed as a
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tragedy for both Germany and Europe as a whole. Moltmann
proceeds to identify the unmastered past" as the root
cause of the disillusionment and alienation experienced by
many of his contemporaries.2
Moltmann develops this reading of his contemporary
situation by situating the specifically German experience
of alienation within a more general context. He argues
that the political hopes of the 1960's, generated as a
result of the rise of civil rights movements in
Czechoslovakia and the United States, faced a major
challenge from the widespread disillusionment that
followed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the
assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther
King. Moltmann's own experience, combined with this
reading of the collective, postwar experience of the
German people, and the setbacks encountered by the civil
rights movements, profoundly influenced his transition
from an emphasis upon the "theology of hope" to a theology
of the Cross. In the light of the mass slaughter of the
twentieth century (typified by Auschwitz and Hiroshima),
theodicy is deemed to be the question facing Christian
theology. In The Crucified God, Moltmann articulates a
theology of the Cross, that he suggests 6a-K provide the
foundations for a theological response to the question of
theodicy, in the light of the atrocities of the twentieth
century.
The key to The Crucified God lies in the assertion
that Jesus' cry on the cross--"My God, my God, why hast
thou forsaken me?"--encapsulates both the question of
theodicy and the essential content of Christian faith.3
The Cry of Dereliction encapsulates the anguish of the
believer or righteous man confronted by God's silence in
the face of innocent suffering. Moltmann suggests that in
interpreting Jesus' cry in this way, he resolves the
distinction between theism and atheism, by incorporating
the anguish of the protest atheist within a non-theistic
understanding of the suffering God. Understood as an event
between God and God, the forsakenness encapsulated in the
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Cry of Dereliction constitutes the "torment of hell" 4 , and
thus serves to encapsulate the "depths and abysses of
human history" that generate the problem of theodicy.5
Moltmann relies upon the theology of the Cross to
provide the basis for both a formal and a practical
response to the question of theodicy. However, a recurrent
criticism of The Crucified God is that it emphasises the
former at the expense of the latter. Moltmann articulates
a formal, theological response to the problem of theodicy,
but fails to relate this convincingly to the concrete
situation of the individual sufferer.This criticism is
particularly relevant in the context of his discussion of
the Holocaust. Moltmann claims to be writing a theology in
response to the events of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.
However, does he refer to the Holocaust as a specific,
historical event (as experienced by its victims), or as a
general illustration of twentieth century inhumanity to
man? If the Holocaust fulfils a purely illustrative
function in Moltmann's theology, then this would serve to
explain his apparent insensitivity to the historical
reality of the event; an insensitivity that is all the
more incongruous in view of the emphasis he places upon
the impact of the Holocaust on his personal faith. This
failure to engage with the specificity of the Holocaust is
particularly apparent in the uncritical attitude adopted
toward the appropriation of the child-hanging scene from
Night, and the Cross as a determinative symbol of
redemptive suffering. Although he acknowledges the long
history of Christian anti-Judaism, Moltmann fails to
incorporate this insight into his theology. 6 Thus, it can
be argued that The Crucified God in effect constitutes
pre-Holocaust theology in a post-Holocaust form.
8. 2. THE CRUCIFIED GOD: 
All Christian theology and all Christian life is
basically an answer to the question which Jesus
asked as he died. The atheism of protests and of
metaphysical rebellions against God are also answers
to this question. Either Jesus who was abandoned by
God is the end of all theology or he is the
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beginning of a specifically Christian, and 4herefore
critical and liberating, theology and life.'
Moltmann begins his reformulation of Christian theology
with the question that Ruether is reluctant to pose, let
alone answer: what was it about the life and death of
Jesus that set him apart from other contemporary teachers
and martyrs? He responds by asserting 	 that uniqueness
lies in the godforsakenness of Jesus on the cross,
encapsulated in the Cry of Dereliction. Jesus' death was
an event between God and God, and in the context of his
life and message, constituted the "torment of hell". As
the "torment of hell", Jesus' death on the Cross
encapsulates the problem of theodicy, and thus provides an
answer to the question that dominates both theism and
protest atheism. A theology of the Cross thus transcends
the alternatives of theism and atheism.
Moltmann acknowledges that it is essential for a
Christian theology to differentiate between the death of
Jesus of the Cross and that of a wise man and teacher
(Socrates or Rabbi Akiba), or a political insurgent (the
Zealots). Whereas, Plato portrays Socrates' death as a
"festival of liberty", and the Zealots died "conscious of
their righteousness in the sight of God and looked forward
to their resurrection to eternal life" 8 , Jesus was
"greatly distressed and troubled" (Mk. 14:33), with "loud
cries and tears" (Heb. 5:7), and died with "a loud cry"
(Mk. 15:37). Jesus' distress before his death culminates
in the cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"
(Mk. 15:34). Thus, the earliest portrayal of Jesus' death
differs substantially from that of the traditional heroic
martyr: Jesus died "with every expression of the most
profound horror".9
This "profound horror" can only be understood if
Jesus' death is interpreted within the context of his
relationship to God. The Crucified God rests on "the
assumption that Jesus died with the signs and expressions
of a profound abandonment by God.". 10 This sense of
"profound abandonment" derives its uniqueness from the
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closeness of his relationship to God. Jesus' ministry and
message rested upon his consciousness of an unprecedented
closeness with God. Thus, his death on the Cross stands as
radical counter-testimony to this belief:
anyone who lived and preached so close to God, his
kingdom and his grace, and associated the decision
of faith with his own person, could not regard his
being handed over to death on the cross as one
accursed as a mere mishap, a human misunderstanding
or a final trial, but was bound to experience it as
rejection by he very God whom he had dared to call
'My Father'."
It is in the theological context of the relationship
between Father and Son that Jesus' godforsakenness on the
Cross constitutes the "torment of hell".
In interpreting the Cross as an event between Father
and Son, Moltmann places it within a trinitarian context.
The Father abandons the Son; the Son is abandoned by the
Father. The Father suffers out of love for the Son; the
Son experiences the radical negation of his proclamation
of the closeness of God. Father and Son are "totally
separated by the abandonment of Jesus and at the same time
intimately united in surrender." 12 As an expression of
Jesus' "unique abandonment by God" 13 , the Cry of
Dereliction encapsulates all experiences of abandonment
and godforsakenness: Jesus cries out against the God who
appears to be absent on behalf of all innocent sufferers.
As an event within the trinity	 --God against God--the
Cross attains representative status:
God (himself) suffered in Jesus, God himself died in
Jesus for us. God is on the cross of Jesus 'for us',
and through that becomes g 9d and Father of the
godless and the godforsaken."
The unique abandonment of the Son by the Father, and
extreme forsakenness experienced by the Father at the loss
of His Son, incorporate all the "depths and abysses of
human history". Thus, on the basis of this double
experience of forsakenness, God becomes the "God and
Father of the godless and godforsaken", sharing the
victim's anguish.15
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Moltmann elaborates his understanding of the
representative function of the Cross in the context of an
analysis of theism and atheism. He argues that theism runs
counter to Christian understanding of the Cross. Theism
asserts that God is impassible. However, such an assertion
runs counter to Moltmann's interpretation of the Cross:
God cannot suffer, God cannot die, says theism, in
order to bring suffering, mortal being under his
protection. God suffered in the suffering of Jesus,
God died on the cross of Christ, says Christian
faith, .pg that we might live and rise again in his
future.'
Impassibility is incompatible with the reading of the
Cross as a trinitarian event, in which God suffers as both
Father and Son. In Moltmann's theology, God is identified
with love (1 John 4: 16), and the capacity to love is
identified with the capacity to suffer. Thus, a theistic
concept of God is to be rejected: a God who cannot suffer
is a God who cannot love. 16
Atheism, in the form of metaphysical rebellion,
arises as a protest against the theistic divine order:
it is the means by which a man protests against his
condition and against the whole of creation. It is
metaphysiqq1 because it disputes the ends of man and
creation.''
The protest atheist's concern is with the righteousness of
a God who appears to countenance innocent suffering.
Moltmann argues that such a critique is valid when
directed against the theistic concept of an impassible
God: the theistic God is unaffected by suffering, and is
thus both incapable and unworthy of love.18
Moltmann concludes that a trinitarian concept of God
rooted in the Cross transcends the dispute between theism
and atheism, recognising the limitations of both:
A radical theology of the cross cannot give any
theistic answer to the question of the dying Christ.
Were it to do so it would evacuate the cross. Nor
can it give an atheistic answer. Were it to do so it
would no longer be taking Jesus' death cry to God
seriously. The God of theism cannot have abandoned
him, and in his forsakenws he cannot have cried
out to a non-existent God."
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It is essential to Moltmann's argument that the ability of
God to suffer, both in himself and alongside humanity,
offers "the only way past" protest theism: the complaint
of Ivan Karamazov or Albert Camus is unanswerable.
However, on the Cross, God takes up and incorporates this
protest. God and suffering are no longer contradictory
realities: God is in suffering and suffering is in God.2°
The inherent problem with this entire strategy lies in
Moltmann's failure to provide a convincing explanation of
why his theology of the Cross offers a resolution of
protest atheism by situating suffering "in God".
8. 3. THEOLOGIA CRUCIS AND THE HISTORY OF SUFFERING: 
As in the case of Rosemary Ruether, Moltmann acknowledges
that a Christian resolution of the problem of evil, rooted
in the Cross and Resurrection, faces a critical challenge
from the fact that the world remains unredeemed. However,
unlike Ruether, he does not consider the unredeemed status
of the world to be incompatible with the "once and for
all" status of the Cross-Resurrection as the overcoming of
evil and the beginning of a new creation. The Cross is a
"once and for all" event, but the promised new creation
remains in the future, when the world will be redeemed.
The certain promise of the new creation, on the basis of
the trinitarian event of the Cross, gives "courage to be"
in the face of continuing suffering in the present.
Moltmann's analysis of the theology of the Cross as the
basis for a resolution of the problem evil has attracted
one recurrent criticism: he provides a primarily
theoretical response to a practical problem. What
justification is there for his assertion that such an
analysis of the Cross provides "courage to be" in the
context of the counter-testimony of an unredeemed world?
Moltmann acknowledges that, despite the Cross, the
problem of evil remains unresolved as long as the world is
unredeemed. This resolution can only come with a new
creation:
only with the resurrection of the dead, the murdered
and the gassed, only with the healing of those in
despair who bear lifelong wounds, only with the
-222-
abolition of all rule and authority, only with the
annihilation of death will the Son hand over the
kingdom to the FaOlter. Then God will turn his sorrow
into eternal joy."
The knowledge that, on the Cross, God suffered and died
"for us", provides the believer with the "courage to be"
in the face of "nothingness and all annihilating
experiences" 22 , in the interim period between the
"provisional finality" of the Church in the present and
the "fulfilment of the kingdom" in the new creation of the
future. The new creation suggested by the Resurrection of
Jesus belongs to the "language of promise", rather than to
the "language of facts". Moltmann's assertion that the
theology of the Cross resolves the problem of evil thus
relies upon "eschatological verification".23
It is ironic that, despite claiming that a
trinitarian theology of the Cross transcends protest
atheism, Moltmann lays himself open to one of its major
criticisms of religious belief--the morality of an appeal
to eschatological verification. He cites Ivan Karamazov's
rejection of eschatological verification as the "classical
form of protest atheism":
I don't want harmony. I don't want it out of the
love I bear to mankind. I want to remain with my
suffering unavenged and my indignation unappeased,
even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price has
been placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so
much for admission. And therefore I hasten to return
my ticket of admission. And indeed if I am an honest
man, I'm bound to hand it back as soon as possible.
This I am doing. It is not God that I do not accept,
Alyosha A ,I merely most respectfully return him the
ticket."
Moltmann cites Ivan's critique as part of an analysis of
theism and atheism, an analysis that is intended to
support his reformulation of the theology of the Cross. He
asserts that the Cry of Desolation encapsulates the cries
of all those who call out to God for justice. Understood
as an event between God and God, the Cross incorporates
the anguish of all who experience suffering and loss: the
metaphysical rebellion of Ivan Karamazov is taken up into
the Godhead.
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However, is such a manoeuvre legitimate? The essence
of Ivan's critique lies in the rejection of a future
harmony, on the grounds that it commands "too high a
price". Moltmann's theology, despite its adoption of the
language of protest atheism, relies upon precisely such an
appeal. It is not the presence of suffering "in God" that
underpins his response to the problem of evil, but the
promise of a new creation on the basis of the Cross as a
"once and for all" event between God and God. Without the
promised new creation, the question of theodicy "remains
open". 25 Ivan Karamazov may give voice to an anguish
analogous to that expressed in the Cry of Dereliction, but
it is an anguish that arises from his inability to accept
precisely the kind of new creation envisaged by Moltmann:
if the sufferings of children go to make up the sum
of sufferings which is necessary for the purchase of
truth, then I say beforehgpd that the entire truth
is not worth such a price."
Ironically, Moltmann's position is similar to that
postulated by Ivan's novitiate brother, Alyosha. Alyosha
shares Ivan's anguish, but argues that the justice of a
future harmony rests on the fact that the Son:
can forgive everything, everyone and everything and
for everything, because he gave his innocent blood
for all and for ev thing is on him that the
edifice is founded,
Ivan's rejection of Alyosha's suggestion is found in the
parable of the Grand Inquisitor. 28 Thus, a theology of the
Cross fails to provide an answer or incorporate the
metaphysical rebellion of the protest atheist. Instead,
Moltmann's attempt to incorporate protest atheism serves
to undercut his theology of the Cross: protest atheism
questions the morality of the new creation that underpins
the resolution of the problem of evil.
Moltmann's analysis of protest atheism serves to
highlight a second difficulty with his approach. He notes
that Ivan Karamazov is protesting against speculative
theodicies in the face of the anguish generated by
innocent suffering. Hence, the insistence that a theology
of the Cross reflect the moral anguish and outrage of the
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protest atheist: it is essential to avoid abstraction by
remembering the concrete detail of human suffering.
However, does not the location of suffering within the
Godhead serve to generate abstraction? Rebecca Chopp
suggests that theodicy is primarily a speculative
theological problem:
For Moltmann, suffering is, first, the question of
the appropriate concept of God. Moltmann can offer
an answer to the question of suffering by making
God the measure and context of all suffering. God's
suffering--more ultimate that any human suffering--
can be understood and responded to only in faith:
faith sees the glory of the, ntriune God in the faces
and cries of the oppressed."
Such an analysis presents a distorted picture of
Moltmann i s theological strategy. Suffering is primarily
"the question of the appropriate concept of God". However,
he is convinced that in correcting the misconceptions of
theism and "making God the measure and context of all
suffering", he is paving the way for a practical response
to the problem of evil. His theological strategy is rooted
in the quest for a faith capable of countering the
disillusionment experienced by his own generation. Such a
faith requires firm theological foundations; foundations
Moltmann strives to provide through his analysis of the
godforsakenness of Jesus on the Cross. The protest atheist
has successfully critiqued theism. It is thus necessary to
reformulate Christian theology on a non-theistic basis, in
order to offer a convincing response to the anguish of the
believer.
The practical efficacy of Moltmann's theological
response to the problem of evil rests upon the assertion
that:
Every person damned and forsaken by God can,,j,n the
crucified one, experience community with God."
The experience of "community with God" gives "courage to
be" in a situation of "godforsakenness and
hopelessness". 31 However, is there any justification for
this assertion? Moltmann asserts that "nothingness and all
annihilating experiences" have been taken up into the
"trinitarian history of God". Carl Braaten suggests that
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it is more logical to regard such experiences as
irreducible counter-testimony to the Christian promise. To
do otherwise is to minimise the negative experience of
suffering:
Those who cry out from the graveyards of death make
it seem rather that history is left with an open
wound that has not yet been closed. I think Moltmann
has fallen for a speculative theodicy and 	 thus
into a mystification of history 	 so that in spiAe
of Auschwitz and Vietnam, God will be all in all."
Again, it is possible to accuse Moltmann's critic of
misrepresenting his position. He does not deny that
history is left with an "open wound", but insists that
until this wound is healed in the new creation (when God
will be "all in all"), the believer derives "courage to
be" from the experience of "community with God". However,
having registered this caveat, Braaten is correct in
noting the danger of "mystification" inherent in
Moltmann's approach. Is not the emphasis upon "community
with God" giving "courage to be" elitist: it privileges
those capable of maintaining faith in the face of
"nothingness and all annihilating experiences"? Is
community with God" dependent on the individual
consciously experiencing it; or is God present in an
individual's godforsakenness regardless of whether His
presence is recognised? What of those victims who are so
dehumanised as to be unconscious of their status as
subjects, as in the case of the Muselmiinner? For Braaten
and Chopp, Moltmann's reformulated theology of the Cross
is incapable of incorporating the experience of the
Holocaust, as encapsulated by the figure of the Muselmann.
Moltmann's German contemporary, Johann Baptist Metz
identifies the root of the problem as the lack of clear
demarcation between a theological response to the problem
of evil (the analysis of the godforsakenness of Jesus on
the Cross as the "torment of hell"), and the reality of
suffering (the application of this theological analysis to
the Holocaust):
Whenever one tries to relate the history of
redemption completed in Jesus Christ to the human
history of suffering, not just by juxtaposing them
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in a historical paradox (so that one is sub
contrario asserted to be in the other), but to
understand the alienation of the history of
suffering itself as within the dialectics of the
Trinitarian history of God, what occurs is a
confusion between the negativity of suffering and
the negativity,of the dialectically mediated concept
of suffering.''
Moltmann's failure to clarify this distinction results in
an inherent confusion within The Crucified God between a
theological interpretation of suffering and the reality of
that suffering in itself. Tha result of this confusion is
either a "dualistic eternalization of suffering" (the
problem remains but is now internal to the Trinity, rather
than external in the world. Does alienation become an
intrinsic characteristic or attribute of the Godhead?), or
a "condescending reduction of suffering to its concept"
(the problem of evil is resolved with no reference to the
experience of the individual sufferer). 34 Metz' analysis
is born out by an examination of Moltmann's specific
treatment of the Holocaust through his usage of the child-
hanging scene in Night.
8. 4. MOLTMANN'S APPROPRIATION OF NIGHT: 
Moltmann's appropriation of the child-hanging scene from
Night as II a shattering expression of the theologia
-	 1crucis 65 has aroused a great deal of controversy in
Christian circles. The citation of Night occurs in the
climactic section of The Crucified God: "The Experience of
Human Life in the Pathos of God", in the chapter "The
'Crucified God". 36 Controversy centres on the
appropriateness of using such a passage in this particular
context. Criticism varies from describing such a usage as
0
blasphemy (Roy Eckardt) to theoikgcally inappropriate
(Johann Baptist Metz).
For Moltmann, Elie Wiesel's description of the public
hanging of a child in Auschwitz provides "a shattering
expression of the theologia crucis". He acknowledges that
such an interpretation does not reflect the passage's
original intent, but argues that it is justified :
it is true in a real, transferred sense, that God
himself hung on the gallows, as E. Wiesel was able
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to say. If that is taken seriously, it must also be
said that, like th cross of Christ, even Auschwitz
is in God himself.
Moltmann identifies the agony depicted in Night with that
of Jesus on the Cross. On the basis of his interpretation
of the Cross as the encapsulation 
4
kunothingness and all
annihilating experiences", he asserts that "even Auschwitz
is in God himself"; Auschwitz is taken up into "the grief
of the Father, the surrender of the Son and the power of
the Spirit". 38 Thus, the God hanging on the gallows at
Auschwitz is identified with the "Crucified God".
The crucial question is whether such a Christian
theological identification of God is legitimate.
Moltmann's most extreme critic, the American theologian,
Roy Eckardt, argues that such an identification is
"blasphemy" in the context of the Holocaust. 39 He
questions the appropriateness of Moltmann's appropriation
of Night in support of a theologia cruets, and suggests
that such a usage smacks of Christian triumphalism. In
citing the child-hanging scene from Night, Moltmann
responds to the statement, "Where is he? He is here. He is
hanging here on the gallows...", by commenting:
Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be
any other Christian answer to the question of this
torment. To speak here 9 g a God who could not suffer
would make God a demon."
However, Eckardt challenges the appropriateness of such a
comment:
why has the word "Christian" been inserted here? The
sufferer was a Jew. FuWier, the voice giving the
answer is that of a Jew."
He accuses Moltmann of ignoring both the fact that the
victims of the Holocaust were predominantly Jewish (Night
being Wiesel's memoir of the Jewish suffering in
Auschwitz), and the historical culpability of the Church
for generating an atmosphere and environment in which the
extermination of the Jews could occur with little or no
opposition. In the light of the Church's record, ably
demonstrated by Rosemary Ruether, the appropriation of
Night in support of a theology of the Cross can be
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interpreted as a continuation of Christian triumphalism: a
Christian theologian is appropriating a Jew's religious
response to a specific instance of Jewish suffering for a
purpose that is totally alien to the author's own
understanding. Eckardt is prepared to concede such
implicit triumphalism is unintentional on Moltmann's part,
but argues that it is present nevertheless.
Eckardt concludes his analysis by accusing Moltmann
of gross insensitivity in his handling of the Holocaust.
The insensitivity of the appropriation of Night in support
of a theology of the Cross is compounded by the placement
of this analysis immediately preceding the subsection,
"The fullness of life in the trinitarian history of God":
It is sad that Moltmann says these things at this
place in his study. We plead only for the dead
children, women, and men who could never accept such
propositions as those cited....At this juncture,
Moltmann's eyes are closed to a simple fact: those
who were murdered at Auschwitz were representative
(willing oF, unwilling) of a view he directly
It is the appropriation of Night within the context of a
discussion of the "trinitarian history of God" that
convinces Eckardt that latent Christian triumphalism is
running through The Crucifed God.
In defending Moltmann's usage of Night, Richard
Bauckham brusquely dismisses Eckardt's criticisms as
II exaggerated". 42 He argues that the Cross, as the
encapsulation of the problem of suffering, is analogous to
the Holocaust and thus provides the basis for a religious
response:
This reinterpretation is justified in the light of
the cross, which would be enough to end faith in
God, were it not seen as God's presence precisely in
abandonment by God. Hence,in Auschwitz, as oa",the
cross, God is present in His own contradiction. 
However, Bauckham is merely repeating Moltmann's failure
to distinguish between the concept of suffering as a
theological problem, and the reality of suffering as
experienced by the victims. An appeal to Jesus'
godforsakenness on the Cross may provide a convincing
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response to the Holocaust for Bauckham as a Christian
theologian. For other Christian theologians, such as
Braaten or Chopp, such an appeal entails a dangerous
mystification of the historical suffering of the Jews (as
symbolised by the passage from tiigh4 In view of the
legacy of Christian anti-Judaism, the arguments of both
Bauckham and Moltmann seem curiously naive. Moltmann does
not appear to have anticipated that the appropriation of
Night, within the context of a trinitarian theology of the
Cross, would generate such controversy: he moves directly
from a citation of the child-hanging scene to a defence of
his trinitarian reading of the Cross, without any
qualifying reference to the passage's original context or
purpose. Bauckham's defence fails to engage with the
central issue: the propriety of a Christian theological
identification of God in the Holocaust, in the light of
the history of Christian anti-Judaism.
Johann Baptist Metz elaborates upon this question of
propriety. His analysis of the appropriate Christian
response to the child-hanging scene echoes Eckardt's
concern. Both agree that the key question is who has the
right to respond to the question posed by Wiesel. However,
whereas Eckardt simply asserts that this right is confined
to the Jews, Metz offers a more systematic defence of this
claim:
Who really has the right to give the answer to the
God-question--'Where is God? Here he is--he hangs on
the gallows?' As far as I am concerned, only the Jew
threatened by death with all the children in
Auschwitz has the right to say it--only he alone.
There is no other identification of God• • • • here as
far as I am concerned, no Christian identification
of God is possible. If at all, this can be done only
by the Jew imprisoned together with his God in the
abyss .... Only he 2 I think, can alone speak of a 'God
on the gallows', not we Christians outside of
Auschwitz who sent the Jew into such a situation of
despair or at least left him in it. Here, for me,
there is no 'sxise', to which we could testify
without the Jew."
In effect, Metz argues that a theoretical response to the
problem of suffering (as posed by the Holocaust) can only
be articulated by those who experienced the historical
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reality in question. This category could be extended to
incorporate all Jews, if one accepts Emil Fackenheim's
definition of a Jew as anyone who would have been defined
as Jewish under the Nuremberg Laws. Christians are
"outside", having "sent the Jew into such a situation of
despair or at least left him in it.". Thus, it is the
Christian history of anti-Judaism that illegitimates any
"Christian theological identification of God". Such an
identification can only come from "the Jew imprisoned
together with his God in the abyss".
However, how are Christians to respond to Auschwitz
if a theological identification of God is the prerogative
of the Jew? Metz suggests that the answer lies in a
recognition of this state of dependence:
We will forego the temptation to interpret the
suffering of the Jewish people from our standpoint,
in terms of saving history. Under no circumstances
is it our task to mystify this suffering! We
encounter in this suffering first of all the riddle
of our 9wn lack of feeling, not, however, the traces
of God.'"
If Metz' suggestion is adopted, then Christian theology's
initial response to the Holocaust is to acknowledge its
own culpability, in the form of the history of Christian
anti-Judaism (hence the seminal importance of Faith and
Fratricide). The acknowledgement of this history brings
the recognition of Christianity's position "outside" the
Holocaust, and its subsequent dependency upon Jewish
religious responses. Moltmann's apparent insensitivity
arises as a result of his failure to acknowledge this
state of dependency; a failure that constitutes the major
difference between the work of Metz, and American
theologians, such as Eckardt, Littell, and Ruether, and
that of Bauckham and Moltmann. The latter are aware of the
history of Christian anti-Judaism, but fail to incorporate
this awareness in their theological response to the
Holocaust. By contrast, American responses are acutely
conscious of the bearing a recognition of Christian anti-
Judaism has upon the formulation of a response to the
Holocaust. Moltmann's failure to recognise this state of
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dependency can be illustrated through his non-critical
attitude towards the status of the Cross as symbol.
8. 5. THE FATE OF THE CROSS AS SYMBOL: 
There are two elements in an analysis of the post-
Holocaust status of the Cross as symbol: the Cross as a
symbol of Christian anti-Judaism; and the interpretation
of the Cross as the determinative symbol of redemptive
suffering. Again, Moltmann's severest critic is Roy
Eckardt.
Eckardt notes that the very title, The Crucified God,
has unfortunate, albeit unintentional, echoes of the
deicide charge." Moltmann presents the Cross as the
ultimate in godforsakenness, seemingly oblivious to the
way this symbol has been perceived by those outside the
Christian tradition. Whereas, for Moltmann, the Cross is a
symbol of love; Wiesel notes that for Jews, it is a
symbol of "torment and terror"--the symbol of Christian
anti-Judaism. 47 Eckardt suggests that the former
interpretation cannot be totally disassociated from the
latter: the fact that the Cross has come to be associated
with persecution necessarily affects its positive status
as a symbol of love. In the light of Christian anti-
Judaism, as typified by the charge of deicide, the Cross
becomes a flawed symbol. Christian culpability for the
Holocaust results in the irrevocable corruption of the
symbolic value of the Cross:
The "crucified Christ" simply cannot be separated
from what has happened to, and been done to, the
cross .... It was in and through the Holocaust that
the symbol of tke„ cross became ultimately corrupted
by devilishness."
In asserting that the Cross became "ultimately corrupted
by devilishness" during the Holocaust, Eckardt articulates
the logical conclusion of Ruether's statement that anti-
Judaism is the "left-hand" of christology. If anti-Judaism
is intrinsic to classical Christianity, and the Holocaust
is interpreted as the logical outcome of such anti-
Judaism, then the only way of "cleansing" theology is to
move outside the tradition.
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Thus, the validity of Eckardt's criticism depends
upon acceptance of the twin assertions that anti-Judaism
is intrinsic to Christianity, and the Holocaust represents
the logical fulfilment of Christian teaching. As has been
shown in the analysis of Ruether, the second of these
assertions ignores the radically modern character of the
Holocaust. The former assertion can be challenged by
interpreting anti-Judaism as an aberration, albeit a
deeply rooted one, rather than an intrinsic expression of
the tradition. The Catholic theologian, Gregory Baum
suggests that the appropriate response to Christian anti-
Judaism is the regeneration of religious language via the
recognition of the "deadly power of its own symbols".49
Christian theologians must become more sensitive to the
implications of their own religious language through
awareness of the negative side of Christianity's history.
The criteria for such a reappraisal are provided by the
positive content of the gospel. The Church's language and
actions, both historically and in the present, are judged
on the basis of their compatibility with the positive
claims of Christianity:
the attempt to free the Christian religion from
ideological deformations, especially from the anti-
Jewish thrust, is based on the profound
conviction that what God has revealed in Jesus
Christ cannot contain symbols of domination against
any group of people. It is this faith in the Divine
nature of the Christian message that enables
Christians to question some traditional formulations
of their faith and to hive with some unresolved
problems in the present."
The identification of the positive themes in the Christian
faith becomes the basis for a critique its negative
content. Thus, such a critique is internal, rather than
external. The purging of negative elements, such as
Christian anti-Judaism, does not necessitate the rejection
of the tradition: the criteria for this purge are also
located within the tradition.
Eckardt is correct in noting Moltmann's uncritical
use of the symbol of the Cross. However, he is incorrect
in asserting that, as a consequence of its association
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with Christian anti-Judaism, the Cross is "ultimately
corrupted by devilishness". The Crucified God would
constitute a legitimate Christian response to the
Holocaust if it incorporated a sensitivity towards the
"deadly power" of the negative symbolism of the Cross.
The second line of criticism adopted by Eckardt
concerns the status of the Cross as a determinative symbol
of redemptive suffering. He challenges Moltmann's claim
that Jesus' suffering on the Cross was unique and
constituted the "torment of hell": in the context of the
suffering of the Holocaust (particularly that of the one
million children), that of Jesus is "non-decisive" and
"fades into comparative moral triviality". Whereas, Jesus
was "at least a grown, mature man, and by all the evidence
a courageous one", who consciously followed a path that
resulted in his crucifixion, the one million children who
died during the Holocaust were innocent victims who died
simply because they were Jewish under Nazi law. 51 As a
consequence:
the crucifixion is deprived of its redemptiveness.
All that remains upon the hill of Golgotha is
unmitigated evil. After Auschwitz, the crucifixion
cannot be accepted a determinative symbol of
redemptive suffering."
The positive symbol of the Cross is supplanted by the
counter-testimony of Auschwitz.
In denying that Jesus' suffering on the Cross is the
"torment of hell", Eckardt ignores Moltmann's insistence
that this claim is based on theological criteria. Jesus'
death differs from that of the zealot or righteous man
only because of his experience of godforsakenness, an
experience that is unique because of the relationship
between Father and Son. Thus, an implicit parallel is
drawn between the physical suffering of Jesus and that of
the zealot or righteous man. Moltmann is emphatic that
Jesus' godforsakenness is only unique in a theological
sense, as an event between God and God. Such a definition
of uniqueness is unaffected by historical experiences of
godforsakenness: the latter are not events between God and
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God. The godforsakenness of the Holocaust challenges the
assertion that all who cry out to God echo the Cry of
Dereliction; and the affirmation that "Auschwitz is in God
himself". It does not affect Moltmann's claim that the
Cross is a unique, inter-trinitarian event.
Eckardt is open to the same criticism as that
levelled at Moltmann: he fails to differentiate clearly
between the historical reality of suffering and its
theological interpretation. In contrasting the fate of
Jesus with that of the children who died in Auschwitz,
Eckardt is drawing a historical analogy (as illustrated by
the reference to Jesus' age and courage). By contrast, in
supplanting the redemptiveness of the Cross with the
"unmitigated evil" of Auschwitz, he is offering a
theological definition of uniqueness similar to that
central to Moltmann's thesis: the suffering of children in
Auschwitz is the "torment of hell". However, such a
definition requires its own positive theological context.
For instance, it might be argued that the suffering of
Auschwitz constitutes the "torment of hell" in the light
of God's covenantal promise to protect His Chosen People.
Eckardt's statement is meaningless without such a
supporting framework: it rests upon a failure to
differentiate between historical suffering and the
theological interpretation of that suffering.
CONCLUSION: 
Moltmann is struggling courageously to create a
post-Holocaust theology. Yet he cannot escape the
fact that The Crucifie4,God comprises, in essence,
pre-Holocaust thinking.-"
In 'Forgiveness and Politics: Forty Years after the
Stuttgart Confession', Moltmann offers a detailed analysis
of the reluctance of the German Protestant Churches to
acknowledge their guilt, both in terms of their failure to
offer widespread resistance to the Nazi r ggime, and the
role Christian anti-Judaism played in paving the way for
the Holocaust. However, he never considers the
repercussions that such an analysis might have for a
Christian theological response to the Holocaust, such as
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The Crucified God. He notes the "good but lamentably
disputed" resolution of the Synod of the Evangelical
Church in the Rhineland (1980):
We	 confess	 with deep	 concern	 the	 shared
responsibility and guilt of Christians in Germany
for the Holocaust Disregard for the abiding
election of Israel and condemnation of it to non-
existence have always characterised Christian
theology, the Church's preaching, and the Church's
actions up to the present day. Through this we too
have made ourselves guilty „of the physical
extinction of the Jewish people."
Yet, the New Testament exegesis in The Crucified God
reflects little of the same sensitivity. Moltmann employs
many of the stereotypes Ruether deems characteristic of
Christian anti-Judaism: Jesus preaches a "scandalous
message", challenging the "God of the law" of the Judaism
of his day; 55 his ministry provokes "a contest between the
gospel and the law, between the righteousness of faith and
the righteousness of works" 56 ; the crucifixion is "a
necessary consequence of his conflict with the law".57
Richard Bauckham disputes the suggestion that this
exegesis is "potentially anti-Semitic" by pointing to the
accompanying positive references to the Jews. 58 However,
in doing so, he misses the point. Moltmann's exegesis and
theology are open to criticism because he repeats the
stereotypes of pre-Holocaust theology; stereotypes that
have contributed to the history of Christian anti-
Judiasm. 59 The presence of such stereotypes despite his
sensitivity towards the German Churches' historical
record, both long and short-term, serves to emphasise how
deep-rooted such language is within the tradition, and
how deep the need for an internal reformulation of
Christian religious language. Moltmann is being criticised
precisely because of his insensitivity to the resonance of
the exegetical language he employs; an insensitivity that
is all the more surprising in view of his sensitivity to
the Church's historical record of anti-Judaism.
There are two possible, interconnected reasons for
this inconsistent treatment of the Holocaust. First,
Moltmann is not engaged in formulating a response to the
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Holocaust per se. He is formulating a response to the
Holocaust as the symbol of the problem of evil in the late
twentieth century. Moltmann is unwilling to grant the
event a unique status: it is one, albeit radical,
illustration of man's inhumanity to man. The lack of
clarity in The Crucified God between the interpretation
of suffering and the historical reality of that suffering
is paralleled by a blurring of the distinction between the
Holocaust as a symbol of radical political evil
("Auschwitz") and the historical reality of the Holocaust
(the child-hanging scene in Night). In referring to the
child-hanging scene as "a shattering expression of
theologia crucis", Moltmann is offering a theological
mystification of a historical event. Such a mystification
is only valid if offered by the victims or those who
experienced the event. To appropriate the scene for the
purpose of a theology of the Cross is both to deny the
victims' particularity, and to ignore Christianity's
position on the "outside" of the Holocaust.
Second, Moltmann offers an inconsistent reading of
covenantal history. In reformulating the covenant in the
light of the counter-testimony of the Cross, he is
employing a traditional reading of history. However, the
interpretation of the Cross as a "once and for all" event
results in the suspension of the reading of covenantal
history as a dialectic of promise and counter-testimony:
in Moltmann's theology, historical events no longer act as
counter-testimony forcing the reformulation of belief,
they are incorporated within the trinitarian history of
God. The complaint of the protest atheist remains valid:
God may be affected by the suffering in history, but that
suffering is not allowed to impinge upon Moltmann's
concept of God. His theodicy remains intact because
history is no longer allowed to fulfil its function as
counter-testimony. Thus, for all the emotive language
employed, Moltmann's theology parallels theism both in its
reliance upon eschatological verification and the refusal
to admit the existence of radical counter-testimony.
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9. JOHANN BAPTIST METZ: FACING THE JEWS. 
9. 1. INTRODUCTION.
9. 2. CHRISTIANS AND JEWS AFTER AUSCHWITZ.
9. 3. BOURGEOIS OR MESSIANIC RELIGION?
9. 4. THE DESCENT INTO HELL: "ANTI-HISTORY" IN CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY.
9. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
The preceding analysis of the work of Rosemary Radford
Ruether and Jiirgen Moltmann serves to highlight the
leading criteria of a Christian response to the
Holocaust. Faith and Fratricide has proved to be a seminal
text: by conclusively demonstrating that anti-Judaism has
persisted as a central theme in the Church's teaching down
the ages, Ruether has succeeded in forcing the question of
the nature of the relationship between Christianity and
anti-Semitism onto the theological agenda. However, it is
insufficient merely to acknowledge and repent of the
Church's history of anti-Judaism. 1 The Crucified God
remains controversial in spite of Moltmann's awareness of
the Church's historical record, and his determination to
articulate a post-Holocaust theology. The fundamental
criticism levelled against him being that this historical
sensitivity fails to penetrate his theology: he continues
to employ the very theological stereotypes that permeate
Christian anti-Judaism. Thus, Ruether is correct in
identifying the self-critical reformulation of religious
language as the key priority for any Christian response to
the Holocaust. Awareness of the Church's historical record
is insufficient, unless it generates a sensitivity towards
the language and theological concepts that form the
foundations of Christian anti-Judaism.
A second question then arises: does sensitivity to
the history of anti-Judaism require the admission that it
plays a central role in Christian theology, as the "left-
hand" of Christology? Ruether's thesis has been challenged
on the grounds that it is based upon a misreading of early
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Christian origins. Anti-Judaism initially emerges in the
context of the split between Church and Synagogue. It does
not attain the developed form of the Adversus Judaeos
tradition until after the conversion of Constantine, by
which time the Church had become predominantly Gentile.
The key question is thus whether the post-Constantinian
tradition is merely continuous with previous anti-Judaism,
or whether it marks a substantially new departure? If the
emphasis is placed upon the continuity between the pre-
and post-Constantinian tradition, then the eradication of
anti-Judaism requires a fundamental break with traditional
Christianity. If the emphasis is placed upon the elements
of discontinuity, it becomes possible to reformulate the
tradition, by cleansing it of the distortion of anti-
Judaism.
Ruether adopts the first strategy, whereas Moltmann
adopts the second. The difference between these two
positions becomes apparent in the differing
interpretations applied to a shared conviction that the
Church is called to be a counterculture, challenging and
disrupting society's prevailing values. Ruether argues
that the Church can only fulfil this function from outside
the mainstream of classical Christianity. The latter is
interpreted as the epitome of the prevailing values of a
predominantly hierarchical society. The definition of
anti-Judaism as the "left-hand" of Christology reflects
Ruether's conviction that Jesus' "original" message has
been corrupted by the subsequent theology of the Church.
The eradication of anti-Judaism thus requires a move back
beyond traditional theology, and the "recovery" of Jesus'
message. This "recovery" takes the form of a "new"faith
based upon the religious experience of marginalised and
oppressed groups; a faith that incorporates those elements
of the Christian tradition that prove consistent with this
experience. The alternative is to regard anti-Judaism as a
negative characteristic of Christian theology throughout
its existence, but one that can be eradicated if the
Church adopts a self-critical stance towards its own
actions and history. 2 Thus, the tradition, albeit in
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modified, reformulated form, provides the framework for a
Christian response to the Holocaust. The fact that
Moltmann fails to apply his appreciation of the Church's
historical record to his own theological understanding of
the Holocaust does not invalidate this approach.
The weaknesses inherent in The Crucified God serve to
highlight the need for a Christian response to the
Holocaust to acknowledge both the uniqueness, and the
Jewish specificity of the event. Moltmann's insensitivity,
reflected in the appropriation of Night, and the
uncritical usage of the Cross as symbol, arises from a
failure to distinguish between the historical reality of
the Holocaust, and the event's status as a universal
symbol of twentieth century inhumanity to man. Without
denying the universal applicability of the symbolism of
the Holocaust, suspicion--fuelled by the vivid memory of
anti-Judaism--is aroused when this symbol is employed
within a Christian context without reference to both the
reality and the historical and theological antecedents of
the Holocaust. However, by over-emphasising the continuity
between Christian anti-Judaism and the Holocaust, Ruether
remains insensitive to the radically modern character of
the Holocaust. Thus, it is essential to balance an
awareness of continuity with a recognition of the elements
of discontinuity. To recognise the latter, is not to
excuse or ignore the existence of the former.
Faith and Fratricide and The Crucified God in many
ways serve to represent opposite ends of the spectrum of
theological responses to the Holocaust. Ruether, along
with the derivative work of Roy and Alice Eckardt, marks
the radical end of the spectrum. Moltmann, however radical
his personal theology, marks the conservative end of the
spectrum: although he acknowledges the Church's historical
record of anti-Judaism, he does not feel the need to
reformulate his religious language or theology in any
significant way as a result.
The work of the Catholic theologian, Johann Baptist
Metz (a German contemporary of Moltmann's), can be
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interpreted as falling midway within this spectrum of
response: he accepts Ruether's thesis concerning the
centrality of anti-Judaism within Christianity, but adopts
an approach similar to that of Moltmann in attempting to
reformulate the tradition from inside. However, in stark
contrast to Moltmann, he regards the uniqueness of the
Holocaust as axiomatic. In a sense, he employs a method
similar to that suggested by Baum: he identifies the
"positive" content of Christianity, and then proceeds to
reformulate theology on this basis; anti-Judaism, being
incompatible with this "positive" content, is rejected as
an alien distortion, however deepseated. Thus,
Christianity is not only a counterculture in relation to
society, but also in relation to its own distorted self;
true, "messianic" religion renews Christianity, calling it
back to its vocation as a counterculture from its lapsed
form as "bourgeois" religion. Church history can be read
as a process of charisma (messianic religion);
routinisation; the lapse into bourgeois religion; followed
by the resurgence of charisma. However, the lapse into
bourgeois religion represents the bulk of ecclesiastical
history. Thus, "true" Christianity is that of the
Righteous Gentiles, the minority who responded positively
to the Holocaust. The challenge facing a Christian
response to the Holocaust is to ensure that this minority
concept of faith becomes that of the majority.
Although Metz' analysis of bourgeois and messianic
religion is fully developed, the same cannot be said of
his strategy for ensuring that the latter becomes the
dominant identity of the Church: his work is descriptive
rather than prescriptive. Thus, it is impossible to offer
a critical appraisal of his strategy at this stage. What
follows represents an attempt to cull an outline for such
a strategy from Metz' work to date, and to consider his
suggestions in the light of the preceding analysis of
Ruether and Moltmann.
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9. 2. CHRISTIANS AND JEWS AFTER AUSCHWITZ: 
Never again	 do theology in such a way that its
construction remains unaffected, or could remain
unaffected, by Auschwitz Ask yourself if the
theology you are learning is such that 4 could
remain unchanged before and after Auschwitz.'
For Johann Baptist Metz, the Holocaust poses the critical
challenge to the continuing credibility of Christian
theology; a claim that is defended in two major essays:
'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz: Being a Meditation
also on the End of Bourgeois Religion' (1978), and 'Facing
the Jews. Christian Theology after Auschwitz' (1984). 4 In
these two essays, he outlines his argument in four stages.
A Christian response to the Holocaust demands an
acknowledgement of the uniqueness of the event. Having
acknowledged the uniqueness of the event, it is incumbent
upon Christians to recognise that theology is ruptured by
the Holocaust: it cannot "remain unchanged before and
after Auschwitz". These two insights culminate in the
realisation that Christian theology is now dependent upon
dialogue with the Jews. In its initial stages, this
dialogue takes the form of listening to what the Jews have
to say, about both Christianity and their experience of
the Holocaust. Finally, confronting the Holocaust
challenges Christianity to return to its roots and re-
discover its vocation as a messianic religion.
Metz differs from Moltmann in granting the uniqueness
of the Holocaust a priori status:
the overall validity of the Jewish tragedy and of
the Holocaust is found exactly in its non-
transferability, in its uniqueness and its
incomparability.'
As a result, his work attains a clarity that stands in
stark contrast to the confusion generated in The Crucified
God between the historical reality of the Holocaust,
theological interpretation, and the event's status as a
universal symbol. In 'Christians and Jews after
Auschwitz', Metz identifies and sharply criticises three
strategies for evading both the uniqueness of the
Holocaust, and the question of Christian culpability.6
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First, there is the temptation to define Nazism as a
"purely National Socialist crime", and thus outside the
realm of "Christian causality". Second, the Holocaust is
interpreted as a "type or symbol for all kinds of
threatening or possible catastrophe in the world". In
employing the event as a universal symbol of inhumanity,
the lessons to be learned from the specificity of the
Holocaust can be lost; universal lessons emerge from an
awareness of the Jewish particularity of the event. Third,
the Holocaust is held to be a tragedy for both Jews and
Christians: in lauding the "Christian martyrs", the Church
creates the misleading impression that Christians were
victims of the Holocaust alongside the Jews. 7 Whilst not
denying that Christians also suffered and died as a
consequence of their solidarity with the Jews during the
Holocaust, Metz notes that the identification of the
plight of Christians with that of the Jews serves both to
falsify the historical record, and to detract from the
exceptional behaviour of those who did show such
solidarity: the behaviour of the Righteous Gentiles needs
to be set against the background of the active or passive
complicity of the majority of Christians. The
interpretation of the Holocaust as a tragedy experienced
by both Jews and Christians suggests a lack of sensitivity
towards the Church's historical record, both before and
during the event. The Holocaust was a tragedy for
Christianity, not because Christians were among its
victims, but because of the Nazis' ruthless exploitation
of the legacy of theological anti-Judaism.
Metz concludes his analysis of uniqueness by
demanding that the event be seen as generating a rupture
in Christian theology: a theology that remains unaffected
by Auschwitz is deemed unacceptable. 8 The key question
facing religious belief is now "how we Christians can and
may speak of 'God after Auschwitz' in a credible
constellation". 9 Metz is quick to acknowledge that the
Holocaust is not the only "God-experience" available to
Christians, but insists that the key question facing
Christianity is that of the divine presence in the
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Holocaust. 1° He concludes that it is only possible to
speak of God after Auschwitz, because there were those who
continued to believe during the Holocaust. Both Metz
and Moltmann suggest a reinterpretation of T. W. Adorno's
dictum that to "write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric":
to pray after Auschwitz would be impossible, had not
prayers been said in Auschwitz. 11 However, whereas
Moltmann emphasises the continuum of belief before and
after the Holocaust, Metz stresses the discontinuity:
belief continues, but in a radically different form.
Christians can "form and sufficiently understand their
identity only in the face of the Jews".12
The formation of Christian identity "in the face of
the Jews" takes two forms: an internal critique of
Christianity to identify and purge the roots of anti-
Judaism, and an external dialogue with the Jews. However,
this dialogue initially takes the form of Christians
listening to what Jews have to say, both about themselves
and about their experience of Christianity. Thus,
"dialogue" is something of a misnomer. Christians play a
passive role in this "dialogue", responding to, rather
than initiating the process:
It is not we who have the opening word, nor do we
begin the dialogue. Victims are not offered a
dialogue. We can only come into a dialogue when the
victims themselves begin to speak. And then it is
our primary duty as Christians to listen--for once
to begin really listening- -to what,jews are saying
of themselves and about themselves."
Moltmann's appropriation of the child-hanging scene form
Night constitutes a form of "exploitation": rather than
listening "to what Jews are saying of themselves and about
themselves", he is appropriating a Jewish text for
Christian theological purposes with scant regard for its
original context or meaning. 14 Such "exploitation"
suggests that despite the increasingly conciliatory tone
of Jewish-Christian relations, Christians are still not
"really listening" to what their dialogue partners are
saying: theology has remained unchanged before and after
the Holocaust.
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Thus, great importance is attached to the need for an
internal critique of Christian theology to identify and
cleanse the tradition of anti-Judaism. Until such a
critique takes place, dialogue is destined to fail: the
stereotypes within Christian religious language and
theology prevent theologians from "listening" to what the
Jews have to say "of themselves and about themselves"; a
failure typified by The Crucified God: Moltmann is aware
of Christian anti-Judaism, yet is insensitive to the
presence of anti-Judaic stereotypes within his own
theology. Metz suggests that an internal critique of
Christianity should take the form of a recovery of
Christianity's Jewish roots as a messianic counterculture:
anti-Judaism emerges as a result of the Church's loss of
its sense of vocation and its lapse into bourgeois
religion. Thus, the first stage in a Christian response to
the Holocaust is a recovery of the Church's biblical
identity.
9. 3. BOURGEOIS OR MESSIANIC RELIGION? 
Metz, Moltmann and Ruether all agree that Christianity is
called to be a counterculture. However, whereas Ruether
holds that this sense of vocation was lost at a very early
stage, Metz and Moltmann differ in interpreting Church
history as a struggle between authentic and inauthentic
Christian identity. For Moltmann, this struggle is
understood in a Lutheran sense, as a struggle between the
theology of the Cross and the theology of Glory 15 ; for
Metz, the struggle for identity is between "bourgeois"
religion and "messianic" religion. 16 Both Moltmann and
Metz interpret Church history as a struggle between the
temptation to accommodate with authority and become part
of the prevailing society (the theology of Glory /
bourgeois religion), and an understanding of Christian
identity that is both self-critical and serves as a
critique of society (the theology of the Cross / messianic
religion). Church history bears witness to a series of
renewal movements, when a resurgence of the theology of
the Cross / messianic religion challenges the prevailing
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theology of Glory / bourgeois religion to recover its lost
sense of vocation as a counterculture. The theology of
Glory / bourgeois religion is identified with the
triumphalist reading of salvation history that gives birth
to anti-Judaism. Thus, anti-Judaism is not intrinsic to
the theology of the Cross / messianic religion, but
represents a primary characteristic of the theology of
Glory / bourgeois religion. In Metz' analysis, the
recovery of authentic Christian identity will result in
the eradication of anti-Judaism via an internal critique
of belief and religious language.
In Metz' analysis, bourgeois religion has a number of
clearly identifiable characteristics. It is predominantly
middle class, legitimating the existing social structure:
It is above all a religion of inner feeling. It does
not propose against or in any way oppose the
definitions of reality, meaning or truth ... that
are accepted by the middle-class society of exchange
and success. It gives greater hght and depth to
what already prevails without it.''
Bourgeois religion is characteristically a "merely
believed-in (but not lived) faith" 18 , and thus does not
exercise any disruptive influence on society: belief
conforms to existing intellectual and social norms. Thus,
bourgeois religion accommodates to the prevailing
authority. Thus, the embodiment of bourgeois religion is
found in the response of German liberalism to the two
World Wars: the role of religion is to support and justify
the policy of the state.
The tendency of bourgeois religion to accommodate
with the state is, in Metz' view, its greatest weakness.
This tendency has its roots in the conversion of
Constantine, and the subsequent elevation of Christianity
to the status of the state religion in the Roman Empire.
From this point on, bourgeois religion became the
predominant understanding of Christianity. Messianic
religion takes the form of a periodic resurgence of
charisma challenging the established order of 6,,,,rte""
religion. Thus, Church history is primarily the study of
inauthentic Christianity. The sign of this loss of
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authentic	 Christian identity	 is found in bourgeois
religion's
	 "drastic deficit	 with regard to political
resistance
	 and
	 a corresponding excess of political
conformity". 19
 This support for the established order
stands in stark contrast to the subversive nature of the
Gospel, with its message that "The first shall be last,
20and the last shall be first. 11.
Thus, the leading characteristic of messianic
religion is its power to subvert. The Gospel does not give
"greater height and depth to what already applies even
without it". It "disrupts one's own self-interest and aims
at a fundamental revision of one's habitual way of
life". 21 The key symbol of messianic religion is not
accommodation, but metanoia--turning round. Christians
should be clearly identifiable from the prevailing
society, although still a part of it. 22 Rather than being
a society of "exchange and success", messianic religion is
a covenant between God and His people, and thus is based
upon a vision of equality. Metz interprets the biblical
stories of the Patriarchs and the Exodus as the history of
a people growing in awareness of their status as subjects
in the sight of God. As their awareness of this status
grows, so does the obligation of responsibility--both
towards God and toward themselves as a community.
Messianic faith is built around the triumvirate of
memory, narrative and solidarity. It has its basis in the
memory of God's promises, both in the covenant and in the
ministry of Jesus. The memory of these promises enables
messianic faith to survive despite the counter-testimony
of history. The memory of God's promises is encapsulated
in narrative. The reenactment of the promise in narrative
functions to make it active in the present. Thus, the
Passover Seder and the Eucharist, the reenactment in
narrative form of the divine promise, constitute the
central liturgical acts of Judaism and Christianity.
Memory and narrative combine in inspiring Christian
praxis. Whereas, bourgeois religion is "a merely believed-
in (but not lived) faith", messianic religion is only
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meaningful when "lived". Christian praxis takes the form
of solidarity, both internally as a community, and
externally with all who are oppressed, or who have no
sense of their identity as subjects. Praxis is life lived
in imitatio Christi; the command to love one's neighbour
finds practical expression in the struggle to establish
the kingdom of God on earth. Thus, in contrast with
bourgeois religion, messianic faith is necessarily
political:
Christianity is in its very being, as messianic
praxis of discipleship, political. It is mystical
and political at the same time, and it leads us into
a responsibility, not only for what we do or fail to
do, but also for what we allow tR, happen to others
in our presence, before our eyes."
In the context of the Holocaust, the Righteous Gentiles
acted in a manner consistent with messianic faith: they
took responsibility for what was being allowed to happen
to others.
In supporting his critique of accommodation, Metz
cites Jesus' prophecy of persecution and suffering for his
disciples (Mk. 13:9-13; Matt. 10:17-22). The extent of
Christianity's failure to fulfil its vocation as
counterculture is marked by the relative lack of such
persecution in Church history:
is it not the case that we Christians can recognise
that concrete destiny which Jesus foretold for his
disciples more clearly in the history of suffering
undergone by the Jewis4, people than in the actual
history of Christianity?
Bourgeois religion's successful accommodation with the
state finds expression in the fact that more often than
not, Christianity has been the cause (as illustrated by
the history of anti-Judaism) rather than the recipient of
suffering. Metz identifies the fundamental difference
between bourgeois and messianic religion as their
interpretation of history. Bourgeois religion adopts a
triumphalist interpretation of history, whereas messianic
religion strives to incorporate the counter-testimony of
anti-history". 25 . If messianic religion is to become the
dominant understanding of Christian identity, then the
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latter interpretation of history has to be incorporated
into Christian theology.
9. 4, THE DESCENT INTO HELL: "ANTI-HISTORY" CHRISTIAN 
THEOLOGY: 
Bourgeois and messianic religion represent alternative
interpretations of history: the former adopts a
triumphalist approach, the latter calls for "a kind of
anti-history" rooted in the memory of suffering. In
adopting the latter interpretation, Metz articulates an
understanding of history reminiscent of that of Elie
Wiesel. Religious belief is rooted in a dialectic of
promise and counter-testimony, that gives rise in turn to
a communal, "mystical" reading of history. This reading of
history fundamentally influences a Christian response to
the problem of evil, and is encapsulated in Metz' use of
the symbolism of Jesus' Descent into Hell.
Bourgeois religion is marked by a triumphalist
interpretation of history:
We tend, consciously or unconsciously, to define
history as the history of what has prevailed, as the
history of the successful and the established. There
is hardly any reference in history as we know it to
the conquered and defeated or to the forgotXen or
suppressed hopes of our historical existence."
Messianic religion strives to sustain the memory of "the
conquered and the defeated" as "anti-history"; a
counterpoint to bourgeois religion's emphasis upon "the
successful and the established". The Exodus serves as the
paradigm for "an understanding of history in which the
vanquished and destroyed alternative would be taken into
account". 27 In establishing His covenant with the
Israelite slaves, God challenges the equation of divine
favour with "the successful and the established": it is
the formerly "conquered and defeated" people of Israel who
"prevail".
Thus, "anti-history" constitutes Metz' equivalent to
counter-testimony. Messianic faith centres upon a
dialectic of covenantal promise and the "anti-history" of
suffering: Christian identity emerges out of the
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confrontation of the promise of the Resurrection with the
counter-testimony of history. The latter poses "the
practical challenge to one's hope", 28 However, rather than
ignoring the negative side of history, or interpreting the
suffering of others as a vindication of one's own hope (as
in the Early Church's interpretation of the events of 70
and 135 as a punishment for the Jewish "crime" of
deicide), counter-testimony is incorporated into matrix of
belief: it is necessary to "mourn history"; to remain
conscious of the "cost" of one's success. 29 In the context
of Christianity, mourning history requires that we "look
at ourselves and judge ourselves with the eyes of our own
victims". 30 The critique of anti-Judaism gives practical
expression to Metz' call for Christians to view theology
and Church history with "the eyes of our own victims".
Moltmann's appropriation of Night, and his use of the
Cross as a symbol, lack such self-consciousness; hence the
charge of insensitivity.
In a general sense, Metz' reading of history
parallels that of Wiesel. The latter's "mystical" reading
of history is as comprehensive as the former's concept of
solidarity. Wiesel emphasises the mystical solidarity of
the Jewish people throughout history: individual actions
effect the whole Chosen People, past and present. Metz
argues that messianic solidarity must be all-embracing,
incorporating the experience of "the successful and the
established" alongside that of "the conquered and
defeated":
solidarity is strictly universal in its application
to practical fundamental theology. It extends to
those who have been overcome and left behind in the
march of progress. It includes the dead. Indeed, the
theological category of solidarity reveals its
mystical and universal aspect ahAve all in its
memory of solidarity with the dead."
Thus, both argue that neither the experience of belief,
nor that of those "who have been overcome", can be
excluded from a definition of faith. The negative effect
of history's counter-testimony cannot be excluded through
a one-sided emphasis upon the element of promise: the
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dialectic between promise and counter-testimony must be
maintained.
The emphasis placed upon the "mystical and universal"
character of solidarity serves to highlight the differing
responses of Metz and Moltmann to the problem of evil.
Although acknowledging the challenge posed to the
Christian promise by the "anti-history" of suffering,
Moltmann argues that it has been overcome in the "once
and for all" event of the Cross. However, this victory
will only become complete in the new creation, with "the
resurrection of the dead, the murdered and the gassed",
and "the healing of those in despair who bear lifelong
wounds". Metz demurs, in that while accepting the
definition of the Cross as a "once and for all event", he
challenges the appeal to eschatological verification. The
Cross-Resurrection does not resolve the problem of the
"anti-history" of suffering, but articulates a single
response to it. Suffering constitutes an "incriminating
presence", even within the new creation. 32 Whereas,
Moltmann reformulates the theology of the Cross as the
basis for a response to the problem of evil, Metz appeals
to the symbolism of Jesus' Descent into Hell. He suggests
that the incorporation of this symbolism into the
liturgical commemoration of the Cross and Resurrection
gives expression to theology's inability to resolve the
problem of evil. The symbol of the Descent into Hell
signifies the Church's acknowledgement of the challenge
posed by the "anti-history" of "the conquered and
defeated". Thus, the promise of the Resurrection
incorporates, rather than resolves, the question posed by
innocent suffering:
Christianity in its message of redemption, does not
offer definitive meaning for the unexpiated
sufferings of the past. It narrates rather a
distinct history of freedom: freedom on the basis of
a rede#Ting liberation through God in the cross of
Jesus.'
The "redeeming liberation" experienced in the Cross is
only meaningful if it finds expression in a commitment to
overcome the suffering of others.34
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However, as with Moltmann, there remains a suspicion
that, despite his claims to the contrary, Metz is
ultimately relying upon a form of eschatological
verification. In defending his interpretation of the Cross
and Resurrection, he asserts that the promise of the
future cannot be achieved at the expense of forgetting the
"anti-history" of suffering:
Resurrection mediated by the way of the memory of
suffering means: The dead, those already vanquished
and forgottqn, have a meaning which is as yet
unrealized.'
However, how can "those already vanquished and forgotten"
have an "as yet unrealized" meaning, unless it belongs to
the eschatological future? If this meaning does belong to
the future, then is Metz not guilty of offering a
potentially "definitive meaning for the unexpiated
sufferings of the past"? In 'Facing the Jews', he calls
for a Christian response to the Holocaust that views "the
scenario of history with the eyes of the victims".36
However, if those victims are to be the "vanquished and
forgotten" of the Holocaust, that is to say the
Muselmanner, then it is impossible to reconstruct "the
scenario of history": the Muselmann is, by definition,
beyond thought. 37 Thus, a theology that incorporates the
viewpoint of the "vanquished and forgotten" is necessarily
going to incorporate a degree of silence, in that such
experience is inaccessible to the outsider. Access to the
experience of victims is only possible through the voices
of survivors, or those victims who died, but left a record
of their experience, and thus cannot be fully identified
with the "vanquished and forgotten".
CONCLUSION: 
As a response to the Holocaust, the work of Johann Baptist
Metz is less systematically developed thasi that of
Rosemary Radford Ruether or JUrgen Moltmann. At this early
stage, two general criticisms can be made.
First, Metz differentiates between bourgeois and
messianic religion. However, to what extent is this an
arbitrary	 distinction?	 Is	 messianic	 religion	 an
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anachronistic concept, constructed to provide a yardstick
for judging Church history? Is it in fact as artificial a
construct as Ruether's "ideal", pre-Fall version of
Christianity? The difference being that the arbitrary,
anachronistic character of the latter is freely
acknowledged. If "messianic religion" is an arbitrary
construct, is there any basis for Metz' hope that it will
supplant "bourgeois religion"? Faith in History and
Society and The Emergent Church provide a detailed
description of messianic religion, but fail to provide a
programme for bringing it into being, or for "converting"
the adherents of bourgeois religion. The assumption
appears to be that the latter will acknowledge the
validity of Metz' critique and adopt a similar viewpoint.
However, on the evidence of change since both books were
written (1980 / 1981), such an assumption appears to have
been wildly optimistic.38
Second, in responding to the work of Rosemary Radford
Ruether, the Jewish historian, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi
questions the value of a Christian call for "massive
repentanceu . 39 Both Ruether and Metz emphasise the need
for Christians to recognise and repent of the history of
anti-Judaism; the latter extends this call by arguing that
"Christians can form and sufficiently understand their
identity only in the face of the Jews". However, to what
extent is such a position valid. The need for "Knowledge
and acknowledgement of what has been done to the Jews in
the name of a crucified Messiah"" is unquestioned. It is
also essential that such awareness permeate Christian
theology; the criticisms of The Crucified God are not
levelled at Moltmann's failure to acknowledge the history
of anti-Judaism, but at his failure to allow this
knowledge to effect his theology; he continues to employ
the stereotypical language of anti-Judaism, and is
insensitive toward the negative symbolism of the Cross.
However, are Metz and Ruether's calls for a new basis to
Christian theology (either in dialogue with the Jews, or a
non-hierarchical form of Christianity) the only
alternatives to Moltmann's refusal to incorporate the
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acknowledgement of anti-Judaism into Christian theology?
Both approaches demand the repudiation of a substantial
proportion of Church history; and in Ruether's case, a
substantial amount of classical theology. Is either
expectation realistic? Yerushalmi suggests that such a
reformulation of theology is ultimately a luxury, solely
of concern to Christians. Jewish interest in a Christian
response to the Holocaust is limited to the practical
effect this has on Christian attitudes towards both Jews
and Judaism.41
It is ironic that Metz appears to be aware of this
fact, but fails to incorporate it into his theology. In
'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', he suggests that a
theology that is "unrelated to people and their concrete
situations must cease to exist", being "the very essence
of superficiality". 42 Yet the inherent danger in calling
for history to be seen "with the eyes of the victims" is
that such an approach will degenerate into precisely such
" superficiality". Merely to talk of viewing history "with
the eyes of the victims" suggests a privileging of the
testimony of those who can speak over that of the
MuselniAnner. Metz' approach is valid when employed
negatively, as in his critique of Moltmann's usage of
Night. However, he fails to provide a positive framework
for such an approach: he fails to build upon his
suggestion that theology be based upon a dialectic of
promise and "anti-history". Metz' analysis of the problem
of evil in connection with the symbolism of Jesus' Descent
into Hell serves to illustrate this failure: he fails to
disassociate himself from an appeal to eschatological
verification. Ultimately, Metz fails to draw the logical
conclusions from his own radical proposals. He neither
confronts the totality of the experience of victims (in
that he ignores the experience of the voiceless), nor the
possibility that the problem of evil (as posed by the
experience of the voiceless) cannot be incorporated within
the existing theological framework.
-257-
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Having said that it is insufficient merely to
acknowledge and repent of the history of anti-Judaism,
the significance of such acceptance cannot be
overestimated, as is illustrated by the struggles
within the major Churches over the public confession
of this history. See: Werner Krusche, 'Guilt and
Forgiveness: The Basis of Christian Peace
Negotiation', Forgiveness and Study Project, London:
New World Publications, 1987, 6-39; Amgen Moltmann,
'Forgiveness and Politics', 40-52; Geoffrey Wigoder,
Jewish-Christian Relations Since the Second World War.
2. See Moltmann's analysis of the German Protestant
Churches' response to the Holocaust, culminating in
the 1980 resolution of the Synod of the Evangelical
Church in the Rhineland, in 'Forgiveness and
Politics', 40-8.
3. Johann Baptist Metz, 'Christians and Jews after
Auschwitz', 29.
4. Johann Baptist Metz, 'Christians and Jews after
Auschwitz'; and 'Facing the Jews. Christian Theology
after Auschwitz', in eds. Schilssler Fiorenza and
Tracey, The Holocaust as Interruption, 26-33.
5. Metz, 'Facing the Jews', 30.
6. Ibid.
7. The question of Christian appropriation of the
Holocaust remains a live issue, as is illustrated by
the recent controversies over the beatification of
Edith Stein and the presence of a Carmelite Convent at
Auschwitz.
8. Metz notes that his own theological training remained
unaffected by the Holocaust, see 'Facing the Jews',
27-8.
9. Ibid. 31.
10. Ibid. 30.
11. Ibid. 29; 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 18-9;
Moltmann, The Crucified God, 277-8; Martin Jay,
Adorn°, London: Fontana, 1984, 48-9.
12. Metz, 'Facing the Jews', 26.
13. Metz, 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 20.
14. Ibid. 21.
15. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 207-14.
16. Johann	 Baptist	 Metz,	 'Messianic	 or	 Bourgeois
Religion', The Emergent Church, 1-16.
17. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society, 45.
18. Metz, The Emergent Church, 76.
19. Metz, 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 25.
20. Metz, The Emergent Church, 2.
-258-
21. Ibid. 3.
22. Ibid. 61.
23. Metz, 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 27.
24. Ibid. 26.
25. Metz, Faith in History and Society, 111.
26. Ibid. The theme of history as the "history of what has
prevailed", at the expense of "the conquered and the
defeated", recurs throughout Holocaust Literature.
See: Jean Am‘ry, At the Mind's Limits, 11; Tadeusz
Borowski, This Way to the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen,
trans. Barbara Vedder, (1959), New York: Viking
Penguin Inc., 1988, 131-4.
27. Metz, Faith in History and Society, 111.
28. Metz, 'Facing the Jews', 32.
29. Metz, 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 18.
30. Metz, The Emergent Church, 39.
31. Metz, Faith in History and Society, 231.
32. Ibid. 124.
33. Ibid. 129.
34. Ibid. 229.
35. Ibid. 113-4.
36. Metz, 'Facing the Jews', 28.
37. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 63-4.
38. Metz identifies Messianic religion with Liberation
theology, in 'Transforming a Dependent People: Toward
a Base Community Church', The Emergent Church, 82-94.
However, the extent to which such an assertion is
justifiable is questionable. Compare Rebecca Chopp's
analysis of Metz with her analyses of Gustavo
Gutierrez and Jose Miguez Bonino, The Praxis of
Suffering, 64-81, 46-63, 82-99.
39. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, 'Response to Rosemary Radford
Ruether', 106.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. 106-7.
42. Metz, 'Christians and Jews after Auschwitz', 22.
-259-
10. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN--AND CANNOT--BE SAID? 
10. 1. INTRODUCTION.
10. 2. THE CONTRASTING CLAIMS OF SPEECH AND SILENCE.
10. 21.THE EXPIRATION OF SPEECH.
10. 22.FALTERING SPEECH.
10. 3. RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST.
10. 4. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEODICY
OF PROTEST.
10. 5. THE REJECTION OF THEODICY: STARTING ALL OVER AGAIN.
10. 1. INTRODUCTION: 
The same challenge is faced by Judaism and
Christianity. Both are religions of redemption; both
proclaim a God who cares and the preciousness of the
human in the image of God. Both are covenanted
religions, predicated on the concepts of divine
initiatives and redemptive acts and human committed
responses and ways of living in order to advance and
participate in that salvation. The Holocaust is a
total assault on all these statements. It is
counter-testimony which undercuts the persuasiveness
of both r4igions and contradicts the hope which
they offer.'
All the responses considered thus far acknowledge, to a
greater or lesser extent, the status of the Holocaust as
counter-testimony to the redemptive claims of both Judaism
and Christianity. As counter-testimony, the Holocaust
presents a challenge analogous to that posed by previous
disasters (the destruction of the Second Temple, the
Expulsion from Spain). However, the majority of
respondents argue that the event constitutes historical
counter-testimony on an unprecedented scale, and thus
cannot be absorbed into the existing religious framework.2
In view of this unanimity, it is surprising to note that
only Wiesel (and to a lesser extent, Metz) considers the
implications of such an interpretation of the Holocaust
for religious language. The "total assault" of the
Holocaust cannot be confined to the impact of the event
upon the religious claims of Judaism and Christianity; the
language in which these claims are expressed is inevitably
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affected as well. It is illogical to assert, on the one
hand, that the Holocaust ruptures belief, with a
subsequent need for new theological categories; and on the
other, to deny that the same rupture has any substantial
impact upon religious language.
Wiesel's awareness of the impact of the Holocaust
upon religious language is a reflection of his awareness
of the dilemma facing the writer, particularly the
survivor-writer, who regards literature as both a
continuation of the victims' compulsion to bear witness,
and the erection of a tombstone to the dead. He is not
alone in regarding the conflict between speech and silence
0.4. 4
asAthe dominant themes of Holocaust literature. Silence
has a threefold significance. First, silence signifies
respect for the dead. Second, it symbolises the absence of
both the destroyed communities, and the six million
individuals who died. Third, silence is a potential
response for the writer confronted with the inadequacy of
speech as a vehicle for communicating the experience of
the Holocaust. However, the writer is also compelled to
speak. Bearing witness is an imperative, handed on to the
living by the dead. Speech is an essential weapon against
forgetfulness: to allow the dead to be forgotten is
considered the equivalent of killing them a second time.3
The refusal to speak can also serve to invite a repetition
of the Holocaust. To remain silent can be construed as an
abdication of responsibility: speech is essential, if the
lessons of the past are to be both communicated and
learnt. Holocaust literature suggests two broad responses
to the dilemma posed by the conflicting claims of speech
and silence: "expiration" and "faltering speech". In the
case of the former, speech ultimately fails; a failure
that has radical repercussions for the writer.
The dilemma facing the Holocaust writer parallels
that facing the theologian. The consensus is that a
religious response to the Holocaust must be faithful to
both the belief and unbelief generated during the
Holocaust: one cannot be privileged at the expense of the
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other. However, despite this consensus in theory, only
Wiesel maintains the tension between belief and unbelief
in practice. Both Berkovits and Fackenheim implicitly
privilege belief over unbelief; whereas Rubenstein
sacrifices the assertion of belief in order to emphasise
the integrity of those who lost faith. The parallel with
the dilemma facing the Holocaust writer is evident: at one
end of the spectrum is the total breakdown of speech about
God (Rubenstein); at the other, the refusal to allow the
Holocaust to radically effect belief (the prevalent
attitude among Orthodox Jews, as articulated by the
current British Chief Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits. 4 ). Between
these two poles lies a series of variations, with belief
being articulated in an ambivalent manner reminiscent of
faltering speech. Irving Greenberg identifies such a
position as "moment faith", lived between the experiences
of Sinai and Auschwitz. "Moment faith" finds its fullest
expression in the work of Elie Wiesel. The inference being
that his awareness of, and response to, the conflicting
claims of speech and silence is paralleled by an awareness
of the need to incorporate both belief and unbelief into a
religious response to the Holocaust.
It is an irony that the closest Christian parallel to
Wiesel's awareness of the correspondence between an
awareness of the limitations of language as a vehicle for
expressing atrocity, and the need to maintain the tension
between belief and unbelief, is found within contemporary
philosophy of religion's concern over the ethical validity
of theodicy, rather than in the Christian responses of
Rosemary Radford Ruether, JUrgen Moltmann, and Johann
Baptist Metz. Ruether is acutely sensitive to the need for
an inner critique of anti-Judaism within Christian
religious language. However, although calling for a total
reformulation of Christian theology in response to the
Holocaust, she limits her critique of language to the
presence of hierarchical stereotypes, rather than
addressing the question of religious language per se. As
has been shown, the major weakness in Moltmann's approach
lies in his non-critical usage of stereotypical language
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(marking a failure to recognise the need for an inner
critique of anti-Judaism in Christian theology) and
Christian symbolism. Metz acknowledges the need for a
reformulation of religious language in response to the
Holocaust: Christians are dependent upon listening to what
the Jews qua victims have to say about God. This position
arises out of his call for religious language per se to
incorporate the perspective of the "conquered and
defeated", as well as that of the "successful and the
established". However, Metz fails to consider the full
ramifications of either idea.
All three respondents follow the pattern of Jewish
responses in acknowledging the status of the Holocaust as
radical counter-testimony _ _. Thus, the
context of a Christian response to the event is provided
by the question of theodicy. Both the Jewish and Christian
responses considered here are unanimous in rejecting the
traditional theodicy of "for our sins we are punished".
Wiesel and Rubenstein reject theodicy in any form; whereas
Berkovits and Moltmann (and possibly Fackenheim and Metz)
appeal to theodicy in the form of eschatological
verification.
It is perhaps significant that the closest parallels
to Wiesel are found, not in a Christian response to the
Holocaust, but in the complementary realm of philosophy of
religion, where there has been detailed discussion of both
the ethical validity of theodicy as a response to the
problem of innocent suffering, and the effect that the
rejection of theodicy has upon religious language. The
rejection of theodicy has led to conclusions that
resemble, albeit in more developed form, those reached by
Johann Baptist Metz. The parallels between Wiesel and the
questions occupying	 philosophy of religion reflect a
n4,a
shared concern }.with challenge posed by the individual who
protests his innocence, and rejects theodicy as an
inappropriate response on moral grounds. The consensus
being that, even if theodicy provides an intellectually
consistent "justification" for the existence of evil and
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innocent suffering, it is a "justification" that belongs
in a different dimension to, and therefore fails to
address, the experience of the victim. The connection
between a response to the Holocaust and concern over the
ethical validity of theodicy is explicitly drawn by John
Roth in his essay, 'A Theodicy of Protest'. 5 Roth strives
to preserve theodicy through the incorporation of protest,
as symbolised by Wiesel's Trial of God. However, as with
Moltmann's attempt to incorporate Ivan Karamazov's moral
rebellion within a theology of the Cross, the protest
serves to subvert the supporting framework: the Trial of
God is an expression of moral dissatisfaction with
theodicy as a response to the problem of innocent
suffering; such dissatisfaction cannot be harnessed in the
defence of the moral validity of theodicy.
cn- Ck rt,5 k Cu." vat i).0	•
Thus, if A is to be consistent with the perspective
of Wiesel, it too must be built upon the rejection of
theodicy. It is ironic that the Christian thinker who
mostly closely parallels his position on this point is the
British philosopher of religion, Stewart Sutherland; the
irony lies in the fact that Sutherland never directly
addresses the subject of the Holocaust. It is the
contention of this thesis that his work on theodicy and
religious language provides the most effective basis for a
Christian response to the Holocaust.
10. 2. THE CONTRASTING CLAIMS OF SPEECH AND SILENCE: 
In writing about the Holocaust, the writer is confronted
by the conflicting claims of speech and silence. Pictured
diagrammatically, speech and silence constitute two poles,
both of which are deemed unacceptable. Silence is
ultimately hermetic: it closes off access to the
Holocaust. Speech is inadequate: it proves incapable of
communicating the totality of the writer's experience, and
thus runs the risk of distorting the nature of the event.
Ambivalence towards speech as a vehicle for communicating
experience forms a recurrent theme in literature, but
reaches crisis point when confronted by the Holocaust.6
Uniqueness lies not in the conflicting claims of speech
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and silence per se, but in the events that gave rise to
them, and in the consequences for the writer who fails to
resolve this conflict. The Holocaust writer is struggling
to represent the mechanised mass-slaughter of both
individuals and communities; a slaughter that involved the
eradication of all traces of the victims. The writer has
both to represent the eradication of this trace, and to
recreate what has been lost as a "tombstone" to the dead:
literature fulfils the function of lamentation for the
dead. Thus, the very act of writing serves to emphasise
what has been lost, and the inability of literature to
fulfil its commemorative function: having re-created the
lives of individuals and communities, the writer has to
re-enact their loss. The failure to resolve, however
ambivalently, the conflicting claims of speech and silence
often results in the physical self-destruction of the
writer.
Holocaust writers adopt two clearly identifiable
strategies for resolving the conflict between speech and
silence; one negative, one positive (although in this
context, the term "positive" demands qualification). The
negative strategy results in the "expiration" of speech,
either through death or a self-imposed literary silence.7
Although this strategy is usually associated with the work
of the German-speaking poets, Paul Celan and Nelly Sachs8,
it can more effectively be illustrated by reference to the
post-war career of the Polish writer, Tadeusz Borowski.
Self-strangulation via the expiration of speech signifies
the nadir in the spectrum of strategies for responding to
the conflicting demands of speech and silence. The
majority of Holocaust writers consciously avoid this
nadir, by adopting a more positive, albeit still
ambivalent, attitude toward speech. The decision to
embrace speech is never unambiguous; the writer remains
acutely conscious of the limitations of his chosen medium.
Hence, the decision to describe this second strategy as
"faltering speech" 9 : the writer speaks, yet remains
conscious of the gulf between both his own experience as a
survivor and that of the victims, encapsulated in the
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symbol of the Muselmann; and between those with personal
experience of the Holocaust, and those who were "outside".
Unlike the writer who follows a strategy of expiration,
the writer who employs "faltering speech" elects to allude
to, rather than signify, the extermination of the six
million Jews and the destruction of the Shtetl culture of
Eastern Europe. The elusiveness of the connection between
the experience of the Holocaust and its representation
becomes a dominant theme for such writers. The strategy of
"faltering speech" can be most clearly illustrated by
reference to the work of Elie Wiesel.
10. 21. The Expiration of Speech: 
In A Double Dying, the literary critic, Alvin Rosenfeld
coins the term "the poetics of expiration" to describe the
drying up of the writer's--and more specifically, the
poet's--speech. The poet elects to become figuratively
silent in order to represent the physical silence of the
"Six Million". Rosenfeld specifically coins the term
"expiration" because of its capacity to allude to the
temptation for this literary strategy to find practical
expression in the subsequent physical silence of the poet,
through suicide (Celan) or madness (Sachs). Although
Rosenfeld confines "expiration" to poetry, it represents a
general strategy in Holocaust literature for resolving the
conflicting claims of speech and silence: the closing down
*i.
or failure of the writer's speech serves/.reflect the
"expiration" of those who died. The most extreme version
of this strategy is found, not in the work of Celan or
Sachs, but in that of Tadeusz Borowski. There is a general
consensus among literary critics that his suicide can only
be viewed as inevitable, in the light of his
interpretation of the Holocaust.
Borowski was a member of the Polish intelligentsia in
Warsaw, prior to his arrest in 1943. He was sent to
Auschwitz as a political prisoner and remained there until
the summer of 1944, when he was evacuated to Germany. He
was liberated from Dachau on May 1, 1945. After five
months in a displaced persons camp, and a brief period in
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Paris, Borowski returned to Warsaw on May 31, 1946.
Although he published one volume of poetry, Wherever the
Earth, in the winter of 1942, his reputation was
established by two volumes of short stories: Farewell to
Maria (1947), a collection of stories about his
experiences in Auschwitz and Dachau; and World of Stone
(1948), about the D. P. camps in Germany and his return to
Warsaw. These two volumes were re-published together
posthumously in 1959 under the title, This Way for the
Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen. Shortly after the publication
of these two volumes, Borowski became a member of the
Communist party. Under the influence of Stalinist
socialist realism, he abandoned literature for a career in
journalism. 10 On July 1, 1951, aged twenty eight,
Borowski gassed himself. He himself described Farewell to
Maria as "a voyage to the limit of a particular
experience"; the consensus among both his Polish
contemporaries and literary critics is that Borowski's
suicide constitutes the final statement in this literary
"voyage". 11u 11
It is necessary to set This Way for the Gas, Ladies
and Gentlemen against the background of post-war, Eastern
European Literature. Borowski's compatriot and
contemporary, the poet Czeslaw Milosz argues that this
literature was driven by the desire to eradicate
"emotional luxuries". In his analysis of the place of the
intellectual in Stalinist Eastern Europe, The Captive
Mind, Milosz lays out the criteria for a literature devoid
of "emotional luxuries":
The work of human thought should withstand the test
of brutal, naked reality. If it cannot, it is
worthless. Probably only those things are worth
while which can preserve their validity in the eyes
of a man threatened with instant death.12
Only literature depicting "naked reality" was deemed
valid. However, is not the imposition of such a yardstick
self-defeating? Can literature ever preserve its "validity
in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death"?
Borowski's answer is a negative one, hence his decision to
embrace Communism and socialist realism. His suicide was a
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response to an increasing disillusionment with both
alternatives. 14
The stories in This Way for the Gas, Ladies and
Gentlemen represent a confrontation with the "naked
reality" of the Holocaust, and as such have been described
(Sic)
as "the cruelestiof testimonies to what men did to men,
and a pitiless verdict that anything can be done to a
human being.". 14 For Borowski, Auschwitz represents
reality in microcosm. Both morality and previous history
are understood by reference to his personal experience in
the deathcamps. 15 By eschewing any wider sense of
historical or moral perspective, he strives to represent
the "naked reality" of the Holocaust. The desire to
portray "naked reality" informs Borowski's choice of
language. Sidra Ezrahi and James Young both note that the
language he employs is as "concentrated" as 11;,
interpretation of Auschwitz. 16 This Way for the Gas,
Ladies and Gentlemen is noticeable for the almost total
absence of metaphor; the metaphors that are employed are
self-referential: the metaphors for describing Auschwitz
are drawn from the life of the camp. Thus, the use of
metaphor serves to emphasise the self-enclosed character
of l'univers concentrationnaire:
Rather than risking a dilution of these experiences,
or an escape or transcendence of them through
metaphor, Borowski would concentrate the reader's
mind through metaphor, doublir the impact (not
mitigating it) through analogue.
To illustrate the point: Borowski describes the self-
enclosed existence of Auschwitz through recourse to a
metaphor alluding to the use of Zyklon B, a chemical
originally used for delousing, in the gas chambers--
delousing being a euphemism employed by the Nazis to
describe the gassing process:
The camp had been sealed off tight. Not a single
prisoner, i pot one solitary louse, can escape through
the gate."
For Borowski, the Holocaust lays bare the veneer of
civilization, revealing the primal struggle for survival
underneath. The concentration camp is merely the means by
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which one group exerts control over less powerful groups.
Existence in the camps reflects a similar pattern. The
political prisoners survive by dominating less powerful
groups in the camp hierarchy: the Gypsies and the Jews.
Consistent with this interpretation, several of the
stories in This Way Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen
are narrated from the perspective of a collaborator with
the system, for whom Auschwitz is "home". This authorial
identification is a conscious literary strategy.19
Borowski's adopted persona reflects his interpretation of
Auschwitz:
The first duty of Auschwitzers is to make clear just
what a camp is But let them not forget that the
reader will unfailingly ask: But how did it happen
that you survived? ... Tell, then, how you brought
places in the hospital, easy jobs how you
brought women, men, what you did in the barracks,
unloading the transports, at the gypsy camp; tell
about the daily life of the camp, about the
hierarchy of fear, about the loneliness of every
man. But write that you, you were the ones who did
this. That a portion (4, the sad fame of Auschwitz
belongs to you as well."
Morality in Auschwitz, or in a book about Auschwitz, is
deemed an "emotional luxury".
The absence of a moral voice combines with the self-
referential use of metaphor to generate a dead-pan tone
that verges upon the flippant. There is no sense of
respect or mourning for the dead, as in the work of Primo
Levi or Elie Wiesel. This deadpan tone serves to highlight
further the brutality of Borowski's subject-matter: there
is no attempt to minimise or gloss over the "naked
reality" of Auschwitz. The very title chosen for the first
of his short stories,'This Way for the Gas, Ladies and
Gentlemen', typifies this approach.
Borowski's "concentrated" interpretation of Auschwitz
persists after liberation: the survivor has been violated.
The effects of such an experience remain even after the
cause (the deathcamps) has been removed. The survivor
continues to interpret reality by the criteria of the
concentration camp:
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Concentration camp existence ... taught us that the
whole world is really like a concentration camp; the
weak work for the strong, and if they have no
strength or 110,11 to work--then let them steal, or
let them die."
The survivor is confronted by both his inability to escape
from the "standards" of concentration-camp existence,and
an unwillingness to acknowledge the extent to which he
"collaborated" with these "standards".22
In Borowski's case, the inability to escape from the
"standards" of the deathcamps generates a nihilistic
attitude to society--a nihilism that proves increasingly
incompatible with continued speech. The relationship
between the survivor in his stories and society is one of
radical discontinuity: the survivor continues both to see
himself as outside the boundaries of society, and to see
society as a collaborator with the rhime that excluded
him. In 'World of Stone', Borowski represents this
discontinuity in apocalyptic terms:
Sometimes it seems to me that even my physical
sensibilities have coagulated and stiffened within
me like resin Through half-open eyes I see with
satisfaction that once again a gust of the cosmic
gale has blown the crowd into the air ... sucked the
human bodies into a huge whirlpool And I see that
this weird snarl, this gigantic stew concocted out
of the human crowd, flows along the street down the
gutter, and seeps into pace with a loud gurgle,
like water into a sewer."
Such a wealth of imagery stands in stark contrast to the
scarcity of metaphor in the stories depicting
concentration-camp existence. However, the imagery remains
self-referential: it is limited to the representation of
impersonal, destructive force. "Naked reality" has given
way to an apocalyptic vision of the destructive force
unleashed by Nazi Germany. The whole passage serves to
underline the isolation of the survivor, and the gulf
separating him from the "human crowd".
In the context of Borowski's desire to portray the
"naked reality" of the deathcamps, literature itself is
deemed to be an "emotional luxury". Having written about
his experiences in Auschwitz and Dachau, and upon
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liberation, there was nothing more to be said. Milosz
suggests that Borowski's interest in journalism represents
an attempt to both communicate and act upon the lessons of
Auschwitz. The embracing of Stalinism constitutes an
attempt to oppose force with force: if Auschwitz teaches
that history can only be interpreted in terms of
domination and power, then the only response is to adopt a
reading of history that is capable of opposing Nazism.
Borowski "reads" his personal experience as proof of the
irrelevance of the individual, and more specifically, the
victim, in history; a reading that feeds naturally into a
Stalinist conception of reality. Borowski's suicide
suggests that the perceived equation between Stalinism and
the lessons of "naked reality", as learnt in the
deathcamps, was no longer held to be convincing.
Borowski's literary strategy can be interpreted in
terms of "expiration": such an analysis of the deathcamps
renders continued speech impossible. The absence of any
external frame of reference ensured that his "meaning-
making capacity" remained "interned". Borowski's suicide
can thus legitimately be viewed as the inevitable result
of this inability to break free of, or utilise, his
personal experience of the camps:
In a way, his incarceration might ... be said to
have lasted from 1943 to 1951 .... The outer world
became an extension of the camps--a world he could
never leave. Walled in by his governing tropes,
Borowski killed himself, by gas in,1951, yet another
extension perhaps of camp figures."
This total reliance on Holocaust-based language deprived
Borowski of any positive counter-balance for his
experience of the deathcamps. Whereas Wiesel juxtaposes
the negative witness of the Holocaust with the positive
values of the covenant (particularly as symbolised by his
pre-war childhood in Sighet), Borowski can only view the
Holocaust in negative terms: it has become exclusively
self-referential. His brief support for Stalinism can be
understood as an attempt to locate a contextual framework
(albeit one consistent with his experience of Auschwitz:
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the deathcamps inform his interpretation of Stalinism,
rather than vice versa).
Thus, Borowski's brief career serves to illustrate
the literal "expiration" of the writer's voice when
confronted by the Holocaust. Language has proved incapable
of passing Milosz's test of "naked reality". In this
instance, literature is replaced, first by journalism, and
then by silence. This Way for the Gas, Ladies and
Gentlemen is the most radical attempt to date to describe
the Holocaust in a manner devoid of "emotional luxuries".
The attempt to portray "naked reality" places too great a
strain on both language and the writer, and thus it
ultimately proves self-defeating. If a response to the
Holocaust is to be effective, it requires the presence of
an external framework. Furthermore, we might ask if it is
not the case that the simple fact of the writer's survival
undercuts any attempt to portray the "naked reality" of
the Holocaust: the survivor writes from a perspective
alien to his "characters". The writer who adopts a
strategy of "expiration" ignores the fact that his work
can never be a pure act of mimesis. It is inevitably an
act of re-creation, and as such, necessarily adopts a
viewpoint that is only available to the survivor.
10. 22. FALTERING SPEECH: 
The alternative to "expiration" is to affirm the positive
function of speech as a vehicle for communication. Even
so, this affirmation remains ambivalent: the writer
continues to be acutely conscious of the limitations of
speech. It is acknowledged, either implicitly or
explicitly, that the survivor / writer is incapable of
representing the "naked reality" of the Holocaust.
It is significant that the majority of Holocaust
writers avoid explicitly portraying the reality of the
deathcamps. Apart from memoirs (such as Primo Levi's If
This is a Man or Wiesel's Night), very few writers situate
their work in the deathcamps. The majority of novels
concentrate upon Jewish community life prior to
deportation. Emphasis is placed upon the struggle for
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survival of individuals and communities. 24 The existence
of the deathcamps is acknowledged, either by allusion25,
or second-hand reports. 26 The reader completes the text by
bringing to bear his own knowledge of the Jews' eventual
destination and fate. Thus, these texts are marked by an
emphasis upon the life of the Shtet1 communities prior to
deportation, rather than upon their deaths. Literature
becomes both an act of resurrection (the Shtetls now only
exist in fiction), and an act of commemoration (writing
takes the place of traditional lamentation).27
A second difference between "faltering speech" and
"expiration" lies in the appeal to a set of values other
than the "standards" of the deathcamps. Even memoirs of
the camps avoid Borowski's self-referentiality through the
incorporation of a moral voice; a memory of the
alternative values of pre-Holocaust existence. Emphasis is
placed upon the discontinuity between the writer's life
before the war and his experience during the Holocaust.
Thus, rather than being a representation of the world in
microcosm, the camps are seen as an alien world--l'univers
concentrationnaire- -within the known world. The memoir,
and any subsequent novels, chart the writer's attempt to
reconcile these two worlds. In the memoir, the values of
pre-camp existence are reflected in the narrator's
struggle to establish and maintain human relationships. In
Night, there is the recurrent motif of Wiesel's
relationship with his father; in If This is a Man, there
is Levi's friendship with Alberto and Lorenzo. Both
writers credit their survival, in part, to such reminders
of an alternative reality.
Both the self-imposed limitation in subject matter
and the recourse to an alternative worldview represent
deliberate literary strategies. Wiesel and Levi suggest
that an additional limitation is imposed on them: their
very survival limits their experience of the Holocaust.
The problem confronting the survivor-writer is
encapsulated in the image of the Muselmann. 28 The now
-273-
archetypal description of the Muselmann is provided by
Primo Levi:
the muselmiinner, the drowned, form the backbone of
the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and
always identical, of non-men who march and labour in
silence, the divine spark already dead within them,
already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to
call them living: one hesitates to call their death
death, in the face of which thex nhave no fear, as
they are too tired to understand.'
It is the Muselmann who encapsulates the Nazis' "success"
in dehumanising their victims, and thus symbolises the
essence of l'univers concentrationnaire. As a "non-
subject", the Muselmann is unable to communicate his
experience, as he is, by definition, dumb. The survivor
therefore speaks both on his own behalf, and on behalf of
the Muselmitnner. However, as the Muselmann is incapable of
speech, his experience is necessarily inaccessible. The
survivor is re-creating the experience of those who died
on the limited basis of his own experience. His witness
can therefore only ever be a part of the whole, pointing
to what necessarily remains unsaid.
The survivor-writer remains acutely conscious that he
is able to write, precisely because he never stood in the
place of total experience in relation to the Holocaust.
Those who stood in the place of total experience--the
Muselminner—cannot speak. The survivor defends his self-
appointment as spokesman for the dead on the grounds that
only the survivor can have any idea of the experience of
those who died. If the survivor does not speak, the
experience of the Holocaust would become totally, rather
than partially, inaccessible.
Thus, both the speech and the witness of the
survivor-writer can be termed "faltering". Speech falters
because of the inherent difficulties in communicating the
experience of mass atrocity. 3° The testimony of the
survivor is "faltering" in view of the twofold gulf
perceived to exist: between the experience of the survivor
and that of the Muselmann; and between the survivor and
those with no personal experience of the Holocaust.
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Ambivalence toward language becomes an integral element in
the survivor-writer's style. There is an inevitable irony
in Primo Levi's lyrical description of the Muselminner,
who are--by definition--silent. Wiesel's literary style is
similarly fluent. The language both writers employ serves
to underline the gulf between the survivor-writer and his
subject matter. An alternative strategy is to employ
silence or dumbness as motifs. Instead of striving to echo
the silence of the dead, or the "dumbness" of the
submerged (as is the aim of "expiration"), "faltering
speech" strives to represent this silence figuratively,
eschewing mimetic realism.
"Faltering speech" differs from "expiration", in that
there is no attempt to portray the "naked reality" of the
Holocaust. It is acknowledged from the start that such a
strategy is self-defeating. The intention is instead to
provide outsiders with access to the event. Equally
significant is the survivor-writer's desire to rehumanise
the abstract figure of Six Million. A further problem
arises with the dying-out of the generation of eye-
witnesses. The speech of second-hand accounts of the
Holocaust is inevitably of a different kind to that of
survivors: such accounts are even further removed from the
reality being described. The imperative to speak remains
binding, but the consciousness of the limitations of
language as a vehicle for communication increases.
Survivors suggest that the legitimacy of second-hand
accounts depends upon the extent to which they listen to
the testimony of those who were there, i.e. on the extent
to which they acknowledge the privileged status of victim
and survivor testimony. This criterion of legitimacy is
recognised by both Jewish and Christian theologians.
10. 3. RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST: 
The theologian is confronted by a conflict of claims
parallel to that facing the Holocaust writer. Whereas, the
former is torn between the conflicting demands of speech
and silence, the latter is compelled to affirm both belief
and unbelief as authentic responses to the Holocaust.
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Contemporary religious responses to the Holocaust covered
the spectrum from messianic or apocalyptic interpretations
(Elchonon Wassermann), through the "authentic" Judaism of
the Hasidim and the Orthodox, to contention with God and
the loss of belief (as depicted in Night). The majority of
Jewish thinkers agree that it is necessary for a post
facto religious response to reflect the breadth of this
spectrum. The theologian who comes after the event does
not have the right to question the validity of any of
these responses. However, how is the theologian to affirm
belief and unbelief simultaneously? The difficulties
inherent in responding to this question can be illustrated
from the work of Eliezer Berkovits and Fackenheim who,
despite their protestations to the contrary, resolve the
dilemma by privileging belief over unbelief. Irving
Greenberg and Elie Wiesel suggest that the only resolution
to this dilemma lies in the acknowledgement that neither
belief nor unbelief provides a sufficient basis for a
religious response to the Holocaust: a response is
generated in the "borderlands" between the two; either
belief is incorporated into unbelief (moral rebellion), or
unbelief becomes an integral part of belief (the Trial of
God).
Whereas Rubenstein emphasises unbelief at the expense
of belief, and Berkovits and Fackenheim privilege the
latter to the exclusion of the former, Greenberg and
Wiesel strive to sustain the tension between the two.
Greenberg suggests that belief is only possible after the
Holocaust in the form of "moment faith". The silence of
God during the Holocaust stands as radical counter-
testimony to His presence on Mount Sinai. Faith has to
bear witness to the integrity of both experiences. The
immediacy of the Holocaust must not be allowed to obscure
the memory of the Exodus; nor must the certainty generated
by the Exodus be allowed to obscure the anguish generated
by the Holocaust. As "moment faith", belief incorporates
the reality of anguish and doubt:
Faith is living life in the presence of the
Redeemer, even when the world is unredeemed. After
Auschwitz, there are moments when the flames and
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smoke of burning children blot out faith. But even
when faith reasserts itself, Wae smoke of Auschwitz
obscures the presence of God.'
The memory of Auschwitz does not eradicate covenantal
faith, but its immediacy does serve to obscure any
positive sense of the divine presence. As a result, post-
Holocaust religious language acquires an inherent
ambiguity, reflecting the tensions generated by the
simultaneous affirmation of the presence and absence of
God.
Neither traditional covenantal faith nor atheism is
deemed to be a sufficient response to the Holocaust.
Greenberg suggests that the appropriate response to the
event would be a period of silence in theology. After the
Holocaust, the only meaningful theological statements are
those "credible in the presence of burning children".32
Such a criterion, as was the case with Milosz's of "naked
reality", can only result in silence: no theological
statement would be credible in the "presence of burning
children". Hence Greenberg's suggestion that there be a
period of silence in theology. The appropriate religious
response to the Holocaust is practical, rather than
theological: the only meaningful religious response lies
in the practical re-creation of humanity in the image of
God. If the Holocaust is encapsulated in the symbol of the
Muselmann, then a religious response should concern itself
with the restoration of humanity as the image of God:
the overwhelming testimony of the six million is so
strong that it all but irretrievably closes out
religious language. Therefore the religious
enterprise after this event must see itself as a
desperate attempt to create, save, and heal the
image of God wherever it still exists.33
For Jews, this act of re-creation can take two forms: the
decision to bear children, and participation in the
struggle for human rights. Both actions signify an
affirmation of the continued meaningfulness of human
existence.
It is at this point that the flaws in Greenberg's
argument begin to emerge. If religious affirmation is
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identified with the decision to bear children or with
participation in the struggle for human rights, then the
division between religious and secular Jews is dissolved.
Such acts are deemed expressions of "faith", regardless of
the individual's motivation. Thus, Greenberg adopts a
strategy similar to that of Emil Fackenheim: he resolves
the dilemma of affirming both belief and unbelief by
incorporating the latter into the former.
Thus, of the Jewish thinkers considered, only Elie
Wiesel refuses to resolve the tension between belief and
unbelief. It is the thought of Wiesel, rather than that of
Greenberg that serves to illustrate the latter's concept
of "moment faith". Wiesel is adamant that after the
Holocaust the "true believers" are the "angry believer"
and the "angry non-believer". The "angry non-believer" (or
protest atheist) and the "angry believer" share a common
moral outrage at any attempt to respond to the problem of
innocent suffering by reference to theodicy: there is no
justification for innocent suffering. The victim is the
only person entitled to discover meaning in his own
suffering, or to offer forgiveness.
The dominant motif in both Wiesel's fiction and in
his biblical and hasidic portraits is that of the
individual sufferer proclaiming his innocence before God.
This motif is pushed to its limits in the Trial of God:
God is tried and found guilty on the basis of His
covenantal promises. Thus, the very notion of putting God
on trial is dependent on continued acceptance of the
covenantal framework. The difference being that in
Wiesel's thought, it is God, rather than His Chosen
People, who is guilty of covenantal unfaithfulness. He is
that the maintenance of the tension between belief and
unbelief is a positive, rather than a negative, influence:
it emphasises both the need and humanity's responsibility
for bringing about Tikkun. After the Holocaust, the divine
presence can only be experienced through Tikkun; which, in
turn, can only occur within a communal context. The
individual
	
recognises	 continuity,
	
as	 well	 as
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discontinuity, between his own anguish and that of the
wider community. Contention with God is only a valid
response if it arises from concern for others as well
as for oneself, and if it increases both the individual's
awareness of and sense of responsibility for Tikkun. As a
religious response to the Holocaust, contention is,in
effect, an expression of the individual's commitment to
covenantal ethics in spite of God's failure to fulfil His
promise to protect His people.
10.4. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEODICY OF 
PROTEST: 
The two issues that dominate discussion of Jewish
responses to the Holocaust are the adequacy of theodicy,
and the danger of privileging "positive" testimony.
Rubenstein and Wiesel are adamant in rejecting theodicy;
whereas, Fackenheim is equivocal, and Berkovits strives to
absorb the Holocaust within the existing theodicy of
Hester Panim. With regard to the privileging of testimony:
Wiesel alone succeeds in privileging neither belief nor
unbelief; resistance nor the silent testimony of the
Muselmanner. The same two issues cannot be said to
dominate Christian responses to the Holocaust. Not
surprisingly, emphasis is placed instead upon role played
by Christianity's history of anti-Judaism. Both Moltmann
and Metz consider the Holocaust in relation to the problem
of evil, but neither discusses the question in a depth
parallel to that found in the Jewish responses.
Ironically, an equivalent level of discussion is found,
not in direct responses to the Holocaust, but in the
related debate in philosophy of religion over the ethical
validity of theodicy.
Discussion of the problem of evil is dominated by
debate over the appropriateness of theodicy as a response
to the problem of innocent suffering. The challenge to
theodicy is held to be classically expressed by
Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov. The argument expressed is
that, even if theodicy offers an intellectually convincing
"justification" for the existence of evil, such an
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"explanation" belongs in a different dimension to the
reality of innocent suffering, and thus fails to address
the experience of the victim.34
To date, the most specific attempt to integrate
discussion of theodicy into a Christian response to the
Holocaust is found in the work of John Roth, most
specifically in his essay, 'A Theodicy of Protest'. Roth's
essay is part of a collection that strives to articulate a
theodicy that is "credible" in the light of the Holocaust-
-"the paradigm evil event to which theodicies now
refer.". 35 Roth's interest in theodicy arises out of his
engagement with the work of Elie Wiese1. 36 He roots his
response to the Holocaust in the premise that it is "the
paradigm evil event". 'A Theodicy of Protest' offers both
a critique of traditional theodicy, and outlines an
alternative response centred upon Wiesel's motif of the
Trial of God.
Traditional theodicy is defined as "human
vindications of God's justice in permitting evil to
exis t.". 37 . Evil is "activity" or "inactivity" that
"wastes": it "ignores and violates the sanctity of
individual persons u . 38 Theodicy, in the form of versions
of the free will defence that appeal to eschatological
verification, is dismissed on the grounds that it projects
an "instrumental view of evil", and thus "legitimates" it:
evil becomes the regrettable, but inevitable "price" of
the attainment of salvation through the exercise of free
will. 39
 Roth echoes Ivan Karamazov in rejecting an
"instrumental" conception of evil on the grounds that the
"price" is too high:
a protesting theodicy is skeptical because it will
not forget the futile cries. No good that it can
envision, on earth or beyond, is worth the freedom7A
enfeebled and empowered--that wastes so much life."
Roth is equally adamant in rejecting any theodicy
that compromises divine omnipotence. The need for theodicy
only arises if one believes that God is all-powerful:
If God raised Jesus from the dead, he had the might
to thwart the Holocaust before it ended.41
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Rather than compromise the assertion of divine
omnipotence, Roth qualifies the affirmation of God's
goodness. He interprets Wiesel's motif of the Trial of God
as an indictment of divine goodness: a God who permits
such "waste" cannot be all-good. Thus, contention with God
forms the basis of both Roth's critique of traditional
theodicy, and his alternative "theodicy of protest". He
responds to protest atheism by incorporating it within the
framework of a religious response as "anti-theodicy".
There are two obvious criticisms that can be levelled
against 'A Theodicy of Protest'.First, to what extent is
it appropriate to describe Roth's strategy as theodicy,
since he himself asserts that to "stay honest theodicy
needs anti-theodicy" ?42 For, what is there left of
theodicy in this approach? Roth persists with the
framework of theodicy, even though he is adamant in
dismissing any attempt to "explain", "justify" or
"legitimate" the existence of evil. However, what is
theodicy if not one of these three options? Second, can
contention with God or protest atheism be incorporated
within the framework of theodicy, even as "anti-theodicy"?
Roth ignores the fact both motifs depend upon the
rejection of theodicy: the moral outrage of the "angry
believer" / "angry non-believer" is generated by the
perceived inappropriateness of theodicy as a response to
innocent suffering. To incorporate either back into a
theodicy is to ignore the integrity of such outrage. The
incorporation of contention with God / protest atheism
shatters, rather than preserves, the credibility of
theodicy in the light the Holocaust, the "paradigm evil
event".
10. 5. THE REJECTION OF THEODICY: STARTING ALL OVER AGAIN: 
Contention with God and protest atheism both argue that
the reality of suffering as experienced by the victim
belongs in a "different dimension" to theodicy. If a
Christian response to the Holocaust is to be consistent
with the position articulated by Wiesel, then it must rest
on the premise that theodicy is an inappropriate response
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to the problem of evil. 'A Theodicy of Protest' fails to
meet this criterion: it merely serves to highlight the
incompatibility of contention with God / protest atheism
and theodicy. Thus, a religious response to the Holocaust
is both negative and positive. Negative in that it
provides a critique of theodicy; positive, in that it
suggests alternative criteria for our understanding of
faith and religious language. Wiesel and Greenberg suggest
that these alternative criteria lie primarily in a
recognition of the irreducible problem posed by the
counter-testimony of innocent suffering, and in the
acceptance that the victim's experience of suffering
provides the yardstick for religious language. An
analogous position is articulated by the British
philosopher of religion, Stewart Sutherland.43
Although Sutherland never directly addresses the
Holocaust, the parallels between his ideas and those of
Wiesel reflect a common interest in protest atheism. Much
of his work forms a dialogue with the thought of
Dostoyevsky and Camus. 44
 Furthermore, Sutherland's work
rests upon a premise analogous to that of "moment faith":
he asserts that a response to the problem of evil belongs
in the "borderlands" between belief and unbelief; in
maintaining the tension between the two. Like Wiesel, he
emphasises the closeness of the "angry believer" and the
angry non-believer" (protest atheist):
the boundaries between belief and unbelief are in
certain important respects quite unclear. Believers
who live close to the boundaries often share more
with neighbourly unbelievers than they do with
fellow believers who view the pastures of unbelief
as far distant and dangerous lppds from which they
will for ever remain separated."
Sutherland's understanding of living "close to the
boundaries" is analogous to Greenberg's concept of "moment
faith" (living life between the poles of Sinai and
Auschwitz). Both concepts reflect the conviction that the
anguish of protest / contention transcends the boundaries
of belief and unbelief: it reflects a common sense of
moral outrage rooted in solidarity with the victim."
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Sutherland's rejection of theodicy is based upon two
criteria analogous to those suggested by Wiesel and
Greenberg. The first of these criteria is the second of
five that serve to provide the framework for God, Jesus &
Belief:
A religious belief which runs counter ,tp our moral
beliefs is to that extent unacceptable.'"
Theodicy is rejected on the grounds that it demands the
acceptance of assertions that run "counter to our moral
beliefs". The "rebellion" of Ivan Karamazov serves to
illustrate the use of moral criteria as a critique of
philosophical and theological assertions: any
justification of suffering in terms of providence, the
free will defence, or eschatological verification is
rejected on the grounds that the moral "price" is too
high. Ivan's protest becomes the model for Sutherland's
suggested revision of theology and religious language:
we should refuse to allow moral convictions to be
overruled by appeals to 'higher ways' which are, we
are sometimes told,'God's ways': by incantations of
'mysteries' to which only someon,eb else is privy; or
by appeal to special revelation.'
However, cannot such a human formulation of moral
criteria be interpreted as an expression of Promethean
arrogance, promoting individual concerns at the expense of
a universal perspective? Sutherland acknowledges that such
moral criteria are necessarily limited in scope, but
disputes that this undermines their validity as the basis
of a response to the problem of evil:
Of course our moral convictions are our moral
convictions and we are poor fallible sinners. But
until they are changed by moral argument tlAn they
are the best moral convictions that we have."
The content of theology and religious language is
governed by a second criterion, that provides the starting
point for Sutherland's analysis of theodicy in 'God and
Evil: Starting All Over Again':
My intention is to begin with the plain fact of
suffering, and to see what can be said theologically
and religtmsly that is compatible with such a
beginning."
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This second criterion provides a working principle
analogous to those employed by Greenberg and Milosz: all
three thinkers test language against "naked reality". The
application of "the plain fact of suffering" as a
criterion leads Sutherland to conclude that the problem of
evil cannot be resolved by appeal to a "pre-formed"
theology: theology must be articulated in the light of
"naked reality". Thus, theology is that which can be said
concerning God that is compatible with the "plain fact of
suffering", and which does not run "counter to our moral
beliefs". Theodicy is to be rejected because it responds
to suffering in the light of a "pre-formed" theology and
fails to address the "bench-mark of reality".51
However, in adopting "the plain fact of suffering" as
the criterion for theology, is not silence the inevitable
result: what can be said about God that remains credible
in the light of such a criterion? Sutherland echoes
Greenberg in acknowledging that a degree of silence is
inevitable:
A theology which starts from the realities of
suffering and evil in the world cannot avoid a high
degrgq of agnosticism in its affirmations about
God."
Thus, religious language becomes consciously "faltering":
it acknowledges its own provisional character. Sutherland
suggests that an appropriate analogy is found in the
notion of pilgrimage: theology becomes a spiritual and
intellectual quest; a quest that "always includes the
possibility of thinking again". 53 The impulse to think
again is provided by confrontation with the "plain fact of
suffering".
CONCLUSION: 
Despite the common ground between "moment faith" and
Sutherland's understanding of the "borderlands" of belief
and belief, there would appear to be one major objection
to the creation of a Christian response to the Holocaust,
analogous to that of Wiesel, on the basis of the criteria
laid out in God, Jesus & Belief. Sutherland's appeal for
111 a high degree of agnosticism" appears to be closer to the
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reductionist approach of Richard Rubenstein than that of
Elie Wiesel: Wiesel's response to the Holocaust is rooted
in acceptance of a clearly defined religious tradition:
the covenant. However, Sutherland's approach is minimalist
rather than reductionist. Unlike Rubenstein, he does
reject the truth-content of particular beliefs or
theological concepts. Rather, he imposes limits on what
can--and cannot--be said. It is not the content of
theodicy that is rejected, as much as the notion that the
theologian is in a position to suggest a rationale for the
existence of evil. Hence, the choice of the term
agnosticism"--the belief that nothing can be known about
the existence of God. Such "agnosticism" is closer to
Wiesel's refusal to talk about God ("I never speak about
God now. I rather speak of men who believed in God or men
who denied God." 54 ), than to Rubenstein's assertion that
"there is neither judgement nor judge".
Thus, although Wiesel and Sutherland attach differing
degrees of weight to the "classical" tradition from which
they emerge, their critique of that tradition in the light
of historical counter-testimony (the Holocaust / the
"plain fact of suffering") derives from similar criteria:
dissatisfaction with theodicy as an appropriate response
to the problem of evil, and the assertion of the primacy
of moral beliefs over theological affirmations. The
difference is that Wiesel's moral beliefs are derived from
covenantal ethics. As a consequence, his "agnosticism" is
firmly rooted within the tradition. His position appears
less minimalist than that of Sutherland because he is part
of a tradition that interprets the covenant as a dialectic
between promise and counter-testimony. Thus, there is a
precedent within Judaism for the reinterpretation of the
covenant in the light of disaster. Those calling for a
reformulation of Judaism in response to the Holocaust can
appeal to the precedent of the rabbinic response to the
disasters of 70 and 135, and to Luria's reformulation of
Kabbalah in the aftermath of the Expulsion from Spain.
There is no analogous precedent in Christian theology.
Hence, whereas the responses of Fackenheim, Greenberg and
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Wiesel are held to fall within the spectrum of orthodoxy,
that of Sutherland is considered to be outside this realm.
However,	 despite	 this	 apparent	 unorthodoxy,
Sutherland's thought provides a potentially more
constructive basis for a Christian response to the
Holocaust, compared to that of Rosemary Radford Ruether or
Jurgen Moltmann. In one sense, his criteria for
approaching the problem of evil provide the framework that
is lacking in Johann Baptist Metz' call for Christian
theology to listen to the voices of victims. It is ironic
that, even though he never directly confronts the
Holocaust, Sutherland's work reveals greater sensitivity
toward the questions that dominant discussion of the
Holocaust: he recognises the implicit limitations in the
capacity of theology, and more specifically religious
language, to respond to the challenge posed by the "plain
fact of suffering". The adoption of a framework, such as
that suggested by Sutherland, would provide the basis for
a Christian response to the Holocaust in which the voices
of the victims could be heard, rather than be supplanted
or submerged by the "answers" suggested by theologians.
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